Office of the Historian

301. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, August 6, 1965.

In his last conversation with you, Secretary McNamara said that he wanted to look again at the conditions that we might attach to our FY ʼ66 MAP offer to Thailand. I now find from McNaughton that they have been directed to do a complete re-survey of the Thai military situation and that this will take at least a week before the matter could even be faced again.

In my judgment, this is simply losing sight of the forest. We have gone into the Thai situation as thoroughly as we possibly can from the data available in Washington, and McNaughton agrees with us that the [Page 646] total MAP package of $39 million at least makes reasonable military sense, even though it might be improved slightly by further examination. McNamara is also questioning the necessity for the add-ons of $12.6 million, but these too have been carefully reviewed and are agreed to make fairly good military sense.

The real problem, which McNamara either rejects or does not recognize as the key, is the political one. Since we sent you the memorandum on Monday,2 we have had still further indications of the depth of Thai feeling and the real danger that the Thai will really lose confidence in our whole relationship. Praphat has made an unprecedented speech specifically saying our MAP is inadequate, and I have cross-examined the highly competent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who reports that our MAP deficiencies (in Thai eyes) have come up in virtually every recent conversation he has had with any senior Thai military man, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (Graham Martinʼs failure to report these conversations is simply another in a list of quirks that forms a separate subject.)

In short, I am more than ever convinced that:

1.
We have got to move now, and specifically when Martin sees Thanom on Tuesday.3 It is absolutely clear Thanom expects a message on MAP at that time.
2.
We have got to move with the full Thai MAP package of $39 million in return for the kind of conditions Martin has described in his 634 (summary attached).
3.
Whatever improvement in the Thai program we could devise by further study in Washington, or by the efforts of General Stilwell when he arrives (he is standing by to go out) are simply not significant elements compared to the political stake in immediate action on the above lines.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you call Secretary McNamara with the above arguments and seek a decision not later than tomorrow. I hate to be this blunt, but we simply have got to have a policy and an immediate action on this one, in my judgment, and in the judgment of my whole staff, as well as that of Ambassador Martin.

William P. Bundy 5
[Page 647]

Attachment

Commitments Which Ambassador Martin Proposes to Obtain from Thai Government in Connection with Provision of MAP Add-ons (Bangkokʼs 63 to Department)

1.
Broaden the existing Dawee commitment to increase manning levels to 80% for Project 22 Combat Forces to include also Project 22 Support Units.
2.
Press for Thai achieving desired manning levels before FY 68 (the present goal as outlined in the JUSMAG Force Objectives Study).
3.
Try to include reserves in the over-all increase of manning levels.
4.
Press for intensive field training.
5.
Establish meaningful jointly agreed training standards.
6.
Enforce the principle of performance by individual services as criterion for delivery of military support.
7.
Seek to assure continuing improvement in utilization and maintenance of all RTAF aircraft provided under MAP.
8.
Attempt to remove the present incompetent C-in-C of the RTAF.
9.
Increase the effectiveness of the JUSMAG-Thai joint evaluation process.

Martin does not believe he should ask for more but hopes that a great deal more may be accomplished: “I am completely confident that if given the support and latitude in the MAP program I am seeking, we will be able to make substantial strides in the direction of producing needed reform and modernization in the Thai Armed Forces. At the same time we will be in a better position to continue cultivating the sense of real partnership with the Thai which is so critically essential to assuring the continuing extraordinary cooperation of the Thai. Without this, attainment of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia will be infinitely more costly.”

  1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Miscellaneous Chron. Secret.↩
  2. Document 299.↩
  3. August 10.↩
  4. Telegram 63 from Bangkok, July 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–THAI)↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩