Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 11, 1967, 3:40 p.m.

116386. Ref: Tripoli’s 2228.²

1. DeptOff reiterated to British EmbOff on January 10 our concern that Benghazi withdrawal might cause Libyans question British commitment and might expose Wheelus to additional pressure. Said we wished reinforce points made by Newsom in London and hope way can be paved to assure no adverse Libyan reaction.

2. Brit EmbOff, speaking personally, said he understands matter being presented as no weakening British commitment, in fact redispositions British forces make entry points more secure. Said no doubt British intention informing King and PriMin well in advance. Execution withdrawal needs to be “faultless” so as to cast no doubt on British intentions. Matter of Libyan offset had been considered but rejected. British PriMin message considered sufficient, since higher-level effort might result in alarming Libyans.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Judd and Major Pinckney in G/PM, and approved by Root. Repeated to London, Baida, and Benghazi.
2. In telegram 2228 from Tripoli, January 6, Ambassador Newsom commented on his report earlier that day that the British Ambassador had informed him that the British Cabinet had taken an “irrevocable” decision to withdraw British troops from Benghazi by December 1967. (Ibid.)