246. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1
Washington, September 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
- Mr. Eugene Blackʼs Mission
to Cambodia
For your meeting with Mr. Black
this afternoon at 5:30,2 I attach summary instructions on which I recommend
your approval, and your use as a talking paper with Mr. Black. (Tab A.)
These instructions cover only the Cambodian portion of Mr. Blackʼs trip. As you know, he will also
be making a major speech in Japan, and
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will be calling in Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam,
and in Manila to touch base with the Asian Development Bank people. You
may wish to discuss with him a personal message to the Japanese on the
need for them to do more in Asia—a theme he will be hitting hard in his
speech in any event—and you may also wish to discuss with him just how
he should handle our continuing intentions toward regional assistance in
Southeast Asia, together with the unfortunate failure of the Senate to
act on the authorization of special funds for the ADB.
Tab A
PRINCIPAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MR. EUGENE BLACKʼS VISIT TO
CAMBODIA
September 11–14, 1968
The major reason for including Cambodia in your itinerary is to bring
home to Prince Sihanouk our
grave concern over VC/NVA use of his territory, including the
question of a more effective International Commission for
Supervision and Control. It would be unrealistic to expect a
significant reorientation of Cambodian policy as a result of your
visit. We should keep our expectations within the limits of
Cambodian capabilities rather than anticipate any sweeping or
decisive Cambodian action against the VC/NVA. Our interest will be
served to the extent we can persuade Sihanouk to increase Cambodiaʼs own efforts to
harass the VC/NVA and to press for a more effective ICC operation.
In stressing our deep concern over the abuse of Cambodian neutrality,
you should make emphatically clear that neither the President nor
the American people entertain the slightest hostility toward
Cambodia, or wish for Cambodia anything but the preservation of its
independence and neutrality. You should be prepared to stress that
the President has exercised every restraint possible, and that the
United States continues to act in accordance with the spirit and
letter of the Bowles
communiqué in January. Stressing that the United States has no
desire to see the Viet-Nam war extended into Cambodia, you should
nevertheless underline the fact that as long as the war continues
there will be a danger of border incidents despite our best efforts
to prevent them.
It is almost certain that the Cambodians will raise the question of
an American statement expressing respect and recognition for
Cambodiaʼs
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sovereignty
within its present frontiers. Having made clear our concern with the
problem of VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, you may inform
Sihanouk that the United
States Government would consider making such a statement whenever
this move could significantly enhance the prospects for a lasting
improvement in U.S./Cambodian relations. You should explore whether
in fact Sihanouk is prepared
for resumption of diplomatic relations on a serious and responsible
basis. And you should make clear that our willingness to make such a
declaration and to resume relations would of course be greatly
influenced by the Cambodian attitude on border problems and VC/NVA
activities.
On the question of a declaration, you may pursue the discussion to
the point of making clear the precise form of declaration we would
be prepared to make, but you should avoid a final commitment unless
further instructed.
Your visit should not involve a discussion of the captured LCU and its crew, an issue which it is
hoped will be disposed of before your arrival in Phnom Penh.
Your own special background as the Presidentʼs Special Representative
for Southeast Asian Economic Matters will signal to the Cambodians
your interest in discussing the future development of the Mekong
basin. You may affirm United States support for regional programs
such as that of the Mekong Committee.
