Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

324. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Martin)¹

Washington, September 23, 1966.

Dear Graham:

Yesterday I went to New York and invited Thanat to a lunch which just the two of us had in the Secretaryʼs suite. In brief, I found Thanat in the foulest mood I have ever seen him and for somewhat more than two hours we had the most acid conversation we have ever had.

I started out by telling him how well Bill Bundyʼs hearing had gone before the Foreign Relations Committee² and how no one had challenged or called into question the validity of our commitments to Thailand based on the SEATO Treaty and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué. This rolled like water off a duckʼs back and he immediately plunged into his request for a bilateral and the regularization of our use of Thai bases. There were long bitter tirades concerning the treatment of Thailand by the American press, some U.S. Senators, and so forth. In effect, Thailand was being called the prostitute of the United States. The situation was intolerable and would have to be corrected. There were many bitter words about U.S. willingness to give a NATO Treaty formula to the “white” countries of Europe but unwillingness to treat the “brown races” of Asia in a similar manner. There was much of the same talk that you had already gone through about our willingness to enter into bilaterals with other Asian nations but not with Thailand. Thailand was always left with the short end of the stick while we showed such great interest in our “great friends” such as Cambodia and India. He had made recommendations to his Government on the whole situation and they would either have to straighten it out or he would resign. SEATO was some “old furniture” which the “conservative Thai” were willing to let lie around but we shouldnʼt try to kid anybody into thinking that it was worth anything. We would have gone into Viet-Nam with or without SEATO just as we had gone into Lebanon without any treaty commitments. The Thai were exposing themselves to great danger without any assurances or guarantees from the United States. There was no problem with the present Administration in Washington but what would happen to Thailand if there was a change to an Administration which would disengage from Southeast Asia as was being advocated by so many Americans? How could I say that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee really did not have any influence on American policy or how could I assure him that the views of the Chairman and others like him would not ultimately prevail? In this situation, given the attitudes of some of these people, my statements that the de facto situation of American presence on Thai bases was their firmest guarantee of American reaction in the event of a Chinese attack might well not turn out to be correct. American reaction might be to shrink from the contest with China and withdraw, leaving Thailand to its fate, etc., etc., etc.

He drew a sharp distinction between the “presence” of American forces in Thailand and the use of American aircraft for “offensive” operations. He alleged that Thanom had told him that, while he had given permission for the introduction of American aircraft into Thailand, he had not given permission for their “offensive” use against North Viet-Nam. When I challenged him on this he pointed to the lack of any “written agreements” and, without walking away from his charge that Thanom had not given permission for the use of aircraft against North Viet-Nam, said that Thanom did not have the authority to give such permission on a matter so deeply involving the whole Government and that he had told this to Thanom.

We went round and round the circle of whatever enables us to bring more force to bear on the Vietnamese conflict and thus hastens a satisfactory settlement there contributes to Thai security and the allegation that U.S. “offensive” use of Thai bases increases the “dangers” to Thailand.

On the image of Thailand here in the United States, I told him I very honestly and objectively thought that it had been much improved in recent years and that he deserved much of the credit. I pointed out that in recent speeches I have cited him as an outstanding Asian leader who is bringing a sense of community to the area and otherwise went to great lengths in massaging him for his work with ASPAC, ASA, and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. I said that our inability to speak more specifically and officially with regard to Thai cooperation was inhibiting our ability to present a still better picture. This led him to say that, in speaking here, he was going to be open and specific and I pointed out that this would completely undercut the basis on which we had obtained executive rather than open hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I pointed out that, in spite of the inevitable newspaper leaks, we had rigorously sought to respect what we understood to be the Thai desires on this matter. All of this discussion led around to the only agreement we reached, which was that immediately on my return to Washington I would seek to devise a formula for consideration by both Governments which would surface military cooperation between ourselves and Thailand in the Vietnamese war.

The whole discussion reached the point at which I felt it essential that I categorically tell him that, whatever he might feel with regard to the matter or whatever the desires of our Administration might be, the political realities were that there was just no chance whatever of obtaining Senate ratification at this time of a bilateral U.S.-Thai treaty, especially one that would involve the NATO formula. His reply to this was, “Well, we now know where we stand.” I probed him hard on what he felt were the implications of this statement but got no place.

Following this exchange, he said that he was hereby formally withdrawing the request that the U.S. vote for him for the ICJ. I then returned to our regard for him as Foreign Minister, our hope that he would stay in the job and that he would especially continue to pursue the Asian-wide initiatives he had undertaken but that, if it became clear that this was not possible, we would vote for him for the ICJ. He did not acknowledge this except sometime later to imply that our vote would not be worth much unless we were prepared to give him support with others.

As a result of an inconclusive discussion that we had with regard to the formulae in the SEATO Treaty as compared with our bilaterals with other countries in the Pacific, it was agreed that I would get out the texts and make available an analysis to him.

There was no specific mention of MAP or other issue, nor was the SOFA specifically mentioned.

During the course of the conversation I pointed out that, if his concerns with regard to possible future trends in U.S. foreign policy were justified, a treaty such as he had in mind would not be of much help to Thailand and that we were entitled to have the same concerns with regard to the possible trends in the policy of future Thai governments. He did not deny this but felt that his obligations as Foreign Minister were to do all possible to assure that there was an unequivocal treaty relationship in such a manner that, if Thailand were attacked, U.S. failure to come to its assistance would be a clear treaty violation and thus constitute a maximum pressure on us to come to their help.

In sum, my interpretation of his statements and the implications was that, unless a satisfactory bilateral treaty relationship with the United States was established for the future and unspecified steps taken to make our present military relationship compatible with Thai sovereignty, the Thai Government would take unspecified steps with respect to at least “U.S. offensive” operations from Thai bases. If the Thai Government did not do this he would resign as Foreign Minister. However, I am unable to reconcile this with his assertion that he was seriously running for the ICJ. A possible interpretation is that, knowing that he was not going to get a bilateral from us and that he would not be supported in the Government with respect to present operations, he is already reconciled to resigning under circumstances in which, looking to the future, he can present himself as a stout Thai nationalist and defender of Thai sovereignty.

Incidentally, in reply to my question, he said that he was not coming to Washington. My feeling was that he did not want a rebuff on seeing the President. He was seeing the Secretary at 5:00 p.m. the same day and I of course briefed the Secretary on what had happened at the lunch. I deliberately did not attend his meeting with the Secretary. As you will see, he of course did not let down his hair in the same way to the Secretary but the essential lines remain the same.³

Both of us have seen Thanat in his many moods but yesterday was the worst in my own experience. My feeling was that it possibly arose as much from controversy with his own Cabinet colleagues—and especially the failure of Thanom and Dawee to cut him in on all aspects of the military picture—as it did from his hypersensitivity to disparaging American press stories and Congressional statements on Thailand. It was a day in which he was simply not open to reason—at least he would not admit so to me—and I can only hope that some of the things I said will, on reflection, have a little influence on his attitude for, as you know, I feel that he is a valuable man for both Thailand and Asia, and we need to do all possible to preserve him if that can be done.

The substance of the foregoing will of course be covered in various ways in official traffic but I thought it important that you have the full flavor. It has been written the following day amid the press of other matters but I believe I have covered most of the important profits. I regret that one of my last forays into Thai diplomacy was not very successful. My only hope is that getting some of this off his chest to me will have some cathartic effect.

Sincerely,

Alex ⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI–US. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text indicates that the original was pouched to Bangkok.
2. For the statement made by Bundy before the Committee, and the question and answer session by Bundy and Committee members, September 20, see Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. XVIII, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, 1966, pp. 927–1014. U. Alexis Johnson prepared a summary of the testimony and attached Bundyʼs prepared testimony as a note for the Presidentʼs reading on September 20. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, May/Sept 1966)
3. See Document 323.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.