247. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Your meeting with Eugene Black, 5:30 p.m. Today
Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk2 which constitutes both summary instructions for Blackʼs Cambodia mission and talking points for your meeting with Black this afternoon.
[Page 544]I have one serious reservation to the instructions, which state (page 3) “Your visit should not involve a discussion of the captured LCU and its crew.” If the Cambodians are still holding the crew at the time of the visit, I think it will be impossible for Black to ignore that issue completely. To do so would give a false signal to Sihanouk that the issue is of no real interest to you. It would also be extremely difficult to defend publicly a complete failure to use this opportunity to obtain the release of the prisoners. Finally, there is a good chance that Sihanouk will choose to release the prisoners to Black.
I suggest, therefore, that the instructions be revised to call for Black to express your concern at the continued detention of the LCU crew and your hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able quickly to remove this prickly issue by releasing the crew. The instructions should also authorize Black to accept the prisoners from the Cambodian Government should the offer be made.
Otherwise, the instructions are probably adequate. (Black will have detailed background papers which put flesh on these rather minimal instructions.) In your conversation with Mr. Black I suggest you make the following points:
- —we know that Sihanouk cannot entirely stop Communist use of his territory.
- —we hope, however, that he can be persuaded to increase Cambodiaʼs harassment of Communist misuse of Cambodian territory.
- —we hope that Sihanouk can actively press for a more effective International Control Commission role in identifying violations of Cambodian neutrality.
- —neither you nor the American people have the slightest hostility toward Cambodia and will continue to act with the greatest possible restraint.
- —however, the increasing Communist use of Cambodian territory constitutes a serious problem which cannot be ignored and which endangers both the Cambodian and U.S. Governments desire that Cambodia be insulated from the Vietnam fighting.
- —that is the reason why you attach great importance to the hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able to take effective steps to inhibit significant Communist military activities on Cambodian soil.
One special problem which you might wish to mention to Black is our Daniel Boone operation in Cambodia. In a diplomatic note this week3 Sihanouk equated Communist military activities in Cambodia with the occasional “special forces type” incursions by U.S. forces. He will probably make the same point to Black and I do not think you would want Black to hear of these operations first from Sihanouk. I suggest you mention them briefly and point out that their sole purpose and reason are to develop intelligence on Communist military activities in Cambodia. As [Page 545] to the rest of the trip, I concur in Secretary Ruskʼs suggestion that you discuss with Black an oral personal message to the Japanese on the need for them to do more in Asia. You might also mention to Black that both the Thai and the Vietnamese will be rather prickly about the Cambodian conversations but that we will provide guidance for him on this matter after we have the report of his conversations in Cambodia.
I recommend that you approve the attachment to Secretary Ruskʼs memorandum as Mr. Blackʼs instructions, with a revision to provide for Blackʼs raising the problem of the LCU prisoners and accepting their release if Sihanouk makes the offer.4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia Development Program (Black Committee) (ADB), Vol. III. Secret.↩
- See Document 246.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Johnson approved and a note on the source text indicates that Rostow was notified on September 5.↩