Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 10, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Call Upon the President by Australian Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
• Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary (EA)
• Paul Hasluck, Australian Foreign Minister
• John K. Waller, Australian Ambassador

The President said to Mr. Hasluck that he was running into some real difficulties on Viet-Nam. Recent developments in the Senate made it impossible for him to just go ahead on the present basis. He had received Prime Minister Holtʼs message on Malaysia and Viet-Nam,² but what Canberra envisaged doing was not enough. The President observed that the U.S. was three times as far from the Viet-Nam battlefront as was Australia and was only fifteen times its size. If our effort in Viet-Nam was proportional to the present Australian commitment, we would have no more than 100,000 men there. In the Senate and elsewhere there is an increasingly strong insistence that threatened countries in the area, including Australia, must do much more if we are to consider justifiable a situation in which 600,000 of our boys are in the battle area and we are devoting $30 billion to their support. The President outlined what he believes should be the goals for increase in contributions by Australia, Thailand, Korea, the Philippines and others. He spoke of the inadequacy of Malaysian performance even in the field of the kinds of training that the Tunku had told him Malaysia could offer.

Mr. Hasluck observed that the U.S. commitment of resources to Viet-Nam could only be understood if it was acknowledged that great people were obliged to bear great responsibilities. He said that Prime Minister Holtʼs offer of additional military help was the maximum possible without new legislation, including that legislation needed to amend the National Service Act. The Prime Minister wanted to do something promptly and effectively within present national capabilities and had done so.

The President stated his belief that Prime Minister Holt, Sir Robert Menzies and Foreign Minister Hasluck himself should consider how they could go to the people in Europe, in the United Nations and elsewhere with answers to the question “Why Viet-Nam?” The President said that answers to questions revolving around the central issue were easy for him to provide. We are in Viet-Nam to stop naked aggression and make it possible for people to live, free. We support the military government in Saigon confident that democracy was making progress there, and that in no time in history had so much progress been made as over the past year towards establishment of democratic institutions and processes. The South Vietnamese were doing their share of the fighting. Their combat forces are suffering high casualties. We were prepared to stop the bombing when the North Vietnamese show any evidence of readiness to reciprocate. North Vietnamese mortars are raining destruction from the DMZ and bombing is a way to stop it. As to our readiness to negotiate, Thieu, Prime Minister Holt and the U.S. Government have all said and continue saying that we will meet tomorrow anywhere if we can have a real discussion. We are ready to respect and to return to compliance with the Geneva Accords. The President said that all countries in the line of forward march of the Communist aggressors should understand these points. But these points could not be made too often. Mr. Hasluck said that he intended to say almost all of this next Friday when he addressed the United Nations, and, in addition, he would draw some analogies between Viet-Nam and the issue at stake when aggression was not stopped in Europe.

The President and Mr. Hasluck exchanged views about the forthcoming Senate elections in Australia and their possible implications for the ability of the government to pursue present policies.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Vol. III, Memos, 8/67–1/69. Secret. Drafted by Barnett and approved by the White House on October 17. The meeting lasted from 6:04 to 6:50 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) Executive Secretary Read sent Rostow an October 9 briefing memorandum for the Presidentʼs meeting with Hasluck, which had as attachments suggested talking points and a position paper on U.K. withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 AUSTL)
2. According to the October 9 briefing memorandum from Read to Rostow, Holt informed Johnson in an October 6 letter that Australia would augment its forces in Vietnam by 1,700 men before the end of the year. The forces would include an extra infantry battalion with helicopter support, a tank squadron, extra helicopters and pilots, extra engineer capacity, ten Skyhawk pilots and Skyhawk maintenance personnel. Holt planned to announce these plans to the Australian Parliament on October 17. (Ibid.)