Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

553. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, January 23, 1967.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Background

1. Since 1923 Southern Rhodesia has been an internally self-governing colony with a high degree of autonomy. A new constitution granted by Great Britain and approved by a predominately European electorate in 1961 removed most of the few remaining legal controls held by the United Kingdom. This constitution was abrogated on November 11, 1965 when Ian Smith unilaterally broke with the British Crown.

2. The colony’s estimated population of 4,350,000 is composed of about 4,105,000 Africans, 224,000 Europeans (white), and 21,000 of other ethnic groups—or a ratio of almost 20 Africans to 1 European. The whites are largely British or South African in origin.

3. The significant features added by the 1961 constitution were a bill of rights and the introduction of a second electoral roll with lower franchise qualifications, permitting a limited number of Africans to qualify. The African leaders refused to cooperate in implementing the constitution, which they considered a device to perpetuate minority rule, and few Africans registered to vote.

4. The European electorate showed little desire to accept African demands and progressively replaced their more moderate party leaders. In April 1964 Winston Field, a Rhodesian Front Prime Minister, was replaced by his deputy, Ian Smith, when Field failed to move rapidly enough for the more authoritarian elements in his party in independence negotiations with the British. The replacement of Field by Smith was a continuation of the trend evident since the 1950’s when each Prime Minister was more right-wing than his predecessor. On November 11, 1965, after nearly 2 years of unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Ian Smith illegally and unilaterally declared the territory independent from the United Kingdom and proclaimed a new constitution.

5. The British still appear willing to grant the colony its independence under conditions which provide for majority rule coupled with guarantees of minority rights.

6. The six principles set forth by the British in the talks provide for unimpeded progress toward majority rule within a constitutional framework acceptable to the Rhodesian people.

7. The United States and other nations have accepted the British Government’s position that Southern Rhodesia is a British colony. We continue to recognize the sovereignty and legal authority of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia. No country in the world has recognized Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of independence.

8. Soon after the unilateral declaration of independence on November 11, 1965, the British, by a vote of 10–0–1 (France), won approval in the Security Council for a measured policy of economic sanctions against the regime. The voluntary sanctions program has caused some deteriorations in the Rhodesian economy, although there has been serious circumvention throughout South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique. The Rhodesian economy continued to function reasonably well and the Smith regime remained in firm political control. The British began in April 1966 another series of exploratory talks with the Smith regime at the official level aimed at finding a basis for negotiations.

9. Prior to the Commonwealth Conference in London (September 6–15), rumors of an impending UK “sell-out” to Smith were widespread. Zambia threatened to leave the Commonwealth if British policy toward Rhodesia was approved by a majority of the members. The conference communique reflected the wide divergence of opinion within the Commonwealth over British policy on Rhodesia. The UK received general support from only four countries, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, Malta and Malawi, with Canada playing the role of mediator. The other 16 called in varying degrees for more positive action by the British to bring down the Smith regime. (Tanzania did not attend.) The communique did record, nevertheless, the UK’s intention to put proposals to the Rhodesians designed to give the illegal regime one last chance to return to constitutional rule before the end of the year. If these proposals were not accepted, the communique noted that the British Government would jointly sponsor mandatory sanctions in the UN prohibiting the import by member states of selected Rhodesian products.

10. A meeting took place between Wilson and Smith aboard HMS Tiger December 2–4. There, the two sides drafted a “working document” to be submitted to the British and Rhodesian Cabinets. The British Cabinet announced its approval of the document shortly after Wilson’s return to London. The Smith regime, however, stated on December 5 that it was prepared to agree to Wilson’s constitutional proposals but that it had to reject the Tiger proposals as a whole because it could not accept a return to legality (i.e., rule by the Governor for an interim period of about four months). Thereafter, Wilson went to Parliament and reaffirmed the British commitment in the Commonwealth communique not to grant independence before majority rule. Under the terms of the “working document,” independence would have preceded majority rule.

11. UK Foreign Minister Brown on December 8 submitted a resolution to the UNSC calling for mandatory economic sanctions on selected Rhodesian products. On December 16, 1966 a resolution (No. 232) was adopted by the Security Council imposing selective mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

US Interests and Objectives

12. A number of important US interests are involved. We want to maintain our political influence in Black Africa and help to create conditions conducive to stability and progress. Continued lack of movement toward a Rhodesian solution could be exploited by extreme African elements, as well as by the Communists, to our disadvantage. Our goals are to avoid a racist war in Southern Rhodesia and serious deterioration in race relations elsewhere in Africa (particularly Zambia). We are trying also to prevent closer political and economic cooperation among the white-dominated countries of southern Africa. We share the British view that a phased movement toward majority rule in Rhodesia is the best way to achieve our aims.

Interests and Objectives of the UK

13. The basic issue between the British Government and the Rhodesian regime has been the timing of independence in relation to majority rule. The British have been willing to grant independence before majority rule, but only if unimpeded progress toward majority rule were assured. The Africans and other members of the United Nations have urged the UK to allow independence only after the establishment of majority rule.

14. The UK initially supported a voluntary sanctions program (adopted by the UN Security Council in November, 1965) and subsequently backed the mandatory economic sanctions resolution against Southern Rhodesia in the hope that such pressure on the Smith regime would bring about a settlement of the problem based on the six principles. The British are most reluctant to see sanctions extended to South Africa, from which Rhodesia has been buying most of its petroleum products. Such economic warfare with the South Africans could gravely affect the British balance of payments.

15. The British Government has ruled out the use of force in the belief that (1) this would lead to open warfare; (2) public opinion in the UK would not accept such a course; (3) South Africa might intervene; and (4) it would be a big operation necessitating the moving of UK forces from Germany or the Far East.

US Strategy and Past Actions

16. On the same day that the Smith regime declared its independence from the United Kingdom, we announced the recall of our Consul General in Salisbury and the closing of the US Information Office in Rhodesia. The US Government at present maintains a small housekeeping consular staff in Salisbury by virtue of authority granted by the UK.

17. Following the UNSC resolution in November 1965 calling for voluntary economic sanctions in Southern Rhodesia the US Government urged US companies importing various Rhodesian products into the United States to find alternate sources of supply. We later imposed controls on exports to Rhodesia from the United States.

18. On April 9, 1966 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution noting its concern that substantial oil supplies might reach Rhodesia and result in a “threat to the peace” by encouraging the illegal regime. When it became apparent to the British Government that the voluntary sanctions program was not having the desired effect, we were asked to support a UK request in the UN Security Council for a resolution calling for mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. We agreed and, following the collapse of the HMS Tiger talks, the British introduced their resolution. On December 16 UNSC resolution No. 232 was adopted (11 (US)-0–4 (USSR, France, Mali and Bulgaria)) imposing selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The list of embargoed items covers some 80 percent of Rhodesian exports. On January 5, 1967 Executive Order No. 11322 was issued prohibiting activities by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that are proscribed by the resolution.

Future Actions

19. The UK continues to have primary responsibility for the situation. The US Government must, nevertheless, maintain close touch with the British as the sanctions program evolves. We must do whatever we can to provide the British with maximum leverage to use with Rhodesian regime to reach an acceptable settlement. However, the US Government must avoid any action vis-a-vis the British which might be interpreted as pressure on our part to make further concessions to Smith.

20. We should hold frank discussions with the British on the special problem posed by the attitudes of Portugal and South Africa in complying with the sanctions resolution. The British should approach both Portugal and South Africa to convince these two countries that their own long-range interests will best be served by compliance with the Security Council’s decision. As a follow-up, the US should make similar approaches. The above approaches should not foreclose the use of South Africa as a means of influencing the Rhodesians.

21. We should question the British as to how they see the effect of mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia in both the short and longer term. We should also try to learn what further means of bringing about a satisfactory settlement they have in mind. The British should not be given the impression, however, that the United States is so interested in a solution as to be urging concessions to Smith which would be unacceptable to the international community.

22. Since the use of force against the Rhodesian regime appears to be ruled out, no early solution of the problem can be anticipated. The US should nevertheless continue its policy of non-recognition of the Smith regime in order to protect our credibility and position throughout Africa.

23. The foregoing discussion reflects the current assessment of a variety of considerations relevant to US policy. Our policy should be given continuing consideration in the light of the anticipated future problems discussed below.

Anticipated Future Problems

The Enforcement of Mandatory Sanctions

24. The most likely cause of failure of the mandatory economic sanctions program will be non-compliance by key countries. There is, however, some doubt that, even if sanctions were complied with fully, they would in fact bring about an early settlement in Southern Rhodesia based on the six principles.

25. The countries most likely to violate the sanctions are of course Portugal and South Africa.

26. The question that the Security Council will be faced with in March 1967, when a review by the Security Council of the effectiveness of sanctions is scheduled, is what action to take should there be evidence of non-compliance by UN members. Should there be considerable evidence of non-compliance by Portugal and South Africa, there is the strong possibility that various African countries and others will urge the extension of mandatory sanctions to both South Africa and the Portuguese African territories.

27. The UK is most reluctant to engage in economic warfare with South Africa and we would find ourselves in a difficult position should we support such an extension. While our commercial and investment interests are not as extensive in South Africa as those of the UK, we nevertheless have considerable national interest in seeing economic conflict avoided with South Africa so as not to increase the strains on the value of the pound and speculation in gold. One possibility for the US would be to seek reaffirmation of the present sanctions and a renewed call for compliance.

28. Should there be non-compliance by South Africa and the Portuguese territories, various UN members may not only call for an extension of sanctions to these areas but may also request an armed blockade of the coast of the area to force these governments to comply. The Soviet Union would probably encourage and support such moves in order to bring economic pressure on the West for its own ends.

29. The failure of mandatory economic sanctions to bring about the restoration of constitutional authority in Southern Rhodesia would create hostility toward the US and the UK not only in Africa but in other areas of the world. American domestic criticism from both right and left of the US position on sanctions is likely to continue and support for the UK and UN actions may become more difficult to maintain. The prestige of the UK and US is involved as well as that of the UN.

30. If present measures are not effective, the African states can be expected to increase pressure for an independent US policy on Southern Rhodesia. Although US policy has been represented to the Africans as independently arrived at, certain key African leaders persist in the view that the US has been merely following the British lead.

The Declaration of a Rhodesian Republic

31. In the event of a declaration of a republic in Rhodesia (which Smith has stated will not take place without a vote of “the people”), we would be faced with the problem of our representation in Salisbury. Depending on what the British do and the terms on which the Rhodesian regime would accept our continued presence, we might find it to our interest (a) to withdraw the small staff that is presently there, (b) to maintain some unofficial liaison with the regime, or (c) to remain in place, on the theory that an illegal regime cannot become any more illegal by action going beyond the unilateral declaration of independence.

Racial Conflict in Southern Africa

32. In the event that serious racial conflict develops in southern Africa, Communist countries will attempt to win over nationalist elements among the Black Africans. A racial conflict in Southern Rhodesia would be difficult to keep from spreading into other areas both to the north and south. It would be difficult for the United States to remain totally aloof from such a conflict and we would be faced with the possibility of being urged to support either the “white settlers” for the sake of stability or the “black nationalists,” who would probably have Communist backing, for the sake of our position in Africa and in other non-white countries in the world.

1. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 250, Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Federation of. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Bromley Smith to the National Security Council refers to it as a State Department paper for consideration at the January 25 NSC meeting.