Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria¹

Washington, March 3, 1967, 5:13 p.m.

148032. Ref: Lagos’ 6586, 6620; London’s 7046.²

1. Ojukwu’s provocative broadcast, release of Aburi documents in Lagos and broadcast of Aburi tape recording in Enugu have heightened Department’s concern.

2. Re Gowon’s appeal of March 1, Dept. concurs in UK view that our response should be in general terms. We would prefer, however, that US response be oral and informal (Lagos 6714)³ particularly since we unwilling respond affirmatively to all Gowon’s requests and he apparently prepared accept oral response (Lagos 6586 para 3 A). Believe Ambassador Mathews’ expected meeting with Gowon on March 4 appropriate occasion and consequently we would wish to give him urgent instructions.

3. For London: Request you discuss reftels and substance this message with HMG. Department’s thinking, subject to comments from Lagos and London, along lines succeeding paras.

4. Ambassador would inform Gowon that in light well-known position of US in support for Nigerian unity, our assumption is that his request of March 1 to diplomatic corps directed primarily at governments other than US. However, Ambassador happy to reaffirm our long-standing support for FMG and Nigerian unity as requested.

As we have stated in past, however, form of association is for Nigerians themselves to decide.

5. Re Gowon’s specific references to possible blockade and recognition, we unwilling respond in advance to such hypothetical questions. With respect to request not to receive delegations from East, Ambassador could remind Gowon Dept. has already refused receive Oji.

6. In light recent events, Ambassador should also emphasize our deep concern at recurring reports of possible use of force and make clear USG would deplore such action by either FMG or East. While recognizing Ojukwu’s broadcast probably considered by FMG highly inflammatory, we believe resort to “police action” would probably not solve problem but only plunge Nigeria into chaos. It would also endanger lives of American citizens, whose safety is primary responsibility of Ambassador as Gowon has already recognized.

7. US is aware that FMG has made real effort to accept many of East’s demands in face East’s insistence on full execution of its interpretation of Aburi agreements. Should Gowon respond that US appears be advising FMG capitulation to East, Ambassador would state this not the case. It earnest US hope that Gowon will fully support Ankrah’s initiative, since it currently appears to have best chance of pulling Nigeria back from brink. Ambassador also would ask Gowon what other outside initiatives, i.e., Commonwealth or other, might serve useful purpose should Ankrah fail for some reason.

8. Believe it desirable that Embassy Lagos instruct Consul Enugu urgently to approach Ojukwu with similar appeal to avoid further provocative actions and inform Gowon he doing so. Consul could also inform Ojukwu of Ambassador’s expression of support of FMG. HMG may wish DHC in Enugu make similar approach.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to London and repeated to Accra.
2. Telegram 6586 from Lagos, March 1, relayed Gowon’s requests through the assembled Chiefs of Mission for their governments’ reaffirmation of support for the FMG and of Nigerian unity. (Ibid., POL 15–1 NIGERIA) Telegram 6620 from Lagos, March 1, not printed. (Ibid.) Telegram 7046 from London, March 2, not printed. (Ibid., POL 23–9, NIGERIA)
3. Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 15–1, NIGERIA)