Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

542. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 24, 1966, 11:45 a.m.

53836. Following message received by President from Wilson September 23:

Begin Text:

1. I have purposely not troubled you so far with messages about Rhodesia. I know that David Bruce and Pat Dean between them will have kept both you yourself and Dean Rusk well in the picture of recent events and particularly of the exceptionally difficult discussion we had at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, as well as the background and reasons for the Commonwealth Secretary’s present visit to Rhodesia.

2. But I believe we shall shortly reach a moment of decision in this Rhodesian crisis. As you will have heard, I came under the strongest pressure during the Commonwealth Conference to use force against the Smith regime, to declare categorically and unconditionally that there would be no independence before majority rule and also to move a resolution of comprehensive mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. None of these propositions was acceptable to us, but I had to fight an excessively difficult and at times bitter action against them. In the end, I believe we came out reasonably well. The majority of the Commonwealth tacitly accepted that we could not be expected to use military force; and that it was reasonable that we should have a little more time to give the regime one last chance of coming to its senses. But in return, I had to agree that, if that last chance were not accepted by the regime, we would support limited mandatory sanctions against Rhodesian exports of raw materials and perhaps at a latter stage an extension of the oil embargo to cover all imports via Mozambique. Provided that the Commonwealth supported us at the United Nations in limiting the impact of the sanctions in this way (i.e., so as to avoid, if possible, an overt clash with South Africa), I also agreed that we would then withdraw all previous offers made to Rhodesia and declare that there would be no independence before majority rule.

This was the price we had to pay to buy this additional time for a last showdown with Smith. But it was also necessary if we were to hold the Commonwealth together. And I know that this was an objective that you also strongly desired, given the immense racial tensions in the world and the value of the Commonwealth as a truly multi-racial association in helping to mitigate those tensions. I had broadly two main objectives throughout our Rhodesian discussions: to hold the Commonwealth together and to keep the Rhodesian situation under our own control, so far as possible.

4. There were times when I doubted whether either objective could be attained. As it turned out, we managed to secure both, at least for a limited period of time; and I truly believe that the Commonwealth has emerged stronger rather than weaker from this great test.

5. But time really is now of the essence. The Commonwealth Secretary, whose reports this week show that he is playing a difficult hand with shrewdness and skill, is doing his best to make Smith realize that we and the rest of the Commonwealth mean business and that there really is a limit to our willingness and ability to carry the can internationally for Rhodesia. We believe that the terms we are offering as set out in the Commonwealth communique genuinely represent an honorable way out for Smith. But if he is to accept them, he will almost certainly have to bring himself to ditch his own extremists. And I am bound to say that his talks so far with the Commonwealth Secretary do not encourage us to hope that he will have the guts to do this.

6. But if this rather pessimistic forecast proves right, then we are going to be faced with the need for the measures agreed at the Common-wealth Prime Ministers Conference. I hope that initially we can agree in the Security Council on limited sanctions and that this will not therefore involve us immediately in a clash with South Africa. But we can certainly not be sure of this: and in any case a decision to move to further mandatory sanctions of this type may well hasten the day when a clash with South Africa becomes inevitable. This is something which is, I believe, equally repugnant to you and to us. The consequences (as I explained to the Africans at the Commonwealth Conference and as many of them in their heart of hearts fully recognize) are incalculable. They could in the longer run lead to armed conflict with the South Africans and would certainly produce economic warfare, the effect of which, for both our countries in particular but also I believe for Western economic interests generally, would be excessively damaging. But equally I feel bound to repeat the warning that George Brown gave George Ball during the latter’s recent visit here to the effect that we must not be counted on to incur the immense international odium that would result from a British veto in the Security Council on any measures bound to result in conflict with South Africa. This is a case where I think you and we would have to stand or fall together; which is why I am addressing you now in the hope that, by judicious action before the moment of decision arrives, you may be able to help us avert the dangers I have just outlined.

7. It is difficult, and indeed inappropriate, for me to suggest what it might be possible for you to do to help us at this juncture. If you felt that it would be productive, I should welcome any action by the U.S. Government that you might think appropriate, designed to bring Smith to his senses and get him to accept that we all of us mean business, and that there is nothing but isolation and disaster at the end of the road for Rhodesia unless he is now prepared to reach an agreement on the basis of this last offer of ours, even if this has to be at the price of breaking with some of his associates.

8. I also believe that South Africa’s influence on Smith is potentially of the greatest importance. If you saw any prospect of being able to induce the South African Government to bring pressure on Smith for a settlement, in their own best interests, this might well be the most useful of all. In addition, of course we hope that, if we are forced before the end of the year to work for limited mandatory sanctions at the United Nations, we shall be able to count on your help with other countries designed to keep the sanctions limited. We have made it clear that we shall only work for these sanctions provided we have full support from the Commonwealth for keeping them limited. We mean to stick to this. But equally we must expect that at least the Zambians and a number of other Afro-Asians will press for a great deal more. However, what we really want, if at all possible, is to induce Smith to come to terms.

9. I am sorry to worry you with our troubles when you have quite enough of your own. But I feel justified in doing this because, as I say, I think these are really our joint troubles; and if there is anything you feel you can usefully do now, we may be able to avoid finding ourselves jointly in a much more difficult situation which may confront us within the coming months, particularly at the United Nations and in what may follow from the debates there. End Text.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. The text was received from the White House and approved by Read of S/S. Repeated to USUN.