58. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)1
Dear Averell:
Thank you for your letter of May 13th2 in which you asked for our views concerning the position we should adopt at the next meeting with the Libyans on the problem of Wheelus Air Base. We appreciate the [Page 89] opportunity to comment on this matter. We attach great importance to retaining effective use of Wheelus for as long as possible. We also want to avoid prejudicing our base rights in such other countries as Ethiopia by the premature loss of our facilities in Libya.
As we see it, the negotiating situation at this time presents a choice between two broad courses of action. One course is to accept the principle of abrogation now. Presumably this would mean, at least, agreeing now to settle for a shorter tenure at Wheelus than the 1954 Agreement provides. The other course is to attempt to deflect the Libyans from this issue of principle. We might, for example, propose that the tenure question be reserved for later discussion. Meanwhile, we would try to focus the talks on ways in which U.S. operation of Wheelus might assist Libya in some of its military activities, and on formal changes at Wheelus which might make our activities there politically more presentable for Libya. Between these two alternatives, we recommend using the second at this time.
Following our recent discussion with you, we have well under way the study of progressive reductions in the scale of operations at Wheelus for possible use at an appropriate time in the negotiations. The hard core requirement for a fair-weather training base is not easily separable into two or more operations, each with its own facilities. However, we hope to have the broadest possible range of options available for consideration in the near future.3
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- On June 4, Harriman replied to Vance saying that although the Department fully endorsed the negotiating tactic Vance had suggested, he thought that U.S. negotiators ought to be aware of the possibility that in order to meet the U.S. objective of retaining Wheelus for as long as possible, they might be required to agree to discuss tenure in some form. On June 10, Harriman sent Vance a follow-up letter noting that in considering the tenure question, U.S. negotiators needed to take into account the certainty that the Libyans would not under any circumstances consent to an extension of U.S. base rights beyond their scheduled expiration date of December 24, 1971. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 680.1 Libya)↩