Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

396. Information Memorandum From the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer)¹

Washington, April 18, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Comments on Lagos A–469 (Postscript to Annual Policy Assessment)²

Summary and Conclusion

Lagos A–469 questions some basic assumptions which went into the formulation of U.S. policy toward Nigeria in 1967. It also questions the policy itself and how it was carried out, concluding that “much of the damage to our position (in Nigeria) during 1967 could have been avoided.”

In the Department’s view our course of action in Nigeria has been, even in retrospect, the right one. The questions raised concerning it seem to flow primarily from disagreement with the basic premise of that policy, that the United States should not become involved in the Nigerian civil war.

Behind our policy has been: (1) a determination not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria; (2) a desire to promote a peaceful, and hence more durable, resolution of the conflict between Biafra and the FMG; (3) a reluctance to follow any course which might lead to an increase in our international commitments; and (4) a desire to maintain the best possible relationships with all the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly those which might have emerged as independent states. This policy of non-involvement, especially as regards arms sales to the FMG has been consistent with Congressional sentiment as expressed in foreign aid hearings and such legislative acts as the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments.

The hands-off attitude of the United States was of course strongly objected to by the FMG. The FMG tended to disregard the fact that we considered it to be the only legal government in Nigeria. It also did not appreciate fully that the U.S. still intended to make a positive economic contribution to Nigeria so long as that did not mean taking sides in the civil war. Most of all, the FMG greatly resented the U.S. refusal to license the sale of arms and the U.S. statement of August 21, 1967, deploring its purchase of Soviet arms.³ Given these U.S. actions, which stemmed from our policy, it is doubtful whether much, if any, of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG in 1967 could have been prevented. This deterioration has to be weighed against our avoidance of the risks of intervention in Nigeria’s internal affairs, our demonstration to other Africans of our desire to avoid big power interference in the affairs of African states, and of not compromising our aid program with Congress.

Four major reasons for our policy of non-involvement in the Nigerian conflict are discussed below, as well as the following comments on certain aspects of that policy: the refusal to sell arms to the FMG; the U.S. statements on arms sales to the FMG; and, our even-handed approach to the conflict between the FMG and “Biafra”.

Non-interference

To some extent, “non-involvement” is a misnomer but it has been used to describe our policy for the lack of a better word. Recognition of the FMG and refusal to recognize “Biafra,” continuation of the AID program in the West and North, urging of negotiations, and even the refusal to supply arms are all forms of involvement. But the real issue was whether the USG was right in trying to minimize its role through its policy of non-involvement and especially in preventing in so far as possible U.S. arms reaching either side.

A decision to override the generally applicable principle of non-interference in the case of Nigeria would have required very strong justification in the Department, to Congress and to the American people. Our vital interests were not threatened by the “Biafra” secession. We were not being requested to intervene in behalf of a friendly government which an internal minority, terrorist or otherwise, threatened to take over. Nor were we requested to help combat external aggression or an internal revolt abetted by external assistance. Involvement on the FMG’s side would have needlessly antagonized those opposed to U.S., Soviet, and other foreign interference in Africa. It would have set a precedent to which other African nations would have referred when, in analogous or not so similar straits, they too wanted to enlist us in their cause.

Promoting a Peaceful Settlement

Prior to “Biafran” secession, the U.S. attempted to persuade both sides to negotiate their differences and to reach agreement on an advantageous form of political association. Unless the FMG and the Ibos became reconciled there was little prospect for stability and economic growth in Nigeria. After the civil war broke out, we continued to urge a negotiated settlement. Now, while sticking to this line in anticipation of an FMG victory, we are urging national reconciliation and magnanimous treatment of the Ibos on the Federal Government. A negotiated settlement before secession did seem possible, but we could not have worked for it with both sides if we had vigorously supported the FMG. It is difficult to see how selling arms to the FMG, for example, could have helped influence it toward a peaceful solution of its differences with the East. On the contrary, it might have had the opposite effect by appearing to condone efforts for a military solution. Now that the civil war is in progress, it is also difficult to see how U.S. material support for the FMG’s prosecution of the war effort could help contribute to a negotiated settlement or could help moderate FMG goals and action in such a manner as to lead to national reconciliation.

Avoiding Increased International Commitments

The possibility that the United States would be drawn into an ever-increasing role militarily and politically in Nigeria did not have to be a probability to make us wary of granting export licenses for arms to the Federal Government of Nigeria. Wholehearted support of the FMG would have required risks we were not prepared to take given our limited military and economic resources and our commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the United States has always preferred to let the British carry the major burden in Nigeria—both militarily and economically. To substitute for them could have increased the load on us with no net gain to Nigeria. These arguments are particularly applicable over the long run.

Not Alienating the East

A corollary to maintaining the best possible relationship with whatever political entities might come to the fore in Nigeria was retaining American influence in Nigeria and with the Ibos, in order to protect or further our interests there. Although this was only one of the factors behind the Department’s desire not to become enmeshed in the civil war, it had obvious advantages, especially when it appeared that the Biafrans might achieve independence. As late as mid-May 1967, reports from the field were reinforcing the Washington assessment that the Yorubas under Awolowo might secede from the FMG should the East decide to pull out of the Nigerian federation. It was predicted that this event would lead, perhaps after an interval of chaos, to the establishment of three or four independent Nigerian states. Although this danger has ultimately subsided, it was real and could not be ignored. We do not believe that this danger was overrated or unduly influenced our policy.

In 1967 the Department may have underrated the strength and cohesion of the Federal military. However, as long as it appeared that the West and North might not hold together within the FMG (i.e. until the early summer of 1967), an evaluation of the comparative strength of the Federal and “Biafran” armies was only of secondary importance.

In August 1967, soon after the outbreak of fighting, the Department, while not considering stalemate impossible, began to appreciate that the FMG military was much stronger than the “Biafrans” and by the year’s end had come to the view that FMG victory was probably inevitable. Yet our basic policy with respect to the Nigerian conflict—non-interference beyond encouraging both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement—was not changed because that policy was not determined by our estimates of FMG military strength.

A desire to protect our interests in “Biafra” did not lead to a pro-“Biafran” and anti-FMG attitude, but an attitude of relative impartiality with respect to the conflict between the two. Ojukwu was told many times that the U.S. would not support his secessionist effort. Unfortunately, without abandoning our policy of non-involvement, there was no way to eliminate entirely any wishful thinking that the U.S. might eventually aid the Ibos. Even had we embraced the Federal Government more warmly, however, it is extremely doubtful that Ojukwu and the Ibos would have changed their minds on secession.

An additional consideration on our attitude of relative impartiality toward the FMG and “Biafra” is relevant. While sentiment, wherever it is found, does becloud policy, a natural repugnance against taking sides in a struggle between two friendly parties is not purely sentimental or unreasonable. Nor is a refusal to take sides unreasonable for having taken into account the fact that neither adversary has a markedly better case to justify its actions than the other. While we could not expect the FMG to welcome our policy of non-involvement, we could have expected them to respect the motives behind it and not require that the sole, or even chief, criteria of friendship should have been the willingness to license arms sales, declare ourselves unequivocally for Lagos and come out against its eastern opponents. Both General Gowon and Foreign Affairs Commissioner Arikpo have stated that the FMG has come to understand the consistency of our position.

Refusal to Sell Arms to FMG

The principal reason the USG gave for not responding to the FMG request to permit it to buy arms from U.S. sources was put forth in an Aide-Memoire given Ambassador Martins on July 3, 1967: the USG wished to maintain its position of non-intervention in Nigeria’s internal affairs. This reasoning was also behind the earlier denial of the request for 106mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The amount of ammunition requested in that instance was small and military confrontation with the East was only emerging as a possibility. However, the U.S. did not want to be wooed by the FMG into adopting an arms policy that was a little bit pregnant. While the adverse effects of refusing to supply follow-on ammunition for the recoilless rifles we had previously sold the FMG had to be considered, they did not outweigh other factors in the scales. It is questionable whether governments should reasonably expect nations supplying them with arms to maintain follow-on supplies when it is no longer in their interest to do so.

The refusal to permit the sale of U.S. arms to Nigeria, first the 106mm ammunition, and later jet aircraft, defense boats and anti-aircraft guns, was probably the biggest single irritant in our relations with that country, but given our basic policy was inevitable.

U.S. Statements on Arms Sales to the FMG

The FMG resentment over the Department’s press statement concerning the FMG request to buy arms in the United States was of less significance and is likely to be a more ephemeral irritant in our relations with the FMG than the refusal to sell arms. However, had it been shorter, had the term “military assistance” not been uttered inadvertently, and had the press not generated pressure for an early statement, it might have been possible for information on the arms request to have been released to the public in a manner less apt to offend the FMG.

The FMG, playing its own domestic politics, was apparently only too glad to seize upon the phrasing of our statement and twist it so as to use the United States as a scapegoat for its decision to buy Soviet arms. It cannot be forgotten that Gowon over Memorial Day weekend 1967 gave a virtual 72-hour decision ultimatum to the USG in seeking its approval for export licenses if he obtained aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and patrol boats in the U.S. This also had the earmarks, with Ogbu then in Moscow, of an effort planned to justify domestically the obtention of such material from the USSR. The U.S. statement on Soviet arms sales to the FMG has been of value in calling to the attention of Nigerian leaders to our views concerning Soviet arms supplies, making clear what our reaction is likely to be should they mortgage themselves to the Soviet Union. It was, however, designed to call the Soviet intervention to the attention of other African states and at the same time clarify our position to Congress and the American public.

It is highly doubtful whether consulting with the Nigerians prior to issuing the declaration would have softened their reaction. Indeed, our refusal to make alterations in the text to meet FMG objections could have provoked greater FMG resentment. Again, however, pressures in Washington may have resulted in a less ideal statement than would otherwise have been possible.

There is little basis for criticizing the purport of the declarations we made concerning FMG arms procurement. It was the purport, not the manner, of those statements which has caused the far greater portion of the deterioration of our relations with the FMG.

Approach

Our policy on the Nigerian civil war was based in part (1) on recognition that the East was not totally at fault in its conflict with the FMG; (2) on the political advantage which might be harvested at a late date if we retained the goodwill of all political entities likely to become independent; and (3) on encouraging FMG moderation. This called for an even-handed approach in our treatment of the two belligerents on other matters. Thus, we have been careful not to give all-out vocal support to the FMG, although we have firmly declared we sympathize with its desire to maintain Nigerian unity. We have particularly refrained from giving any endorsement to the FMG conduct of the war. At the same time, we attempted to retain our aid program in Eastern Nigeria as long as possible. The cost of these and other attempts at even-handedness seems bearable in the light of the difficulties we might have encountered had we lined up with the Federal Government only to see it disintegrate and “Biafra” establish its independence.

In this connection, it is especially important not to confuse the damage to our relations with the FMG caused by the refusal to agree to licensing sales of arms with the relatively minor harm done by our other attempts to maintain an unantagonistic position with respect to the Ibos. In our relations with the FMG the refusal of arms sales licenses was damaging but unavoidable. The attempt at even-handedness, in so far as it went beyond our arms policy, was avoidable but much less damaging. It was worth pursuing in view of other considerations—principally maintaining our position in “Biafra,” reinforcing our posture of non-intervention and, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, trying to use influence with both sides to induce them to negotiate their differences. These considerations were in harmony with Congressional and public sentiment.

The Department of State has done everything it could to discourage U.S. citizens from aiding “Biafra” and to keep U.S. manufactured arms and aircraft out of “Biafran” hands. Our legal authority has been severely limited, but there are many documented instances where we have headed off confirmed or probable arms and aircraft sales to “Biafra” by refusing licenses. We have tried to convince American citizens to cease trafficking in arms. We have used every legal means available to discourage them. This is evidenced (1) by our efforts to have the licenses of certain individuals revoked when they violated FAA regulations in connection with their illicit arms deliveries, and (2) by our cooperation with Maltese authorities who impounded an illegally registered aircraft used in the “Biafran airlift.” We believe that the approach and content of our policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria have not done irrevocable damage to the Western position in Nigeria. It can be argued that over the long run the effect might be salutary. For a limited and temporary setback in our relations, we think we have avoided the many risks of involvement and perhaps caused increasing appreciation among African nations for our efforts to minimize big power intervention on that continent. We believe we have also avoided the possibility of compromising our ongoing AID program with Congress.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 NIGERIA–US. Secret. Drafted by Alan M. Hardy of AFW.
2. Document 395.
3. For text of the statement, see the Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1967, p. 320.