Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

326. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 6, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Pote Sarasin and Thanat Khoman²

I have forwarded separately my briefing memorandum³ on the above, with Stateʼs briefing book.⁴

You will be interested in the attached memo from Acting Secretary Katzenbach in this connection. It reports on a conversation between U. Alexis Johnson and the two Thai officials.

The main points were:

(1) That instead of a bilateral treaty at this time, we might consider a joint statement of mutual assurances. If this matter is raised, you may want to assure Pote and Thanat that we will see what can be worked out, perhaps for use at the time you meet with Prime Minister Thanom;⁵

(2) the Thai have been deeply upset by Senator Fulbrightʼs criticism of them and of U.S. policy toward them. Pote believes that, without engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if we could issue a statement after his and Thanatʼs call. The statement would reiterate our support for Thailand and for existing policy.

State supports this suggestion. I agree that it is reasonable.

A text of the proposed statement is attached.⁶ If you agree with this recommendation, you might want to show a draft of the statement to the two ministers.

Walt ⁷

Attachment

Washington, October 6, 1966.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson⁸

SUBJECT

• Your Appointment with Minister of National Development Pote Sarasin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman of Thailand

The following information is supplementary to that contained in the memorandum of October 4, 1966, on the foregoing subject transmitted to you by Secretary Rusk.⁹

Alexis Johnson had a long talk on Wednesday¹⁰ with Pote Sarasin on the desire that Foreign Minister Thanat has been expressing for a bilateral defense treaty with the United States, and a shorter talk with Thanat Khoman. Pote Sarasin, who is a very responsible and influential figure in the Government, told Alex that the Thai Government fully recognizes that to attempt to negotiate and obtain ratification of a bilateral treaty at this time would not be in the interest of either Government. It was his feeling that the necessities of the internal Thai political situation could be met by a confidential statement from you to the Prime Minister. He felt that the content of such a statement could be similar to things that we have previously said to the Thai Government in such a form as to enable Prime Minister Thanom to interpret the statement as a commitment to protect Thailand against Chinese Communist retaliation for U.S. use of Thai bases even if there should be a change in administration and in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. Alex pointed out that, to give such a statement a balanced character and the U.S. some assurance against a change in Thai Government policy with respect to Thai bases, in which we were investing so heavily, it would be desirable that something on this be said from the Thai side. Pote Sarasin felt that this was entirely reasonable. Johnson told him that he would see what could be worked out, perhaps for use at the time that you meet Prime Minister Thanom in Manila.

Subsequently, Johnson confirmed with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman that Thanat was reconciled to something less than a bilateral treaty but there was no discussion of details.

It is suggested that you not take the initiative in any detailed discussion of this subject with the two Ministers but, if it is raised by them, you simply indicate that you will be willing to consider something that could be discussed between you and the Prime Minister at the time of your meeting in Manila. We will submit a detailed recommendation to you in this regard.

Pote Sarasin also said that he did not think that the Thai Government would in the near future be willing to change its policy toward agreeing to more specific formal statements on our use of Thai bases for our air action against North Viet-Nam.

Pote Sarasin told Johnson that, while sophisticated Thais were well aware that Senator Fulbright did not represent a significant body of U.S. opinion, because of the Senatorʼs position as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the fact that his name is so well known in Thailand because of the Fulbright scholarship program, his statements deeply wounded and disturbed most Thais. He felt that, without directly engaging in a debate with Fulbright, it would be very helpful if the U.S. Government could make some statement which would in effect be a repudiation of Fulbrightʼs recent speech. We feel that this is reasonable and that the call of the two Ministers on you offers a good opportunity for making such a statement. We therefore suggest that, following their call, the White House Press Secretary issue a statement along the lines of the attached draft. It would be an appreciated and useful gesture if you would show this draft to the two Ministers.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. IV, Memos, 1/66–10/66. Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw it.
2. President Johnson met with Thanat Khomen and Pote Sarasin at 10:50 a.m. on October 7. William Bundy, William Jorden, and Thai Ambassador Sukich Nimmanheminda also were present. The meeting lasted until 11:05 a.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) No other record of this brief meeting has been found.
3. Dated October 6. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, W.W. Rostow, Vol. XIV, October 1–31, 1966)
4. Apparent reference to an October 4 memorandum from Rusk to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI–US)
5. Rostow added by hand the following at this point: “(in Bangkok.)”.
6. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1966, p. 669.
7. Rostow hand wrote the following comment after his signature: “This would help, sir.”
8. Secret; Nodis.
9. See footnote 3 above.
10. A summary of these discussions, Wednesday, October 5, was sent to Bangkok in telegram 61306, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI–US)