Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

85. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, January 21, 1965, 11 a.m.

2054. Message to Secretary from Dr. Wiesner. Pass to White House. Before leaving New Delhi Wednesday² evening for home I left following report for John Palfrey, AEC,³ who will be in New Delhi on Thursday. I have asked to have it sent on to you in the thought it may be helpful in evaluation situation here. Report is as follows.

“There has been a very considerable debate here both in public and private regarding the possibility and desirability of making an Indian nuclear weapon. The main motivation to date is political, but there is also some desire for a deterrent against China and some vague feeling that if a nuclear mine field makes sense in Europe it could be useful on India-China border.

The issue here was confused by Bhabha’s quotations from the AEC report on Plowshare⁴ presented at Geneva that gave a cost of $600,000 for a 2 MT explosion. This was generally interpreted to mean that India could carry out a nuclear explosion for such a sum. In particular this is what the PriMin seems to have believed at one point. Many scientists have complained to the PriMin about this and Bhabha has clarified the point.

Nonetheless I believe that he is still underestimating the cost of carrying out a nuclear explosion. He told me that he could make and test a crude nuclear device for approximately ten million dollars. Incidentally I think it would be helpful if the AEC could provide a cost estimate having some solidity. The estimate should be based on the assumption that the Indians have plutonium available but must develop everything else.⁵

Bhabha is still saying that it would be possible to make a nuclear explosion in 18 months. Many of the scientists object to this optimistic figure and at least two have written to the PriMin stating that it was too optimistic. Bhabha apparently wants authority and resources to move forward without final decision regarding actual explosion.

No one has estimated what a real weapon system would cost or understands what will be done with it.

On the constructive side there are several possibilities. Best of all would be to support the Indian resolution,⁶ or some variant of it, in the UN. The Indian resolution would put the Indians squarely on record against acquisition of weapons and certainly would be a powerful deterrent to any bomb movement here.

Of a more limited scope are the various technical things that could be done. I have discussed the possibility of a small satellite, Plowshare experiments, tropical weather studies, Asian-region ground water development, collaborative research on thorium fuel and fast reactors and further cooperative activities on technical education.

Bhabha is anxious to explore availability of Plowshare with you. He is interested in the possibility of making harbors and water reservoirs. He also raised the question of the exchange of radioactive sampling data obtained from Chinese tests.

It would help the Indians politically if some test data could be made available. I don’t know what the restrictions would be but believe that some could be given to them quickly without any harm. I made no statement regarding the possibility but said that he should explore the matter with you and I would look into it at home.

Bhabha is also interested in talking about nuclear desalinization. We touched on this briefly but without reaching any judgment regarding the desirability of doing anything at the present time.

I did not explore the question of an AEC representative in Bombay.”

End of report of Dr. Wiesner to John Palfrey.⁷

Bowles

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, India, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the White House for Bundy.
2. January 20. Wiesner arrived in India on January 14. In telegram 2055 from New Delhi, January 21, Bowles reported that during a week divided between New Delhi and Bombay, Wiesner met with Shastri and other senior officials of the government. Bowles noted that Wiesner was very favorably received and that, during the course of his visit, Shastri stated that if nuclear weapons were ever made in India it would not be during a Ministry headed by him. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SCI 7 US)
3. John G. Palfrey, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, visited India to attend the inauguration of a plutonium plant at Trombay on January 22.
4. The report has not been further identified. Plowshare was a program initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission during the Kennedy administration to explore the possibilities of peaceful nuclear explosions. The program continued during the Johnson administration. Documentation on Plowshare is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, and 1964–1968, volume XI.
5. Telegram 425 to Bombay, for Palfrey, January 21, forwarded the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community that it would take 1–3 years and would cost India $30–$40 million to develop a modest weapons program. Palfrey was authorized to share that information with Bhabha, and to discuss Plowshare-type projects with him. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Cables, Vol. IV, 12/64–6/65)
6. Apparent reference to the resolution submitted on September 14, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the UAR calling for a cessation of nuclear testing. See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 428–429.
7. A January 30 memorandum from Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Talbot, and Walt Rostow, on the subject of “Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability,” considered alternatives to U.S. assurances to India. Thompson proposed suggesting that India make a unilateral statement that it would not submit to nuclear threats “from anyone” and that the Indian Government was confident that the major nuclear powers would take “appropriate action” if India were attacked with nuclear weapons. The U.S. response to such an Indian statement would reserve U.S. freedom of action in such a case but note that the “heavy price” any country would pay if it considered using nuclear weapons against India made such a contingency “highly unlikely.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 6)