415. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)1
SUBJECT
- Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group of 12 March 1964
The minutes of the meeting of the Special Group held on March 12, 1964, contain the following item:
“Angola—Covert Support to Angolan Nationalist Movement.
“On the Angola paper dated 6 March 19642 and the Mozambique paper dated 28 February 1964,3 Mr. Alexis Johnson said he was acting under instructions and that the Secretary of State requested these proposals be referred to a Cabinet-level meeting for resolution. It was noted that other members were in favor of both papers as submitted. A discussion followed in which Mr. Johnson pointed out that State Department [Page 721] has serious reservations because, if the proposals were approved, the U.S. would be almost in a position of joint action with the bloc against a NATO ally.4 In other words, if Holden Roberto received Soviet and/or Chinese arms and the U.S. provided him with non-military support this would be a form of coincidental collaboration with the Communists against a Western ally.
“Mr. Bundy said he was in favor of supporting the nationalist movement because in the maelstroms of loose power on the African continent, the USSR and China will immediately plunge in if the U.S. remains aloof. Mr. Waller emphasized that the Agency was in a position to deal with many of the other GRAE leaders in addition to Holden Roberto with whom they had been in contact for eight years. There is no alternative to covert subsidies. Withdrawal means abandonment of any guidance and/or influence in the nationalist movement. It was pointed out that Soviet or Chinese arms did not necessarily mean the accompaniment of Chinese and Soviet technicians as experts. Subsidization of moderates might minimize additional bloc inroads.
“The Attorney General said he felt it was absolutely essential to maintain contact with these movements and that the wave of the future is with African nationalism and not with Portugal. He felt we must be realistic in these matters.
“It was determined that the Angola Mozambique package would be referred next week to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General with representation from the Special Group.”5
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler.↩
- Attached but not printed. The memorandum for the Special Group requested authority to provide covert non-military support to Holden Roberto and selected other Angolan nationalist leaders with whom a secure relationship could be developed in order to influence their political orientation and to exercise some control over their program and planning. [text not declassified]↩
- Not attached.↩
- A March 10 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Tyler to U. Alexis Johnson stated that EUR opposed the proposal and did not believe that the U.S. Government should support, secretly or otherwise, revolt against an allied government. In a memorandum to Johnson on the same day, Assistant Secretary Williams expressed his “strong belief” that non-military covert assistance should be provided to the GRAE on the grounds that it was only a question of time before the Angolan people exercised the right of self-determination and that when that happened, the nationalist forces at the helm should not be mortgaged or oriented to the Communists. (Both in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964)↩
- No record has been found of such a meeting until May 4; see Document 419.↩