Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

502. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, December 6, 1965.

Mac—

I’m becoming quite concerned lest Rhodesia rapidly get out of hand. So I’ve redrafted my memo to make this point, and to help the President by showing that there’s more than one option, even at cost of appearing an advocate.

The reason is that State has to my knowledge never given him the whole picture, only a set of piecemeal tactical requests, and a general philosophy that this is a situation in which we can make haste slowly. Partly of course this is because no one wanted to bother LBJ unduly during convalescence, and also because the Seventh Floor professes to feel that he himself wants to stay as far away from yet another mess as he can. However, this is also the Seventh Floor’s own feeling and I’m not at all sure their wish isn’t father to the thought.

Hence my memo which you might just leave at the Ranch. It has the merit of giving the other side of the story. Nor do I feel apologetic for my consistent instinct—now amply supported by the evidence—that State’s counsels of caution ignore the likelihood that such crises tend to get worse if we let them drift, and that we’re likely to get sucked into this one sooner or later anyway. It is also sheer inconsistency for State to send the President a Strengthened Africa Program, but not warn him that our stance on Rhodesia will have a far more decisive impact on our influence in that dark continent.

RWK

Attachment

Washington, December 6, 1965, 5 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Rhodesia Mess. Without mounting a neighing charger (I agree with Bruce that we should look any UK gift horse in the mouth), I offer this broader look at a looming problem than the piecemeal tactical requests put up to you so far. Moreover, at risk of being frankly partisan, I think that you should be given the case for action now to match against the counsels of caution natural in this situation.

As the recent OAU meeting shows,² the Rhodesia crisis is already moving a lot faster than the UK bargained for. There is a mounting risk that Wilson may lose control of it to a gaggle of irresponsible Africans, perhaps with Soviet support. All this is happening while the British (and we) debate whether the UK should go for some kind of “quick kill” strategy, or a much slower economic strangulation. However, this question may soon become academic.

The real question for the UK may rapidly become one of whether it can move fast enough to forestall African escalation. This in turn may depend on the kind of support we can offer, because the UK will find it very hard to carry out any effective strategy without such support. Thus we probably can exert a decisive influence on HMG’s choice.

A. Why get involved in Rhodesia? There’s no doubt that we ought to duck this mess if we can afford to, leaving it to the British or others. We already have enough even larger problems on our plate. But can we?

Rhodesia itself isn’t very important to us. But the point is that it’s critical to all the other Africans. They see it as a straight anti-colonial issue, and all their anti-white instincts are aroused. So our stance on this issue will greatly affect our influence throughout Africa—it will be a test of whether we mean what we say about self-determination and racialism. It will be far more significant than the Congo in this sense.

Next, we’re already involved. We’ve declared ourselves at the UN and imposed some sanctions. We’ll be under great Afro-Asian and UN pressure to do a lot more. Nor would I discount the likelihood of growing domestic pressure here for supporting in Africa what we insist on at home.

• Third is the rapidly growing risk that the UK may lose control of this game, or even throw up its hands and let the OAU take over. The radical Africans are already trying hard to force the issue. They’ll plug for use of overt force or guerilla warfare, thus posing the UK (and US) with the dilemma of either helping out or seeing the Soviets, Chicoms, and Nasser do so (or maybe even being pressed to join with them). Thus the longer this crisis rolls, the greater the chance of it becoming a far bigger and less controllable affair, with pressures on us to block the Communists a la the Congo.
• Fourth is the inevitable pressure on a quarter of the world’s copper supply if Zambia and Katanga are cut off by the Rhodesians.

Finally, as Arthur Goldberg points out (NY 2411), how we handle Rhodesia will also directly affect the remaining agenda of Portuguese territories, Southwest Africa, and apartheid. The longer the Rhodesian boil goes unlanced, the sharper the confrontation over the Southern third of Africa will become. Conversely, if we can lick Smith quickly, it may induce greater Portuguese and perhaps even South African flexibility as they see the handwriting on the wall.

For all these reasons, it is unrealistic to think we can stay aloof. The odds are that if the British don’t move fast—which they probably won’t without our support—we’ll probably be compelled to get involved anyway, but under far worse circumstances. If so, then it might be much better—and less costly in the long run—to try and help the UK choke Ian Smith quickly. This case is outlined in more detail below.

B. Will a slow economic squeeze work? The answer seems to be “no,” as the UK itself is coming to realize. Economic sanctions will take time and could prove ineffective. Time may also play into the hands of Ian Smith and his crowd. With South Africa and perhaps Portugal quietly determined to sustain the Smith regime, the key to an effective sanction campaign is missing. This is one reason for Wilson’s reluctance to invoke total economic sanctions, or to support an oil embargo unless other nations comply. So Ian Smith is betting that, with a little belt tightening, he can outwait the UK, the UN, and the Africans, who will soon adjust to a fait accompli. The UK has talked of the Smith regime’s collapse in terms of three to six months, since the real bite may be delayed till the tobacco sales next spring. But the longer it stays afloat, the less chance for its downfall.

C. The Likelihood of Escalation. But an even more compelling reason is that economic sanctions won’t have time to work because the Africans will probably force the issue first. African frustration is growing in direct proportion to UK and UN inability to bring Rhodesia to heel. As during the Congo crisis, African pressure for direct military action, fed by the Chicoms and Soviets, will probably increase rather than fade out. Bitterly dissatisfied with UK action to date, they are trying to up the ante, either by prodding the UK to take more drastic steps or by taking the initiative away from it.

D. The key is what Rhodesia’s neighbor Zambia does. Unless it joins the other Africans, they will be noisy but largely impotent. But Kaunda is under increasing pressure to act, even though Rhodesian retaliation would cripple Zambia’s economy and put great pressure on copper. To ease this pressure, Kaunda has pled for UK forces. The UK is sending a fighter squadron and probably an infantry battalion too. HMG is also talking about shifting to a “quick kill” strategy, though we don’t know yet whether these moves—and bold words—are designed mainly to pacify Kaunda and others, or betoken a really new UK plan. In any case, such moves might actually encourage Kaunda to take precipitate action in the expectation that the UK and US would bail him out.

Almost all of Zambia’s hydro power, coal, POL, etc. comes in from or through Rhodesia. Smith hesitates to cut it off, because Rhodesia would lose its most lucrative customer (with much greater economic impact than from the present sanctions). But he might do so in desperation. US/UK studies show that it would be very hard and quite expensive to keep Zambia afloat. The biggest problem would be to get enough coal in to run Zambia’s railroads and provide power for its mines, and then to get copper out. Alternate rail routes are not very good, and depend mostly on tacit Portuguese cooperation. A civilian airlift seems very expensive for more than a minimum of emergency supplies. One partial hope would be to step up coal output quickly from a new Zambian mine, though it’s lower quality coal.

All this leads to three conclusions: (1) At present reading this crisis will probably get much worse rather than tail off; (2) the UK may lose the whip hand, which would make the mess even worse; (3) sooner or later Zambia will clash with Rhodesia, and then appeal for a rescue operation—which would be very expensive.

E. What are the US options? Barbara Ward listed them in the analysis she sent you. They boil down to (1) stay loose and let the UK do what it can; or (2) back the UK in taking a stronger line. But if I’m right, we don’t really have two options; instead it’s more a choice between helping the UK move faster now (with our backing), or being dragged in later when the UK may no longer be in control. It’s the perennial question of whether it would be wiser—and cheaper—to move vigorously to choke off a crisis, or to play it more gradually.

F. Could tougher measures bring Smith to heel quickly? There is no easy answer. The key is to convince the Rhodesians that they’re going to be in impossible hot water if they don’t back down. Preliminary troop dispositions and tougher economic measures would help, and may also be essential to keep the other Africans to give the UK a chance. The mere threat of forceful seizure of Kariba could have an enormous psychological impact, both within and outside Southern Rhodesia.

The case against such “quick kill” threats is that they might only trigger Rhodesia to cut Zambia’s water off. But once again the point is that if the UK doesn’t move fast, African pressure on Zambia may force it to self-inflict this wound anyway. And once the Africans themselves get going on a military solution the chances of a UK-style solution will be compromised.

Thus there may even be a strong case for urging the UK to consider use of force. This would be highly painful to Wilson, but less so to us. I’d hazard that our commitment could be limited to airlift of UK troops. This would be a lot less expensive than bailing out Zambia.

G. What would it cost us to back the UK fully now? Wilson is operating both politically and economically so close to the margin that it will be hard for him to act decisively unless he can count on us. His people have already presented a bill of particulars (London 2488 attached). We just don’t know yet how much these measures would cost us. Presumably stockpile releases for the “common defense” would be done on a deferred barter basis without B/P impact; if done as a sale they would help our payments balance. Most of what we lent or supplied to help Zambia (locomotives, rail cars, cargo planes) would doubtless be US-made too. These things need careful study, but I’d hazard that the costs would be less than those if the Africans take over, with Soviet support. And if the plan misfired, we’d be no worse off than we would be anyway if Zambia’s links with Rhodesia will be cut sooner or later in any case.

H. Conclusions. (1) We can’t stand aloof from the Rhodesia crisis—events won’t let us; (2) a gradual economic squeeze already seems inadequate to bring Smith to heel; (3) the slower the UK moves the more likely the Africans will take over—with unpredictable results. Nor does a cautious US policy really protect us from eventual greater involvement; it may merely postpone this until after the crisis has become much worse.

If all this is so, then urging the UK toward a quick kill—provided that it seems to have a fair chance of working—may be our best bet. HMG isn’t asking to take over, but only to back it. All we need say is that we’ll consider doing so, if the UK plan looks reasonable (they haven’t really shown all their cards as yet). But Washington’s inclination will be to err on the side of caution unless you call for a serious look at a quick kill. To do so would not commit you, merely offer a better basis for choice.

R.W. Komer ³

Attachment

The UK has asked for our reactions to the following questions (State’s preliminary reactions are also given):

1. Will the US take actions corresponding to the UK’s intensified trade and financial sanctions, and support UK efforts to get others to do the same? We are willing to approach private US companies to encourage their voluntary support of UK sanctions; we already have Presidential authorization to regulate US exports to Rhodesia and can match UK action commodity by commodity; we would support UK efforts to enlist the cooperation of other countries.

2. If the US cannot support an immediate oil embargo, how far are we prepared to go?

We don’t want to commit ourselves to more than consultations on this subject because an oil embargo is ineffective without a naval blockade.

3. Would the US agree to meet the cost of any equipment, more quickly obtainable in the US, which Zambia urgently needs for contingency planning?

We first need to study the contingency planning exercise.

4. Would the US join the UK in the financing (insofar as Zambia is unable to finance) and planning of an airlift?

We would agree to join in planning, but not in financing.

5. Would the US release manganese from stockpile and help persuade the Belgians to take it in order to release freight cars to carry additional Zambian copper out via the Congo?

We’d agree to sell manganese from stockpile to the Belgians.

6. In the event of a copper shortage, would the US agree to help the UK and Europeans from our stockpile?

We would not be able to release stockpile copper.

7. Would the US participate in an economic mission going to Zambia next week to delve into the economic ramifications of UDI?

We would not participate; however, we’d send an economist to our Embassy to work with the mission.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Secret.
2. The OAU Foreign Ministers met in Addis Ababa December 3–5 and voted to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom by December 15, if it had not crushed the Rhodesian rebellion by that date.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.