84. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
1323. Deptel 733.2 My meeting with Ayub in Rawalpindi this morning was the best in over a year. In response to an intimation from me, the usual Foreign Office note-taker was omitted and we met alone for entire 50-minute period. Feeling post-election euphoria, he was in relaxed, communicative mood and seemed full of good will toward US. He responded with warmth to my reiteration of our congratulations and sense of satisfaction at his impressive election success. He drew friendly analogy between President Johnson’s electoral triumph and impending inauguration, and his own. I had definite impression that he considers he has a freer hand and more latitude of action now that election stresses and uncertainties are over, and that he will feel less constraint about seeking some improvement of his relations with US.
Early in conversation I extended President’s invitation for Washington visit latter half April, recalling that it had been over two years since Ayub was last in the US and 3–1/2 years since his last full-fledged visit, emphasizing importance and urgency we attach to wide range of bilateral and regional issues which call for consideration Chief of State level.
Ayub concurred heartily in urgent requirement for face-to-face meeting with President Johnson to consider many pressing matters and spelled out in warm, even affectionate, terms his eagerness to see President and his family again. He said “President Johnson knows depth of my friendship and regard for him which is so evident it does not even need to be restated.” He said only difficulty with suggested latter part of April date was the heavy program of major engagements [Page 180] already laid on for him throughout entire spring period March through June. He mentioned Afro-Asian conference at Algiers, prospective visits to Communist China and Soviet Union, National Assembly elections, budget session of National Assembly, Commonwealth Ministers conference in London and possible State visit to UK.
He asked if it might be feasible to postpone US visit to latter half of 1965 in view of this problem. Then he inquired if, better yet, the President could not visit Pakistan? He indicated that with any encouragement at all he would like to extend the invitation. I discouraged the latter suggestion mentioning the most formidable schedule of visits and trips already in prospect for the President throughout 1965. I then questioned the wisdom of postponing Ayub visit to US to late 1965. I pointed out that our continuing assistance programs, both economic and military, needed to be planned ahead and that while we did not tie our assistance directly to political considerations, we needed to be sure that the broad policy framework within which our programs operated was appropriately set and reciprocally understood. His visit was important and urgent from this standpoint. The entire spectrum of problems relating to our interests, programs and presence in Pakistan, the position of Pakistan in the free alliances, the paramount issues between Pakistan and India, Pakistan in the Afro-Asian context, and the Pak relationship with Communist China and the Soviet Union, needed top level attention sooner rather than later. We would prefer to consult with him as our ally before our consideration of current problems in South Asia went much further.
This gave the President pause and he said he would like to have a short time to consider further the timing of a visit. He expressed his wish to arrange the visit at the time mentioned if it were in any way possible. I told him that if necessary the visit could be limited to the suggested two days in Washington, although we would be disappointed if he could not make a week’s tour of the country. I added that it might be possible for him to combine the short visit to Washington with some other scheduled trip in a westerly direction. He replied he would give me a definite reply within two weeks at the outside. I accepted this. It was evident from a later portion of the conversation, which I will report separately, that his current idea of trying to moderate and restrain the aggressive tendencies of Communist China during his forthcoming visit to Peiping looms large in his mind and that he would like to discuss with the President and Secretary Rusk before he goes to Peiping tactics and arguments he might use in seeking to influence the Chinese Communists. While I did not encourage him in this quixotic concept, I infer that this may be an additional reason for him to try to squeeze in the visit to Washington at the time we have offered, notwithstanding the undoubted difficulties for him.
[Page 181]Other principal topics covered in our wide ranging discussion were: (1) Bhutto’s current visit to Moscow and Pak-Soviet relations in general, (2) Nature of Pak relationship with Communist China, (3) Chicom policy in South and Southeast Asia, (4) Post-election domestic situation here, (5) Indian negotiating attitude toward Pakistan, (6) need for periodic US Naval task force presence in Indian Ocean, (7) slanderous election charges by Pak official against local US representatives, and (8) requirement for permission to rent housing in Rawalpindi to enable US Mission personnel to make the move from Karachi to Rawalpindi. On all these matters the President’s reaction ranged from slightly better to materially better than my expectations. Separate telegram covers all these topics.3
Tone of President’s attitude can be summarized in his statement that “Pakistan remains in alliance relationship with you and nothing has changed that.”
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis.↩
- In telegram 733 to Karachi, January 12, the Department, responding to a suggestion made by Shoaib to Rusk in September, authorized McConaughy to extend an invitation to Ayub to visit Washington to meet with the President in the latter half of April. (Ibid.)↩
- These topics were reported on in telegrams 1336 and 1343 from Karachi, January 15 and 16 respectively. (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK)↩