Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

471. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State¹

Salisbury, October 2, 1965.

163. Pursuant Deptel 198 (1720 to London)² saw PM Smith, who received me on an hour’s notice, at 11:20 am. MinExtAff Dupont was with him.

In accordance London’s 47 (1411 to Dept)³ made following points: 1) expressed deep concern USG over critical stage now apparently reached in GSR-HMG relations; 2) Stated USG would follow forthcoming GSR-HMG negotiations in London with closest attention; 3) Voiced earnest hope USG, GSR and HMG would succeed in reaching agreement acceptable to all parties; 4) Said USG would view failure this respect as tragic and likely have grave repercussions throughout Africa and indeed world.

In reply Smith said he thanked SecState for his message which he regarded as “constructive” and “positive.” Asked me convey following additional points to USG: 1) He considered it “ironic” that HMG now appealing to USG for assistance, as he had heard on the “grapevine,” against potentially rebellious colony whereas situation was just the reverse in 1775; 2) GSR does not intend to do anything “rash or irresponsible.” On other hand it was his duty protect Rhodesia from becoming another Tanzania, for example, dangerously infiltrated by Chicoms. To avert such a development GSR would feel fully forced take this extreme step, which he still hoped avoid; he trusted USG would refrain from “interfering” with situation. Such outside interference would only make matters worse, particularly for Africans in SR; 4) If vindictive and harmful sanctions were taken against SR we should not delude ourselves that repercussions would be confined to SR alone. Neighboring countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, could also be hurt. (Smith referred here to 500,000 Zambian and Nyasa workers in SR who figured in earlier GSR whitepaper.)

Comment: I did not attempt argue any of these points since Smith indicated he considered interview, which reasonably friendly and relaxed, terminated.

I regard points 3) and 4) as essentially tactical threats calculated deter US since GSR clearly apprehensive over possibility USG may back up and reenforce UK economic sanctions. Alacrity with which I was received at time when Smith very taken up is further sign, my view, of definite GSR concern over position US will take on SR case.⁴

McClelland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but the telegram was received at 9:12 a.m. and repeated to London, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. Passed to the White House at 9:50 a.m.
2. Dated October 1. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, Document 469.
4. Telegram 1458 from London, October 4, reported that the British were very pleased with McClelland’s approach to Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD)