Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, July 15, 1968.

SUBJECT

• I. U.S.-Algerian Relations
• II. Vietnam
• III. Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Layachi Yaker—Director of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs, Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mohammed Aberkhan—Office of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs, Ministry Foreign Affairs
• John F. Root—Director, Office of Northern African Affairs, Department of State
• Laurent E. Morin—Charge d’Affaires, a.i., American Embassy, Algiers
• Fred J. Galanto—First Secretary, American Embassy, Algiers

I. U.S.-Algerian Relations

Mr. Yaker welcomed Mr. Root to Algiers, noting that they had known each other for some time, which enabled both sides to talk on a personal as well as on an official basis. Yaker said there were two main sets of problems having a bearing on U.S.-Algerian relations: international—Vietnam and the Middle East—and bilateral. He would be willing to inform the Foreign Minister of the talks, particularly any comments Mr. Root might care to make on new U.S. approaches to these problems.

Mr. Root expressed his pleasure that the GOA had agreed to receive him. He said the U.S. was ready to respect whatever procedure Algeria wished in carrying out talks. We appreciated the initiative which Foreign Minister Bouteflika had undertaken in March 1968 with Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani and had respected the Algerian wish to keep subsequent talks in the Italian channel. Sooner or later, perhaps the intermediary could be dispensed with.

Mr. Root emphasized that the fundamental desire of the U.S. remained the same—for a restoration of normal relations. The break had come on Algerian initiative, not ours. The premise on which the break had been made had been proven false, but this was all behind us now. Any decision would be up to the GOA. The U.S. would wait for a signal. Resumption itself could be a relatively simple process—just agree to resume.

As for new U.S. approaches on Vietnam and the Middle East, our attitude towards these problems would be determined by our overall interests, commitments, and considerations. Our views and policies on these questions were not a function of U.S.-Algerian relations. Mr. Root said he liked to think, however, that on both questions the U.S. was following policies which were farsighted and aimed at the achievement of lasting, peaceful solutions.

On the immediate question of bilateral relations, Mr. Root said he did not feel a new approach was needed. The U.S. approach to Algeria had always been one of friendship and cooperation. Mr. Aberkhan could give witness to the friendliness which the Algerian Embassy found in Washington and its great success on the Washington scene. In North Africa the U.S. looked for good relations with all countries. We felt pained that the U.S. had good relations with three countries but not with the fourth—Algeria. We were not pursuing selfish interests in Algeria, but were interested in stability and progress. We hoped, for example, that the presence of U.S. business interests in Algeria would provide a basis for strengthened cooperation. We appreciated the fact that Algeria had not allowed the break to affect American business and that Algeria had been generous and hospitable to the small U.S. staff in Algiers. We had also noted the improvement in direct contacts with Algerian officials. We did not ignore these various signs of good will, including the Algerian willingness to receive Mr. Root. If the GOA was interested in improving relations, and we thought it was, the U.S. would certainly reciprocate.

Replying, Mr. Yaker noted, somewhat icily, that there seemed to be no new important elements in the American attitude towards Vietnam and the Middle East. At independence, America enjoyed a large capital of good will in Algeria. This had been dissipated, mostly because of Algerian feeling on Vietnam, the reasons for which were well known to Mr. Root. The GOA was unhappy with the situation, and disconsolate that external matters have hindered the development of harmonious relations with the U.S. Algeria had been made to pay a heavy price in the rupture of food aid for work programs, needy feeding and other activities. The GOA had been penalized by the stopping of shipments to the benevolent agencies (VOLAGs), an action which had a strongly negative influence on Algerian leadership and public opinion. The GOA had no new elements to report. Perhaps it should just close the “dossiers” and wait for better days. But, on the other hand, it was encouraging that an old friend and acquaintance of Algeria like Mr. Root should be making this visit to Algiers now. Perhaps this was a good sign.

Mr. Root said he liked Mr. Yaker’s conclusion about personal friendship. As a former member of the American Embassy in Algiers, and considering all the years he had been associated with Algerian affairs, it was difficult for him to keep a detached attitude. Relations with Algeria were like an investment. He had become attached to it and wanted to see it pay off. It was a real challenge to seek the improvement of relations. It was not a source of great satisfaction to the U.S. to know that of all the influences—Arab, African, European-French, and Soviet—acting on Algeria, that of the U.S. was the smallest.

Addressing himself to bilateral relations, Mr. Root noted that the break in food aid through the voluntary agencies did not occur as a result of the break in relations. The PL 480 assistance was yet another matter—an impasse had been reached in May 1967 for reasons familiar to Mr. Yaker. It was decided in Washington after June 1967 that VOLAG aid should not be affected but that its fulfillment should be based on factors such as: —the country should be willing to receive and distribute it; —it could be carried on U.S. ships which could call freely; —and the freight would be paid by the recipient or the VOLAGs. As a result of the failure to meet these technical qualifications, VOLAG shipments had stopped. Hence, it was not a political consequence.

In the follow-on to the Bouteflika-Fanfani talks, the Algerian Foreign Minister had said that gestures from the U.S. on Vietnam, the Middle East, and food aid would help. Washington replied it could not make gestures for restoration because Algeria was the one which broke. The U.S. could not pay a price for resumption. Without calling these things gestures, however, the U.S. had tried to signal Algeria that it had an open disposition. Governor Harriman in particular, who retained an excellent souvenir of his December 1966 stay in Algeria and his talks with President Boumediene and Minister Bouteflika, had been struck by Algeria’s very recent willingness to help find a suitable site for the Vietnam talks.

As for the VOLAGs, the U.S. was prepared in principle to respond to a request from the agencies themselves for a continuation of activities at the level of the past year. Mr. Root was chagrined that there had been a communications breakdown. The decision was made some weeks ago, and he thought the VOLAGs would have responded immediately with proposals, but they had not. Perhaps Mr. Yaker could look into the matter and facilitate the VOLAG dealings with the GOA organizations. In all events, Mr. Root expressed the hope that this act, more than words, would show the U.S. interest in the welfare of the Algerian people.

Mr. Yaker appeared genuinely and visibly pleased at this news. He said this was the first clear indication he had heard. Mr. Root explained it had been our intention in making this manifestation of good will that the GOA be informed through the agencies which were carrying on the humanitarian program. He was sorry the message had not come through clearly.

Mr. Root asked Mr. Yaker to convey to Minister Bouteflika our feeling that broken relations was not a normal situation. The break, and the lack of an ambassador always implied that things were not going well. Mr. Root reiterated that restoration could be a simple procedure. In this connection (in an allusion to the UAR) he supposed that Algerian policy on resumption would be decided by Algeria. Yaker bristled briefly but then stated with a smile that Mr. Root knew the Algerians well. They were known for their independence and would make up their own minds.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Galanto on July 31. The meeting was held at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.