544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
68392. For Ambassador. Following message was sent today by private channel to Prime Minister from President Johnson:
“In reply to your good message on Rhodesia,2 let me begin by saying that I greatly admired the way you handled the Commonwealth Conference. You were certainly right to concentrate on holding the group together and retaining control of the Rhodesian situation. As you say, the Commonwealth is very important to all of us—the more so as racial problems multiply.
If Smith throws away his last chance, you may depend on our full support for the moves spelled out in your letter. Specifically, we will support your withdrawal of all previous offers to Smith, your adoption of a position of no independence before majority rule, and your proposal of limited mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council.
I know you are aware that there will be strong pressures to broaden the sanctions and to apply them to South Africa. My people—both at the State Department and in New York—seriously doubt that there will be support in the Council for limiting the scope of export sanctions or for restricting to Mozambique any subsequent oil embargo. They believe that the drive to enlarge the target to include South Africa is likely to be overwhelming. Nevertheless, I fully appreciate your problems with a UK veto of such an enlargement.
I do not think that we can help through direct contact with Smith. If you believe it would be useful to have a go at Vorster, I am willing to have my Ambassador reiterate our firm support for your policy and for UN resolutions designed to end the Smith regime. He would try to persuade them that their own interests dictate that they comply with the present voluntary sanctions. He would also point out that the Security Council is likely to impose mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, and that South African refusal to comply would lead to pressures to extend them to South Africa which would be difficult for us to resist. Perhaps your people in Pretoria could make a similar approach.
In any event, I would suggest that we use the time you have gained to discuss the problems presented if you are forced to give effect to your conference commitments, as well as the contingencies which could arise [Page 920] if things go badly in New York. If you agree, I will get my people in touch with yours.
I want you to know that I think you have been a great force for good in this matter. I know it is a heavy cross, but you are doing Africa and the world a great service.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Nodis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S.↩
- See Document 542.↩