Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, June 13, 1967, 4:44 p.m.

210639. State/Defense message.

1. This message requests your views on immediate future Wheelus.

2. Part I—Main elements of situation as of June 11:

(a) 38 F–100, plus a few air-sea rescue and transport aircraft still on base. Flying operations limited to supply and evacuation.

(b) 6300 Americans evacuated from Libya, 3305 civilians remain in country, of which 530 employees and dependents still at Wheelus. 3346 US military still on base. Unknown number third-country nationals may use base for evacuation.²

(c) Stages for defense of base, if necessary, outlined Tripoli’s unnumbered telegram June 9.³

(d) Security situation Tripoli area seems to be improving but presumably still subject sudden change for worse.

(e) Attitude and intentions of King and GOL in aftermath of Sinai debacle still unclear.

3. Part II—Fundamental assumptions or issues:

(a) Context of our base rights at Wheelus may have changed radically with events of past week. Even if lie about use of Wheelus is not perpetuated, we may find it difficult resume useful operations for some time. Question to be reviewed in both field and Washington is extent to which continued importance Wheelus function to US strategy would justify determined effort remain there in face of hostile mob actions.

(b) Immediate future of country depends heavily on extent to which King and GOA reassert authority, particularly if Cairo propaganda blasts continue and local mood remains inflammatory. Presumably in own self-interest, regime will want to recover control and provide adequate protection for Wheelus, but ability to do so uncertain.

(c) There is at least possibility breakdown in order leading to threat of mob action against Wheelus. Alternatively, GOL to placate local or general Arab sentiment, may demand control or even evacuation of Wheelus.

(d) If King should abdicate responsibility or prove ineffectual in present circumstances, present government might be overthrown or Prime Minister Maziq simply concentrate on preserving his position in Cyrenaica. If government overthrown or effective authority reverts to provinces, successor leadership we would have to deal with in Tripolitania likely be more radical and Cairo-oriented.

(e) On other hand, suggestion that US giving in to Cairo propaganda in preparing to give up Wheelus could pull rug from under King and present govt.

(f) Mob action against Wheelus which Libyan security forces unable to contain would present us with serious dilemma. Use of US force justified in last analysis in protecting American lives, but physical injury or deaths among Libyans would again inflame emotions against US throughout Arab world. Resulting loss effective use of Wheelus might be only one of adverse consequences for US policy.

(g) This in turn leads to two further questions: (1) whether non-lethal crowd control equipment at Wheelus (fire hoses, etc.) should be augmented, and (2) whether remaining military complement at Wheelus should be reduced to essential minimum.

(h) If Wheelus becomes political and physical target, this may seriously prejudice any prospects early resumption oil flow by companies Libya. We may then have to weigh our interest in Wheelus against interest in Libyan oil. Conversely, continued US presence Wheelus may support our interest in Libyan oil.

(i) If internal security breaks down or country threatened from without (e.g., by Algerians), King and GOL may appeal to us for protection. We would then have to decide whether to intervene with force in their behalf. British would presumably be faced with such request before US, given their defense treaty with Libya and presence of UK troops in Cyrenaica.

(j) Assumption underlying Wheelus/Embassy defense plan (reftel) seems to be that all Americans would be evacuated and base abandoned if mob action could not be controlled. We recognize that total withdrawal from Wheelus will make it extremely difficult if not impossible ever to return to Wheelus.

(k) We would contemplate intervening unilaterally with additional force only to protect American lives, and contemplate intervening with force to protect American interests (base and oil installations, or stake in survival of friendly government) only at express request recognized Libyan governmental authorities. Political implications could be far-reaching.

(l) Because of British interests in Libya (including El Adem airbase) and responsibilities under UK-Libyan treaty, closest possible consultation with UK desirable but not until US has carefully considered situation and you are then so instructed. Embassy London’s 10292 does not provide much reassurance that UKG has thought out its own reactions to various contingencies.

4. Part III—US interests:

(a) We are in Wheelus under valid base agreement. We would want to hold on to base and retain at least essential American military complement, preserving our base rights and resuming normal operations when possible, because (1) military importance Wheelus; (2) abandonment of Wheelus might bring new risks to other Americans and other American interests in Libya and elsewhere in Arab world; (3) we do not wish to appear to be responding to and confirming false Cairo propaganda; (4) our withdrawal would probably weaken Libyan Government and Libyan security; and (5) US withdrawal except under clear and present danger could have unfavorable implications affecting US base rights in other countries.

(b) We want to cooperate closely with present GOL in reducing vulnerability of Wheelus to minimum. For this we need fullest possible cooperation GOL, first, in reestablishing public order, and second, by encouraging GOL to take most effective stand to limit damages Cairo propaganda.

(c) We think it tactically unwise to take any initiative to change status of base. If GOL considers some alterations, at least in appearance, are necessary, we would give any appropriate suggestions to this end our urgent consideration.

(d) We think F–100’s should remain on ground for time being but prepared to leave on short notice.

(e) We want to avoid all actions that would further arouse Libyan and Arab passions against US or would further prejudice US stake in Libyan oil.

(f) For present, therefore, we intend stand fast at Wheelus with minimum activity and hope to rely on GOL to protect base from mobs. Request Embassy Tripoli views on need and desirability reducing size Wheelus complement.

(g) Meanwhile future prospects with regard to Wheelus, in light of all current factors, will be undergoing urgent review.

5. We urgently need your comments and recommendations addressees in light foregoing considerations. We especially need continuing assessment of capability GOL to maintain law and order and survive politically, and of what is likely to happen within country if GOL fails in this mission. We also anxious to have your recommendation of actions that could be taken to preserve acceptability of Wheelus to GOL and also Libyan populace in general.⁴

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Campbell of AFN; cleared by Kitchen, Lang of DOD/ISA, General Sibley of the Joint Staff, General Martin of USAF, Neuman, Judd, and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE.
2. Angry demonstrations and attacks against U.S. offices in Libya occurred immediately following the outbreak of the Six-Day War on June 5.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US)
4. In telegram 114 from Tripoli, June 15, Newsom reported that the Embassy agreed generally with the Department’s assessment. The U.S. approach should be to assume that the Libyan Government would be able to restore order and follow through on its expressed desire to resume normal relations with the United States and normal base activity at Wheelus. Newsom noted that the Libyan officials with whom he had been in contact had given no indication that they expected U.S. withdrawal from Wheelus. He believed that Libyan security officials had the situation under control and the Embassy was working with the government to keep base activities subdued. (Ibid.)