82. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
1862. Two days ago [1 line of source text not declassified] told Emb officer, in strictest confidence that Cabinet had instructed Bhabha to proceed with first stages of producing atomic bomb.
Bhabha had previously reported that eighteen months would be required to produce bomb and once initial explosion had occurred, he could produce fifty in five years. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Bhabha was then instructed to proceed with first twelve months of necessary work. At end of that period GOI would review situation and decide whether or not to push project to completion.
Factors influencing final decision would include progress during this twelve month period by nuclear powers to bring ChiCom nuclear bomb production under control and additional amount of prestige ChiComs would have acquired by having bomb. Bhabha had assured Cabinet that final test could be handled underground and hence there would be no violation of Moscow agreement.2
Although efforts of mission officers [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to check this story have produced no further evidence, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has thus far been accurate reporter and because procedure he described could be rationalized however painfully in Indian mind as not violating previous agreements or contradicting stated policy, we have been concerned.
Therefore at completion of my regular business with Swaran Singh in yesterday’s meeting I expressed serious distress over what I described (in order to divert suspicion from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) as two apparently well authenticated stories from Bombay that indicated Cabinet had decided to move ahead with program as described above.
Swaran Singh asserted flatly that rumor was unfounded, that such effort would be breach of public understanding and that I should accept his assurance that no such plan was in wind.
I replied that I was reassured by what he said since it would be impossible for GOI to prepare for setting off atomic device without it [Page 177] becoming generally known, and this in turn would greatly undercut India’s present forthright position.
Swaran Singh remarked that while I must realize GOI is under great pressure from various groups in country to go ahead with bomb, PriMin was adamant on this subject. We could rest assured that if GOI should change its mind we would be so informed.
I said it has been suggested to me that story might have been floated deliberately by someone interested in pressuring U.S. into guarantee of India’s security so that building of Indian bomb would not be necessary. I reminded Swaran Singh of President’s statement of assurance on Oct 16 and said we had deliberately avoided further reference to nuclear umbrellas because we did not want to appear to be pressing them into relationship with us which they might not be prepared to undertake.3 Furthermore, public comment about U.S. nuclear support for India at this time would tend to frighten off Russians who otherwise might conceivably be persuaded to undertake parallel if not joint approach.
Swaran Singh expressed his appreciation of our sensitivity to his political problems but made no comment on my suggestion that story might have been deliberately planted.
Comment: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] statement to Emb officer was made on highly confidential basis and it is of vital importance that his name be protected within Dept and elsewhere. Otherwise we will lose good friend who in past has been excellent source.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18–8 INDIA. Secret; Limdis. Received at 4:19 a.m.↩
- Reference is to the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. (14 UST (Part 2) 1313)↩
- Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson sent a memorandum to Rusk on December 31 expressing his concern that Bowles was encouraging the Indians to think that the United States would be prepared to offer a unilateral guarantee to India against nuclear attack, or be prepared to enter into a joint guarantee with the Soviet Union. Thompson noted that he was unaware that any such policy had been discussed in Washington and added that he did not see how such a specific guarantee could be offered to a non-aligned country and not offered to all of the allies of the United States. He also observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had serious reservations about the concept of a joint guarantee with the Soviet Union. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18–8 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 5)↩