Office of the Historian

299. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, August 1, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Thai Unit for Viet Nam and Thai MAP Add-ons
1.
Attached at Tab A2 is a letter to Defense Secretary McNamara for your signature proposing that we authorize Ambassador Martin to advise the Royal Thai Government of our FY 66 MAP program, including add-ons, as a means of laying the groundwork for a subsequent proposal for a Thai RCT in South Viet Nam.
2.
Secretary McNamaraʼs position has been that the proposed MAP add-ons are not justified. However, he is willing to provide them in return for a Thai commitment to put a unit in South Viet Nam. On the other hand, Ambassador Martin, in response to our query (Deptel 168, Tab B)3 has told us in Embtel 190 (Tab C)4 that to link the MAP add-ons directly [Page 643] or indirectly (by simultaneous discussion) with such a proposal could have extremely serious consequences in Thailand. He has further said that failure to provide the MAP add-ons would badly hurt our position in Thailand. Ambassador Martin may have overstated the case, but FE fully agrees that the risks he cites are present and that they are not remote.
3.
Ambassador Martin further states that if given the authority to discuss the MAP add-ons with the RTG now, in relation to getting commitments from the Thai armed forces for improvement of their state of readiness, and if given a little time to otherwise condition the RTG, he would anticipate RTG approval of a request for forces in South Viet Nam.
4.
The requested MAP add-ons total $12.7 million, which would bring the FY 66 MAP to $39.7 million. This compares to $38 million for FY 65, $42.8 million in FY 64, $73.5 million in FY 63, and $81 million in FY 62. In other words, what is being proposed is only a continuation of a fairly low level of MAP rather than a major increase over previous levels. In addition, it would be given only in return for commitments to bring about improvements in the Thai armed forces. In view of the relatively small sum involved in comparison with overall expenditures on Vietnam, and in view of vital importance of Thai cooperation in that connection, we feel that it would be extremely shortsighted for us not to go ahead with the Thailand MAP program as requested by Ambassador Martin and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS. If in addition it helps to lay the groundwork for obtaining a Thai unit for services in South Viet Nam, so much the better.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Secretary McNamara and initial the telegram attached at Tab A.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Pickering. The date is handwritten on the source text.↩
  2. Tab A was not attached, but the letter was signed, see Document 300.↩
  3. Dated July 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  4. Dated July 31. (Ibid.)↩