Office of the Historian

39. Information Memorandum From the Country Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs (Root) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore)1

Washington, October 3, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Belkacem Krim’s Emissary Asks for U.S. Support

Mr. Michel Leroy, the representative of Algerian exile leader Belkacem Krim, called on me at 10:00 this morning.2 We had previously heard from our Embassy in Paris that Leroy was coming to the United States and might approach us on Krim’s behalf.

Leroy explained that Belkacem Krim was presently disturbed by Algeria’s leftist policies and the extent of Russian influence in the country. To combat this he had founded the MDRA (Democratic Movement of Algerian Renovation) which was well entrenched throughout the country and even represented in Boumediene’s immediate entourage.

Leroy saw Krim’s return to power as inevitable but stated that some slight U.S. financial assistance over the next few months would enable Krim to perfect his organization and return to Algeria that much sooner. In exchange for this help, Krim would be prepared to conclude political and economic accords of various sorts whenever he should assume power. Leroy denied that Krim’s organization had been weakened by last summer’s arrests of MDRA militants and gave me a list of names that purportedly represented the hard core of Krim’s organization.

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If the State Department could not help him, Leroy wondered if it could put him in touch with some American service that could be of assistance. “Such as,” he said, “the CIA.” I replied that the United States was not in a position to be helpful in this matter. We did not see the Algerian situation in as gloomy colors as Mr. Leroy did and felt we had to stand by our guiding principle of non-interference in another country’s affairs. I told Leroy, furthermore, that many specious charges had been leveled against CIA but that he should remember that Algeria was not an area of major American concern. Finally, I conveyed to Leroy the substance of our reply to Krim’s request for a visit (Department’s 248231, attached)3 and added that I doubted if the results of any trip Krim might make to the United States would be worth his while.

As I excused myself for another appointment, Leroy said he would remain in town for several more days in case I had further word for him. I replied that he was, of course, free to do so but should not expect to hear again from us. I did not object, however, when Leroy asked if he might call me on Monday morning. He assured me on leaving that he was fully aware of the delicacy of his mission and that even within the Krim entourage only one other person knew of this approach to the United States.

Comments:

(1)
I feel we should avoid giving Leroy any encouragement, especially since we consider Krim’s political prospects to be unfavorable.
(2)
CIA showed no interest in the matter one way or the other when the prospect of Krim’s visit first came up. I am informing CIA of my morning conversation and will let you know what position they take.4
(3)
We can expect Leroy to try to interest private American firms in his principal’s future. The security arrangements surrounding this visit will, hence, be more porous than ever—which is another reason why we should keep our distance.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 ALG. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hume A. Horan in AF/N.↩
  2. The memorandum of conversation is ibid.↩
  3. Not attached.↩
  4. A handwritten note initialed by Moore in the margin reads: “JR—should CIA be tempted, please let me know.” On October 7, Root wrote a memorandum to the files stating that he had spoken that morning with [name not declassified] of the CIA, who had said that not only was there no disposition to provide such assistance to Krim, the CIA thought it was unwise to give him any encouragement. When Leroy subsequently telephoned, Root told him that there was no change in the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 ALG)↩