Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

32. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

I–36036/67

Washington, October 13, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Australian Request for Consultations Regarding Future Security Arrangements in Malaysia/Singapore

On 10 October 1967 the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, called on the Secretary of Defense² and presented him with a paper entitled “Memorandum on the Defence of Malaysia” (copy enclosed). This document has also been given to the Secretary of State. Mr. Hasluck stated that Prime Minister Holt wished to make a statement in Parliament during the next four to eight weeks on his governmentʼs intentions regarding Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore, following the British withdrawal. Prime Minister Holt desires to know, before making this statement, to what extent the United States would be prepared to support Australia if it decides to retain its military presence in this area after the British depart.

In order that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense may be in a position to respond to the Australian Governmentʼs request for consultations on this matter, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the Secretary of Defense with their views and recommendations concerning strategic/military implications of the Australian Foreign Ministerʼs memorandum. In formulating these recommendations, it is requested that attention be given to the following additional questions:

1. What is the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area to the United States?

2. What are the principal advantages and disadvantages, from a military point of view, of the U.S. encouraging Australia and New Zealand to assume primary responsibility for the security of Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdraw?

3. To what extent could the U.S. military services make use of military facilities in Singapore and Malaysia, if these facilities were under Australian/New Zealand control, following the British withdrawal, and if it were determined to be in the U.S. interest to make use of such facilities?

In view of the Australian Ministerʼs request to the Secretary that this matter be “closely held”, it is requested that special care be taken to restrict dissemination of the enclosed memorandum. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are desired by 6 November 1967.

Paul C. Warnke ³

Attachment

Washington, October 9, 1967.

Memorandum on the Defence of Malaysia by the Australian Minister for External Affairs

A

Regional security needs to be a total security stretching from Korea to the Indian Ocean. Hitherto the United Statesʼ guarantees have formed a line as far as Thailand and the British have guaranteed the security of Malaysia and Singapore.

The new situation with which we have to deal has two different timetables:

(a) Before and after the total British withdrawal in the mid-seventies.

(b) Before and after the end of hostilities in Vietnam.

We do not know whether these two timetables will coincide or whether we have to make suppositions about further variations on them.

Broadly, we can talk of the “short-term” problem and the “long-term” problem in Malaysia and Singapore but these phrases at present can mean little more than “in the next few years” (say four, five or six) and “afterwards”.

B

In the short-term the military need in Malaysia and Singapore may not be great and no immediate threat from outside (except possibly insurgency from the Communist remnant in southern Thailand) can be seen. But the argument for a continuing Australian presence in Malaysia is strong.

(a) Malaysia and Singapore expect something from us.

(b) Morale, both in these countries and surrounding countries, needs to be maintained.

(c) A continuing presence may assist the effective development of self-defence capacity by Malaysia and Singapore.

(d) Once we went out we would probably be out for good and it would certainly be harder to get back in the event of an emergency.

C

In the long-term the general case for maintaining a presence in Malaysia is the same as the case for maintaining a guaranteed security in other parts of the region and the one cannot be separated from the other. It would be hard for us to stay in Malaysia as the only white-faced troops on the mainland and it would be equally hard for the United States to stay in other parts of Asia, even though the need existed, if we had pulled out of Malaysia.

The decisions both our governments make on any phase of regional security are intertwined. At this stage we seek consultation. We need understanding rather than commitments but, without these necessary understandings at this stage, difficulties could arise.

D

Among the questions we raise for discussion are the following:

1. Australia believes it is important for us to stay in Malaysia, but we certainly are unable to take over British responsibility or to replace Britain. We can only develop our own role (side by side, we hope, with New Zealand) up to the limits of our capacity, having regard to other commitments. What is to be that role? Does the United States agree that we should develop such a role?

2. Australia has already decided and announced a decision to give defence aid of $20 million (Australian) to encourage the development of Malaysian and Singapore defence over the next three years ($16 million to Malaysia and $4 million to Singapore). What else will be available (e.g. from Britain) either for economic assistance or for defence?

3. Australia has not yet made a final decision on its own military presence but the scale of this support will probably be of the same order as the present forces (a battalion, plus an A/A battery, plus some aircraft and a naval presence). New Zealand also has not made a decision but the indications are that their battalion, which has already been drawn upon for the Vietnam contingent, may be further reduced. In the short-term is this sufficient?

4. In the event of the need for any build-up of forces or movement and supply of larger numbers of forces, problems of logistic support may arise. Hitherto there has been some dependence on the British. Will there be a need for other logistic support?

5. In the event of hostilities or (in prospect of an increased threat) in the event of building up and movement of forces to meet such a threat, the question of the ANZUS commitment will arise. It has been our tacit understanding that Australia should not place herself in positions in which the ANZUS commitment might be involved without consulting the United States and that the United States will indicate its own views of how the commitment applies. Do we need to have further understandings about the ANZUS commitment if Australia and New Zealand stay in Malaysia? Both of our countries have political difficulties to face. When the Australian Prime Minister announced an intention to stay in Malaysia he would be likely to meet questions about the position under ANZUS. On the other hand, at the present juncture, there would be difficulties for the United States Administration in Congress if it were to declare another commitment overseas. Can we consult on finding a suitable formula to express our understanding? The Australian Government would want to be able to reassure Parliament that in entering into commitments we had full understanding from the United States Government.

6. The Malaysians and the Singaporeans may seek some assurance or guarantees from us or set conditions on our continued presence in their territory. Our presence there now is only covered by a letter from the Australian Government associating itself with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. (This will give a legal basis to our presence there until about 1970.) At present, with most of our own forces engaged in Vietnam, it would be hard for Australia to give any assurances or guarantees that relied for performance on our own resources.

7. In any arrangement made with Malaysia and Singapore for retaining our forces there we would certainly hope to be able to commit the same forces to SEATO plans in Thailand without forfeiting the right to return.

8. The matters mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 have been brought under notice at this stage because they may be raised in the five-power (or four-power) talks the Tunku has proposed to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. The Australian Government is still examining questions that will arise if any proposal is made for a defence agreement with us, but one consideration that weighs with us is that, at this stage, while we want to stay in Malaysia we should keep open our options for the future. Has the United States any comments to make on such a subject?

9. In all matters relating to defence aid to Malaysia we have the current diplomatic problem of handling Indonesia. We want to maintain good relations; we do not want to alarm them or give an impression that we are arming Malaysia against them; and we hope that they would see any decision as a necessary part of the answer to Chinese expansion. We would also wish to build a road towards future co-operation with Indonesia for mutual security, even though the realisation of that hope may at present seem remote. If our hopes that Indonesia will follow peaceful courses are not realised we need to have some defensive or deterrent capacity.

In summary we want:

(a) As much British defence effort in the East as can be contrived—but we are not optimistic.

(b) Effective Malaysian and Singaporean self-defence, as early as possible. This [portion of text missing] Malaysia and Singapore. Our confidence is qualified by many doubts.

(c) To maintain the credibility of SEATO

(i) to reassure Thailand;

(ii) to give U.S. President the freedom of action that a treaty gives;

(iii) to give ourselves a legal basis for being in Asia.

(d) To keep ANZUS alive as the principal guarantee of Australiaʼs own security.

Hence

(e) The closest possible understanding with U.S.A. on all matters affecting a continued American interest and presence in the region.

We need to know:

(a) More details about British intentions, plans and capacity in respect of

(i) the run down in Malaysia and Singapore;

(ii) aid to Malaysia and Singapore as promised;

(iii) the honouring of their commitments both under SEATO and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.

(b) More specific information about Malaysian and Singapore proposals in respect of

(i) the relationships to each other;

(ii) their self-defence preparations;

(iii) their willingness to give some sort of legal basis to our own defence and

(iv) their attitudes to the U.S.A.

(c) Further indications of American thinking both in the period before the ending of hostilities in Vietnam and after the ending of hostilities, recognising of course that what happens after that point of time depends on the way in which hostilities end.

Throughout all these discussions there arises the question of the timing of successive moves.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919, 381 Malaysia, 1967. Top Secret. Drafted by Nuechterlein on October 12.
2. See Document 30.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Warnke signed the original.