395. Airgram From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Nigeria: Annual U.S. Policy Assessment, 1967: A Candid Postscript
REF
- Lagos A–419, February 11, 19682
“A deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Nigeria in 1967 was inevitable.” This sentence opening the section on Nigeria and the West in the 1967 Policy Assessment does not mean that the degree of deterioration which actually occurred was inevitable. To the contrary, I believe that much of the damage to our position in Nigeria during 1967 could have been avoided. I offer the following personal analysis of the reasons for this avoidable damage in the hope that it may contribute to preventing similar reverses in future in Nigeria or elsewhere.
This analysis focuses on the psychology of our approach to Nigerian developments, on certain aspects of our short range policy and on selected USG actions.
Approach
Our approach to the conflict between the FMG and “Biafra” has been colored by our revulsion, both official and personal, against the [Page 672] brutalities inflicted on the Ibos in 1966. Our sympathies have been with the Ibos. In addition, many Americans admire Ojukwu. We like romantic leaders, and Ojukwu has panache, quick intelligence and an actor’s voice and fluency. The contrast with Gowon—troubled by the enormity of his task, painfully earnest and slow to react, hesitant and repetitive in speech—led some Americans to view the Nigerian-“Biafran” conflict as a personal duel between two mismatched individuals.
The most serious effect of these attitudes on our approach to the conflict has been a consistent underrating of FMG capabilities and overrating of “Biafran” capabilities. This was particularly marked in late 1966 and early 1967 when we were most skeptical of the capabilities of the FMG, most impressed with Ojukwu’s prospects and, consequently, most neutral toward the conflict. It is ironic that in this same period Gowon was anxiously pursuing the same short range objectives as the USG—i.e. the preservation of some kind of a Nigerian nation and the avoidance of civil war—while Ojukwu was whipping up secessionist sentiment in “Biafra”-to-be and accumulating arms.
In assessing the FMG’s ability to maintain national unity we concentrated too much on evidences of discontent and disarray and too little on basic factors favoring the FMG. First among these was the strength of the concept of national unity among non-Ibo Nigerians. Others were that Gowon and his immediate associates controlled the only organized power in the country—the military establishment and the police—and that there were no effectively functioning political organizations to oppose the FMG or national unity. The record of Awolowo, the only major political leader left in Nigeria, made it highly likely that his stand would be strongly influenced by his antipathy toward the Ibos and that he would opt for unity if offered a leading role in the FMG.
Even after it became apparent that Nigeria was not going to fall apart as a consequence of Eastern secession and civil war, we tended to disregard the wide disparity in available manpower and resources between the FMG and “Biafra.” We were surprised when the FMG captured Nsukka and amazed when it seized Bonny. Only in its short-lived occupation of the Mid-West did “Biafra” measure up to our expectations. We are still prone to cry, “stalemate,” whenever FMG forces suffer reverses or are slow in taking their next objective.
Ojukwu and his associates in deciding on their course of action in late 1966 and early 1967 were undoubtedly influenced by awareness of American attitudes. To cite my own case, I have often thought that if when I saw Ojukwu in mid-October 1966 I had shown less sympathy and stressed even more than I did the necessity of keeping Nigeria together, he might subsequently have given greater weight to the difficulties in the way of successful secession. Many other Americans, official and private, with whom “Biafrans” had contact were more swayed by sympathy and [Page 673] admiration than I. The result was that most Ibos convinced themselves that the USG would regard “Biafra” with at least benevolent neutrality. Even now some of them seem to believe that if only they can find the right formula, the USG can still be brought to support their cause.
Thanks to the American press and the reactions of individual Americans, Nigerians supporting the FMG are fully aware of our attitudes. They are baffled and resentful. While many of them understand our revulsion against the brutal treatment of the Ibos in 1966, they believe we tend to overlook prior and subsequent events and particularly Ojukwu’s intransigence which in their view is mainly responsible for Nigeria’s present situation.
Policy
A passive USG policy of non-involvement in situations like the Nigerian crisis is not enough. It did not prevent open involvement of private American citizens in the delivery of obsolete U.S. made bombers to “Biafra” and in the organization and operation of the vital Lisbon-Port Harcourt airlift. By the time the USG tried to discourage these activities, serious damage had already been done to the U.S. position. Many Nigerians simply do not believe that the USG cannot prevent such activities by American citizens and consequently accept charges that these are CIA operations.
I have previously urged that we tighten our controls on the removal of aircraft from the U.S. and on the activities of USG licensed pilots and other air crew. Although I still believe we should do this, the experience of the past year makes me fear that the smart operators would even then be at least two jumps ahead of the USG.
It seems likely that we could more effectively inhibit American involvement by pressing the hopeful beneficiary rather than American citizens. If we had told Ojukwu in October 1966 after the Warton crash in Cameroun that we would publicly denounce any subsequent attempts on his part to involve American citizens in the Nigerian situation and would take steps to ensure that the FMG was not put at a disadvantage by any military materiel of U.S. origin he might acquire, this active pursuit of non-involvement might well have restrained Ojukwu’s attempts to give his secession an American aura.
A related problem arose from Ojukwu’s skillful and persistent efforts to enlist American journalists and other potential publicists in the “Biafran” cause. He was so successful, in part because of the magnificent ineptitude of most FMG propaganda efforts, that the American press usually gave the impression that the U.S. strongly favored “Biafra.” This made it difficult to persuade Nigerians that the USG really was non-involved. We could have helped ourselves by a more active effort to dissociate the USG position from that of the U.S. press.
[Page 674]Although apparently regarded in Washington as but one aspect of the policy of non-involvement, our policy of even-handedness during the first half of 1967 had a separate, marked impact on the Nigerian situation. As seen by Nigerians, it was a policy of involvement. Equal treatment of an internationally accepted national government and a dissident and subsequently rebellious regional government could only redound to the advantage of the latter. This was clearly appreciated by Nigerians and “Biafrans”, whose reactions were understandably different. Nigerian reactions ranged from outrage to nonplused dismay, and the resulting scar tissue will abrade U.S.-Nigerian relations for some time to come. The “Biafrans” were delighted. It may be doubted, however, that we have gained lasting credit even with the Ibos whose eventual recollection of our role in their struggle for independence will probably be that we fell far short of their expectations.
Actions
Refusal to Sell 106mm Ammunition. Our final refusal in early 1967 to fill long-standing FMG orders for ammunition for the 106mm recoilless rifles we had earlier sold Nigeria still rankles in the minds of important FMG military figures who considered the decision unfriendly and our explanations evasive. I am mindful of the domestic considerations which led to our refusal, but the cost in terms of trust and understanding between the USG and the FMG was heavy. I can think of no remedy for this kind of situation except that we refrain from supplying arms to any country unless the U.S. national security interest is so compelling and continuing that we are sure that we shall be willing to provide follow-on support.
Resistance to Terminating AID and PC Projects in Former Eastern Region. We came close in June of last year to taking the position that the USG could continue AID and PC projects despite requests from the host government for termination. Certainly the circumstances were difficult and unusual, but unless we were prepared to extend at least de facto recognition to Ojukwu’s government in the former Eastern Region, we had no legal justification to resist the demands of the FMG that we cease our operations in that area. Our brief resistance served only to arouse deep suspicion of our motives on the part of key FMG civil servants and many other Nigerians.
Statement concerning FMG Request for Arms. The uproar over the Department’s press statement of last July concerning the FMG request to the USG for arms focused on the mischance that the statement used the words “military assistance” in referring to a request to buy arms. This was fortunate as it obscured a much more important issue—namely, that the USG had breached the confidence of the FMG. It will be recalled that the FMG had classified its requests to the USG and HMG as “Top Secret.” While it was true that the press in the U.S. and the U.K. had got wind of [Page 675] the requests, this did not justify our public disclosure without prior warning to the FMG. Had we told the FMG in advance that we would have to admit to the press that we had received its request, we could have worked out a mutually satisfactory statement. We would thus have avoided much of the public outcry and, of more importance, the memory of our breach of confidence now fixed in the minds of Gowon and other senior FMG figures.
Statement concerning the Soviet Supply of Arms to the FMG. In this instance we again disregarded our normal practice of informing a friendly government in advance when we found it necessary to make a public statement affecting its interests. It is hardly likely that the FMG would have given its approval to any USG public pronouncement on the Nigerian purchase of arms from the U.S.S.R., but we could at least have explained our position before rather than after the event. Moreover, if our statement had castigated the Communists for supplying arms to both sides in the civil war, we would have scored more effectively against the Communists, made a greater impact in Africa and given much less offense to the FMG.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has obviously not produced any penetrating new insights. It does, however, suggest the continuing truth of some old platitudes about the conduct of foreign relations. I cite three which seem relevant.
- 1.
- Sentiment beclouds policy.
- 2.
- Great powers cannot avoid involvement; they can only seek to ensure that it serves their interests.
- 3.
- Diplomacy is more effective before than after the event.