Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria¹

Washington, July 20, 1967, 6:57 p.m.

10593. Following is FYI noforn based on uncleared memcons subject to revision on review:

1. Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, met with Mr. Walt Rostow in White House during morning July 20 for half-hour talk to discuss Nigerian situation and US-Nigerian relations. He gave rationale for FMG “police action” against East as last resort after every effort to find peaceful solution. Ambassador added that he understood official US position, but could not correlate it with special position of affection Nigeria accords US and vice-versa. Nigeria had come to US prepared to pay for arms since it trying to put down insurrection. US refused, yet it had assisted Congo. Also Nigerians were active in US in behalf Biafra. N.Y. Times correspondent, after being expelled from Nigeria, had gone to Biafra and filed stories against country with which US had good relations. FMG needed a statement from “right US source” which would declare it wished Nigeria to remain united.

2. Mr. Rostow replied that he would look into activities of Nigerians in US hostile to their government. He knew wide latitude accorded under US law, but wished to be assured that every possible action had been explored. There no doubt US would like to see Nigerian unity, but it hardest for third party to get involved in family quarrel. From 1961, when Rostow had helped set up development assistance program for Nigeria, he believed country had great future and that USG prepared to do what it could in this direction. This hope still holds. US not prepared to put Nigeria in any other power’s sphere of influence and has not been passive in leaving development assistance to others.² As for Congo and Nigeria, there were great differences. In former there was external threat disrupting unity and we had sent three C–130’s in carefully limited action in continuity with earlier UN resolutions. Nigeria has not brought its problem to UN. As Ambassador can see from press, Congress does not wish US to be involved in other countries’ affairs unless there is clear external threat. Finally, our margin of influence with foreign countries on vital issues frequently proves quite small. Rostow cited examples of this, which Ambassador agreed supported case for FMG and Biafra settling problem themselves.

3. In afternoon, Ambassador Martins, with Counselor, talked with Under Secretary Katzenbach for 40 minutes and covered ground similar to morning. He sought advice of Under Secretary in explaining US actions concerning Nigeria to his government and public in this “crisis of belief.” The Under Secretary inquired what happened if Ojukwu were eliminated. It hard to understand Ojukwu acting without support and would not same problem exist? Martins briefly said FMG intended first to restore its authority in minority states of East and adopt containment policy for Ibo state, which would have opportunity to be member of federation with full rights. As far as Times correspondent in Biafra is concerned, Under Secretary said, Ambassador could count in any issue of that paper how many editorials were favorable to policies of USG. If USG could not influence paper in behalf its own interests, how could it do so for Nigeria? Activity of correspondent was not US responsibility. If Ambassador pursued matter with Times, he might find there even more difficulties.

4. In long run, said Under Secretary, Nigerian people should not have real difficulty in accepting explanations of US arms policy or difference between Congo and Nigeria. Over past five years US had given primacy to Nigerian development over other African states. Articles in US press on American arms policy should make clear to Nigerians why USG had not been able to license sales to that country. Congo was external problem stirred up by non-Congolese. He knew no African, European or Asian non-Communist state criticizing US for its policies and actions toward Nigeria. He believed that if we were wrong, others would recognize this. As for any Nigerians agitating here for Biafra, Nigerian public really would not expect us to change our Constitution or internal laws. Americans and foreigners here have right to speak up.

5. To help explain US policy to Nigerians, Under Secretary suggested Ambassador could state (a) USG has sought to correct through appropriate comment any false or misleading statements, (b) US not treating Eastern Nigerians in this country working for Biafra any differently than it is doing for its own people, and (c) we cannot be responsible for US manufactured items of military equipment which may be found in East. As matter of fact, US arms can be bought from Communist countries. USG does not possess legal and constitutional powers to halt or impede actions of which Ambassador complained. Under Secretary cited examples of Americans traveling to North Vietnam and Cuba who have reportedly spoken there critically of their country and written critically of US policy on return. Yet, USG unable to take any action against them.

6. Conversational tone in both meetings was frank and friendly.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 BIAFRA–NIGERIA. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Melbourne and cleared by Hamilton at the White House.
2. Circular telegram 216694, June 26, noted the desire to continue existing assistance programs in all parts of Nigeria and discussed efforts to accomplish this goal. (Ibid., AID (US) BIAFRA) However, all Peace Corps volunteers and staff were withdrawn from the East by mid-August, and all Eastern loan projects and the Calabar-Ikom road project were suspended by the end of September.