81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
676. Assistant Secretary Talbot called in Pak Ambassador Ahmed December 24 to follow up on Ambassador’s December 11 conversation with Governor Harriman on Kashmir integration moves by GOI.2 Talbot [Page 174] said we have made firm diplomatic representations to Indians regarding our attitude towards recent Indian action extending provisions of Articles 356 and 357 to Kashmir.3 He noted that we have seen Pakistan’s letter to SC which seemed to us an appropriate way to deal with the matter. Talbot reiterated our long standing legal position that we do not recognize validity of unilateral actions to change the status of Kashmir. He affirmed US had made this legal position clear to Indians. He pointed out on other hand US feels that such deep international dispute as Kashmir is unlikely to be resolved solely in terms of legal considerations. Talbot cited our extensive and unsuccessful efforts to help resolve problem, most recently in 1963. He stated that it seemed to us afterwards neither side regarded substantial compromises in its positions as in its national interest. Only with such compromise can movement toward a settlement occur. As US ponders current situation we do not see how outside powers can be helpful until disputants decide themselves to make such concessions.
Talbot expressed concern over sharpening tensions over Kashmir and within Kashmir noting Azad Kashmir President Hamid Khan’s statement that his government considered itself relieved of its CFL obligations because of latest GOI measures. We were also aware of escalation of CFL incidents. US failed to see how rising tensions would improve chances for settlement. However US hopeful that tentative beginnings of a dialogue which began in 1964 between Shastri and Ayub could be carried forward in the new year.
Talbot said Pakistan knows our concern for stability and security of subcontinent and our desire to maintain closest possible relations with Pakistan. But, Pakistan must also be aware of our deepening confrontation with Communist China. This confrontation must affect and color our policies in Asia at this stage.
Ambassador Ahmed in reply said GOP was quite appreciative of US position concerning recent Indian action. But in Pakistan’s opinion asking for substantial compromises is asking too much. Fundamentals of an issue cannot be disregarded summarily because party in the wrong is adamant on facing facts squarely. Facts are Kashmir is held against wishes of its people and this condition is recognized by world opinion. Ayub had said that if plebiscite impossible, he was prepared to listen to any other ideas. GOI response has been to strengthen its [Page 175] stranglehold on Kashmir at time when atmosphere of good will had been built up at least from Pakistan side.
Increased tensions were inevitable results of India’s action and explosive situation may develop in Kashmir whose leaders must now be restive. With respect to Azad Kashmir President’s statement this reflects his own view and does not commit the GOP.
Talbot commented that one factor increasing turbulence in the subcontinent and Indo-Pak relations is political and military pressure by Chicoms. This was not a factor in the pre-1962 Kashmir situation. Chicom policies however now are important factor and have made Indo-Pak relations more difficult. Ahmed agreed that this argument has been used with good effect by US and India. But he stated argument should not cloud US judgment. Every question is now being pivoted around China which is new factor in calculus but impasse on Kashmir has existed 15 years.
Ahmed said that Pakistan appreciates our difficulties in Far East. GOP has maintained for two years there would be no Chinese attack on India and that China and India will settle their differences. Therefore China should not be considered major factor in Indo-Pak problem. Nonetheless the US, UK, and USSR arms build up in India goes on encouraging Indian intransigence. This is why the US is getting nowhere on Kashmir.
Assuming subcontinent defense is an American objective, the USG should tell GOI that until it does come to terms on Kashmir, India will not receive American aid. “The US has whiphand but refuses to crack the whip.”
Ahmed said he would like to hear not only that US deplored GOI action but also that US would do something about it. US should use leverage with India. This was his suggested solution; he believed that US should consider others. US position should not rest solely that India and Pakistan must make substantial concessions which is both Indian and Soviet position. Ahmed said he was not happy with this posture which in effect meant no decisions.
Ambassador Ahmed then asked if Indians had given us any explanation for their action. Talbot responded that whatever their reasons may have been Indians had been left in no doubt as to our attitude.
Ambassador Ahmed expressed his puzzlement over Shastri’s consent to recent Indian action. Shastri had reputation of being man of conciliation and did not give impression he was under pressure to take hard line on Pakistan. In closing he reiterated his view that Kashmir problem was not only problem for GOI and GOP but USG had interest in its resolution and should and could play more active role in subcontinent.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret. Drafted by Simmons (NEA/SOA), cleared by Cameron and Kimball (IO/UNP), and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi, London, and USUN.↩
- See Document 80.↩
- Talbot called in Ambassador Nehru on December 18 to express U.S. disagreement with and disapproval of the Kashmir integration decisions announced by Nanda on December 4. He said the United States was surprised and disappointed over India’s latest moves with respect to Kashmir, and would not recognize any Indian action to settle the Kashmir dispute unilaterally by changing Kashmir’s status with respect to the Indian Union. (Telegram 1250 to New Delhi, December 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK)↩