Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

114. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, April 30, 1965.

43. Deptel 1230² and 1231³ and Rawalpindi’s 42⁴ to Department.

1. Just after I left my noon meeting April 30 with Foreign Minister Bhutto, he requested me to see him again at 4 p.m. When I returned for second meeting, I found Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed noticeably agitated. Bhutto explained that they had received, just after my noon call, message from Ambassador G. Ahmed reporting his conversation with Talbot on April 27 (Deptel 1217)⁵ at which Talbot had set forth our position that MAP equipment not to be used in disputed areas (Deptel 1200).⁶ Bhutto pointed out question had profound implications for GOP since bulk of its military equipment is MAP-supplied and probably any military action by India against Pakistan would be launched from or against disputed area, such as Kashmir or Rann of Kutch. Paks under this reasoning could not use MAP where it would be needed and would be in impossible position.

2. I clarified our position in accordance with Deptel 1230 stressing that we were not laying out rigid generalized rule necessarily applicable to all disputed territories. We would expect to make determination on each issue based on merits or case. In case of Rann of Kutch we considered facts and circumstances murky, legitimate self-defense not established, and therefore use of MAP equipment by either side not justified. Situation here readily susceptible to settlement without dangerous resort to force and cease-fire should be pursued. Furthermore, question of use of MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch area would be merely academic point if cease-fire achieved. At later points in conversation, I hammered away at this point in order to emphasize necessity of Pak agreement to cease-fire.

3. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed were at once relieved by clarification that no far-reaching generalized principle automatically to all disputed areas had been set up, and still deeply concerned by implications of our postulation as applied to Rann of Kutch situation. Two main points made by Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed in commenting on our position re use of MAP equipment were: (a) Before US attempted to make unilateral decision as to whether legitimate self-defense involved in Rann of Kutch or in other areas, further extensive consideration facts and full consultations between us should be held. (b) Since most Pak military equipment MAP-supplied, while Indians not dependent to any comparable extent on US sources, Paks would be more heavily penalized by US withholding from both sides, and Indians would be emboldened if Paks relatively disadvantaged. Under present circumstances in Rann of Kutch, GOP would be forced to withdraw all its forces onesidedly, since they mainly MAP-supplied, while Indians not thus handicapped.

4. Aziz Ahmed also presented Pak justification that use of MAP in Rann of Kutch in fact “legitimate self-defense” involving defense of territory properly claimed by GOP and wrongfully attacked by India. He pointed to following facts: (a) GOP maintained post at Chad Bet until 1956, at which time Indian forces came in with air cover and took over post by force, which GOP did not resist; (b) in 1960 when territorial dispute last discussed, it was agreed that neither side would disturb status quo; (c) beginning in January 1965 India in fact disturbed status quo by establishing a series of new posts in disputed territory and by moving in first police and then strong military forces; and (d) GOP did not move troops into disputed area until 18 April after Indians hit Pak post at Ding preemptorily, demanded Pak evacuation of Kanjarkot and took over other posts.

5. In reply, I stressed first that facts still murky, given strong Indian presentation of its conflicting position, that US taking openminded position in absence of basis for judgment, that pressing objective at moment is to achieve cease-fire, and that problem involved in this case clearly dictated closer consultations at early stage on any comparable threatening situation in future. I assured Paks that, in taking stance on Rann of Kutch, we are applying terms of standing agreement to particular existing situation rather than redefining this agreement or establishing any general restriction indiscriminately applicable to all disputed territories.

6. Bhutto came back to question he raised at earlier meeting on US assurances, drawing analogy between US determination on use of MAP equipment and US determination on whether aggression involved. He recalled that, during his discussions with Under Secretary Ball in Washington in October 1963, he had foreseen the very possibility that, in a murky situation, aggression could not be readily determined and that our assurances to GOP on aggression by India would be difficult to invoke quickly enough to help Pakistan. For this reason, Bhutto said, he had urged further definition and strengthening of our assurances. Instead, the US reaction in the Rann of Kutch crisis would appear to confirm Pak misgivings and to dilute the force and dependability of US assurances. Bhutto urged an early response to his inquiry of this morning on US reaction in event Indian threats of retaliation carried out. He also proposed that urgent problem of right to use MAP equipment be accorded further exhaustive consideration and analysis by two governments, even [given?] its far-reaching implications.

7. I told Bhutto that I was doubtful that reply would be received to his question about US assurances before he left for London evening May 2 but this was matter he might take up with Secretary at London. I also indicated again that it seemed unlikely that we would be able comment on hypothetical situations relating to recent Indian vague threats which we hope and believe India will not carry out. Bhutto argued that current Indian threat not hypothetical given statements made by Shastri and other recent Indian actions.

8. During discussion, in response my pressing on need for immediate cease-fire, Bhutto reiterated that Paks prepared for cease-fire as outlined to UK. He also informed me of gist of Ayub reply to Wilson letter of April 30 setting basis for “de facto” cease-fire. He informed me that Pak forces have been restrained from taking further action so as not to aggravate situation further in Rann of Kutch area. Pak forces in area are therefore not taking advantage of superior military position which would now permit them readily to reach 24th parallel, and to take over Chad Bet and cut off whole GOI force from its line of retreat.

Comment: It quite clear at conclusion our meeting, which lasted almost one hour, that Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed quite shaken by definition of our position in context of actual Rann of Kutch situation, and also in context of how it might affect US MAP support and defense assistance in event of future fuzzed over aggression by India.

9. I would not recommend immediate response to Bhutto reassuring GOP on effectiveness of past assurances against aggression, since a little uncertainty on their part for next few days could provide the additional leverage needed to achieve cease-fire. However, I do not think that we can postpone providing these reassurances very long without risking very serious damage to our position here. At same time, I strongly urge that GOI be reminded immediately of the standing explicit US assurances to Pakistan as a further deterrent against an Indian contemplation of retaliatory action against Pakistan in another area, such as East Pakistan.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Karachi, CINCMEAFSA, and DOD. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 4:34 p.m. Passed to the White House and CIA.
2. In telegram 1230 to Karachi, April 29, the Department clarified its position with respect to the acceptable use of MAP equipment. The legal position outlined in telegram 1200 to Karachi, April 24, was intended to apply to the situation in the Rann of Kutch, and was not meant to imply that a case for legitimate self-defense could never be made in connection with a disputed border. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1231 to Karachi, April 29, instructed McConaughy to make clear the U.S. position with respect to the use of MAP equipment in his scheduled meeting with Bhutto on April 30. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 42 from Rawalpindi, April 30, reported on McConaughy’s first meeting with Bhutto on April 30. Bhutto, on instructions from Ayub, asked McConaughy to ascertain what the U.S. position would be in the event that “unmistakable Indian threats” led to general warfare between India and Pakistan. Bhutto described the situation as the gravest in the history of Indo-Pakistani relations and reviewed the history of U.S. assurances to protect Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression. (Ibid.)
5. Document 112.
6. See footnote 3, Document 112.