Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, August 26, 1966, 6:13 p.m.

36265. Subj: British withdrawal of troops from Libya.

1. During recent Washington visit, Prime Minister Wilson alluded to possibility sustaining treaty commitment to Libya without necessity for British presence. In subsequent conversations in Dept., British Emboff asked whether follow-up of Primin’s brief mention this subject would be sympathetically received. Following negative reaction from Dept., British stated to Dept. they recommended to London no follow-up.

2. Nevertheless, Dept. uneasy that British attempting pave way for virtually complete withdrawal from Libya (presumably excluding El Adem), perhaps based on low-key approaches mentioned above and such discussions as that of Sarell with Newsom (Tripoli A–47).² Moreover, British may believe we would not object, view our lack of reaction to reductions in Malta and Gibraltar and our knowledge their serious economic problem.

3. We suppose that British would justify further withdrawal from Libya on financial grounds (although insignificant foreign exchange savings result since Libya in sterling area), and minimal interpretation of British obligations under Libyan treaty (which in any event they believe they can sustain without presence in Libya). British may also believe that their substantial oil interests in Cyrenaica would receive same kind of protection they judge would be extended to American interests in Libya. It may well be that only factor still keeping British in Libya is personal attitude of King, who presumably regards British as his chief protector, and need for El Adem, which, however, evidently diminishing.

4. We consider that psychological aspects of British presence are of particular importance. Departure of additional British troops might reawaken latent pressure for corresponding U.S. moves, despite personal views of King, and other important Libyans might lose significant respect for value of British (therefore U.S.) military presence. We inclined believe that if British left Benghazi, their presence only in remote eastern reaches of Libya would be tantamount no presence at all on Libyan scene, but only satisfying personal wishes of King. We believe also that once departed, British could not easily move back into Libya. We hope we have made it sufficiently clear to British that U.S. could not fill the void their departure would leave, physically or psychologically.

5. In circumstances, and especially considering pattern discerned in British withdrawals elsewhere, Dept. considers it desirable go on record in London re Libya. Therefore suggest demarche limited to discussion of Libya, based on our common interests in stability and integrity of Libya and history of close consultations over past years. In expressing appreciation for frankness with which British have discussed their defense plans for Libya, and recognition of exigencies of British situation, we might say that we would wish be equally candid in stating that we continue to consider Libya as special case, that we would be alarmed at further indications British wish minimize or eliminate their presence (although we recognize that they have plainly said they will honor defense commitment), that our recognition of British difficulties and consequent reductions elsewhere in Mediterranean should not be misread as indicating we would be indifferent to further UK withdrawal from Libya.

6. Welcome comments of addressees, but believe approach in London should be made at early date.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–UK. Secret. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Looram in AF and Shullaw in EUR/PMI, and approved by Kitchen. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Baida.
2. Dated July 27. (Ibid.)