Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, August 2, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Thai MAP

Attached (Tab A)² is a letter to you from Secretary Rusk which puts us back to where we were three months ago.

In essence, it proposes that we give the Thais not only the FY 66 MAP ($27 million) but also the $12.7 million of add-ons which keep raising their heads in this duel between State and Defense. He wants us to make the concession on MAP before we press to get the Thai troops for Vietnam.

Secretary Ruskʼs approach, in essence, is that “the MAP problem must be settled by itself before we proceed to the question of a unit.” I do not see why this is necessarily the way to proceed, but we can bow to his judgment in this regard. We can do so by “settling the MAP issue” on the terms which we have been pressing all along—namely, telling the Thai they can have their FY 66 MAP (without add-ons) provided they take appropriate steps to address the counterinsurgency problem and to increase the manning (and thus combat readiness) levels of their regular forces.

We have queried Ambassador Martin as to the commitments which he thinks he can obtain from the Thais and he advises that (a) Daweeʼs commitment to increase manning levels of Project 22 forces should be broadened to include support forces as well as combat forces; (b) he would press for intensified field training; (c) he would enforce perform-ance by individual services by channeling MAP through Thai Supreme Command; and (d) he would require continued improvement in utilization and maintenance of aircraft. While Martin does not think we should ask for more, we had in mind a somewhat more precise list of conditions or commitments (see Tab B).³ Also, we emphasize counterinsurgency.

Cables referred to in Secretary Ruskʼs letter are at Tab C.⁴ The $12.7 million of add-ons is set forth at Tab D⁵; it constitutes about half of Ambassador Martinʼs request.

I suggest that you take this matter up with Secretary Rusk at lunch on Tuesday.⁶

John T. McNaughton

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 1266, Thailand 091.3 MAP. Secret.
2. Not found; see footnote 2, Document 299.
3. Attached but not printed. The sentence following the superscript is handwritten.
4. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 299.
5. Not found attached.
6. McNamara wrote the following note on the source text: “8/3 To Mr. McNaughton. John, please assemble & review with me the entire state of Thai military forces: a) current vs proposed manning levels for all units, b) recent appraisal of training of forces, c) current vs proposed ʼin commissionʼ rates for gd & air equips, d) current vs proposed counter insurgency force & programs (popular forces, communication hamlet identification, etc.), e) current vs proposed Thai defense budget, f) current vs proposed MAP for ʼ66, esp. major items, etc., etc., g) describe Project 22 forces & how the ʼadd-onsʼ relate to them & their readiness, h) origin of items in Bundy letter to McNaughton, i) content of cable 63, j) what are Stilwellʼs views—shouldnʼt he come to Washington before we settle. RSM.” Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Valenti had lunch with the President on Tuesday, August 3, from 1:45 to 2:14 p.m. No record has been found, except that the Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that they discussed the “Pakistan situation.” (Johnson Library)