Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

390. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, July 3, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Gowon’s Arms Request

As I am sure you know, Gowon sent identical wires to the President and Harold Wilson yesterday asking for immediate sale to the FMG of 12 fighter-bombers, 6 PT-boats, and 24 anti-aircraft guns. He wanted deliveries to begin within 48 hours. He added that if the U.S. and UK were unable to supply these weapons, he would be forced to get them from any source which would make them available—an obvious reference to the Soviets and/or Eastern Europeans.

We do not know whether Gowon already has a deal with another arms supplier. We do know that the FMG had a mission in Moscow last week which the Easterners claimed (and the FMG denied) was negotiating for arms. We also know that there has been some traffic in words with the Czechs. The AF judgment is that if there is not yet an agreement in being, there soon will be.

Our latest report is that the British are having a Cabinet meeting on this subject today, but that their preliminary disposition is to agree to sell the anti-aircraft guns, but nothing else.

Wayne Fredericks (acting for Joe Palmer, who is on leave) and I have worked out the following suggested U.S. position for submission to Nick Katzenbach as soon as possible:

1. The U.S. has consistently maintained that the Nigerian problem is an internal problem in which it could not appropriately interfere. This continues to be our view.

2. Given the prospect that the supplying of these arms could well lead to civil war, the U.S. cannot agree to supply them.

3. We are gravely concerned at the security situation implied by General Gowon’s message. Therefore, we are asking our Ambassadors to approach Kenyatta, President Diori and General Ankrah as possible mediators. (Each is agreed by both sides to be neutral in the Nigerian dispute.) The Kenyatta suggestion dovetails with an imminent meeting of the East African heads of state who plan to take up the Nigerian problem as an agenda item.

If Katzenbach buys our recommendation, he would give this position to the Nigerian Ambassador in the form of an aide-memoire.² It would not be done in the President’s name. It seems best to us to keep the President out of it as long as possible.

The judgment behind this position is that the prospect of Communist arms sales to the FMG—to the extent they are avoidable—is not so forbidding as to make it worth our feeding the flames by selling arms to the FMG. We think the Czechs have also been dickering with the East about arms sales. The Soviets have behaved very correctly throughout the crisis, pressing for unity at every opportunity. It does not appear that the Communists are involved in any campaign to gain political control of Nigeria—and the Nigerian political milieu makes that an unlikely objective, at best. Even if it were otherwise, the political cost of taking sides in Nigeria in the present post-Middle Eastern atmosphere would be very great indeed, particularly to the AID bill. In the present mood of the Congress, I would not be at all surprised if we got a quick resolution banning any such sales and perhaps abolishing MAP at the same time. (Apart from other problems, there are several strong pro-Easterners in the Congress, led by Mr. Resnick.)

In summary, we just don’t believe the U.S. can or should forsake our even-handed stance now.

I drag you through all this because there is a chance Katzenbach will call you this afternoon. When Wayne talked to him yesterday, he seemed to lean toward an equivocal answer to Gowon indicating that we would be willing to talk, though we obviously could do nothing in 48 hours. Fredericks, Bert Mathews (our Ambassador to Nigeria) and I are all firmly convinced that it would be a great mistake to give Gowon any reason to believe that we might grant his request unless there is some real chance we might actually do so. It would ruin us forever with the Easterners, and it would set us up for a very hard fall with Gowon if, as I strongly suspect, we couldn’t deliver.

At a minimum, I think the President should know about any reply other than a clear “no.” It is he who will be stuck with the consequences in Nigeria and face the music on the Hill. Fredericks will (1) try to talk Nick out of the “maybe” tactic and (2) if Nick remains unconvinced, ask him to check with the President before he goes ahead. I suspect that would lead to a call to you.

I will keep you informed. I am supposed to be taking some time off this week but I will keep up with events and be available if you need more detail.

Edward K. Hamilton ³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 6/64–8/67. No classification marking.
2. Katzenbach gave Martins an aide-memoire on July 3 stating that the United States could not accede to Gowon’s request because of the U.S. policy of non-intervention in Nigerian internal affairs. It reiterated the U.S. hope that all possibilities of reaching a peaceful solution would be fully explored. It did not refer to any approaches to possible mediators. The text was transmitted in telegram 817 to Lagos, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 NIGERIA)
3. An unidentified hand initialed above Hamilton’s typed signature.