Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:56 p.m.

1669. For Kaiser from Acting Secretary. I have seen London’s 1373 rptd Salisbury 44² and, in view of possible imminence of UDI, believe it essential that we and British thoroughly understand steps each can take should UDI occur.

Our support for HMG position on UDI is not without qualification. We cannot undertake, for instance, to make up any balance of payments losses—whether they be 50 million pounds or 200–300 million pounds—which UK suffers as result of sanctions imposed in event of UDI.

While British may be aware that there is some thought here that we might provide substitute for UK imports of SR tobacco by sales from CCC stocks of US Virginia leaf tobacco we not yet sure this can be done promptly, that we have authority for exactly this type transaction, or that it could be done without balance of payments costs to UK.

Similarly, another suggested course, that of suspending SR sugar quota on US market to complement removal of access to Commonwealth markets for SR sugar, requires further study as to exact steps necessary to achieve it.

Finally, course of embargoing all US trade—imports and exports—with SR presents problems which require further study here.

In short, we not in position now to give unqualified support to UK economic proposals in event of SR UDI and British should be aware that our political support is not to be construed as blank check for support in other spheres.

While I have instructed Department to do its staff work and get on top of these matters urgently, and we will inform you more specifically of what we can and cannot do, believe you and other Embassy officers should be guided by foregoing in discussions with British authorities.

At same time, seems clear that as hour of decision approaches, HMG not precise as to what it will or can do. Believe we should have from them clearer indication of their proposals, their ability to undertake them, and rapidity with which they might move.

In using foregoing as guidance you should avoid making it possible for HMG to seize upon our yet-to-be-determined ability or inability to follow the UK fully or partially on sanctions or of our unwillingness to offset balance of payments losses as excusing them from taking action or permitting them to place blame for lack of action at our door particularly in justifying themselves to other Commonwealth countries.³

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, George S. Springsteen, Jr.; cleared by Mulcahy; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury.
2. In telegram 1373 from London, September 29, Kaiser reported that the British were faced with a dilemma in deciding how far to go in imposing economic restrictions against Rhodesia in the event of UDI. He noted that the British Government believed that it had received firm assurances of U.S. support no matter what it decided, and he advised that if the U.S. Government had any doubts about unqualified support of the eventual British decision, it should make these known to the British as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD)
3. In telegram 1418 from London, October 1, Kaiser reported that he had told Garner that while the U.S. Government fully supported the British political position on Rhodesia, there was a question at this point as to how far it could go on economic actions. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD)