115. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1

3111. Ambassadors Bowles and Lodge2 this evening called on Prime Minister Shastri who was obviously preoccupied with the situation in the Rann of Kutch. PM asked Lodge to convey the following message to President Johnson: the Government of India has no objections to discussions concerning boundary demarcations in Kutch area. GOI has agreed to British proposals for cease-fire and discussions. If Pakistan does not accept a cease-fire he “shudders” to think what position GOI might have to adopt. Not only is there a danger of a large conflict, internal difficulties are also possible (he mentioned specifically the possibility of communal disturbances in both countries).

Pakistani propaganda concerning Indian attack is preposterous since, if India had planned an attack, it would never have chosen such an unfavorable area.

Shastri further stated that on April 13 Pakistan had made proposals consisting of (1) a cease-fire, (2) return to the status quo ante, (3) further discussions. The next day GOI accepted. Immediately thereafter Pakistan withdrew the original proposal and made further demands.

Lodge agreed to deliver the message to President Johnson. The conversation then turned to the situation in Vietnam. Lodge outlined the reasons why Vietnam is an important issue and described the nature of the struggle. He concluded with a request for any advice Shastri might want to proffer and suggested the possibility that GOI might [Page 246] want to assist the GVN in some concrete manner such as by sending ambulances and personnel.

Shastri then commented that he appreciated the clear description of the situation and remarked that the U.S. was the best judge of what should be done. He stated somewhat wistfully that there seemed little chance for talks. In describing his position that conflict should cease, he stressed that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong must cease their activities as part of an agreement.

The meeting ended with a brief discussion of the degree to which Communist China is failing to gain complete support in Africa and the nonaligned countries.

Bowles
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret. Also sent to the White House, and repeated to Saigon and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge stopped at New Delhi on the way to Vietnam at President Johnson’s request to assure Prime Minister Shastri that Johnson had meant no discourtesy in postponing Shastri’s visit. Lodge was instructed to explain the reasons for the postponement again, and to tell Shastri that Johnson was anxious to reschedule the visit. (Telegram CAP 65137 to New Delhi, April 27; ibid., POL 7 INDIA)