Office of the Historian

33. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–614–67
Washington, November 8, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Australian Request for Consultations Regarding Future Security Arrangements in Malaysia/Singapore (S)
1.
(S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–36036/67, dated 13 October 1967,2 which requested the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the strategic/military implications of a memorandum furnished to you by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, dated 10 October 1967.3 In formulating their recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of [Page 84] Staff also gave attention to the additional questions posed in the reference.
2.
(TS) The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area derives from its controlling position with respect to passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and its proximity to the western approaches to Southeast Asia through Thailand. Freedom to transit the Malacca and Sunda Straits, both of which can be controlled effectively from the Malaysian/Singapore area, is axiomatic in principle and necessary in practice. Continuation of the present high volume of military and commercial transits would require circumnavigation of the Indonesian Archipelago if control of the Straits areas were denied the United States or its allies. Such a detour of over 2,000 miles would be comparable to placing an additional ocean, the size of the Atlantic, in the path of seaborne traffic.
3.
(TS) The US strategic/military interests would be adversely affected if Australia, following the United Kingdom withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore, decided not to maintain a military presence in those countries. The United States should:
a.
Support a continuing Australian/New Zealand presence in Malaysia and Singapore now and following the announced British withdrawal from the area and encourage Australia to develop a leading role in the area.
b.
Support Australian and New Zealand participation in a regional security arrangement.
c.
Reassure Australia that the terms of the ANZUS Treaty apply to Australian/New Zealand Armed Forces, public vessels, and aircraft in Malaysia/Singapore.
d.
Continue to encourage the United Kingdom to retain some military forces in the Malaysia/Singapore area.
e.
Not assume any of the current UK treaty commitments to Malaysia and Singapore, and avoid stationing US forces in Malaysia and Singapore.
4.
(U) A detailed consideration of questions raised in the memorandum by the Australian Minister for External Affairs is contained in Appendix A.4 Answers to the additional questions contained in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) are in Appendix B.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
J.O. Cobb
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Malaysia 381, 1967. Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates that McNamaraʼs Special Assistant saw this memorandum.↩
  2. Document 32.↩
  3. See the enclosure to Document 32.↩
  4. Neither appendix is printed.↩