Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria¹

Washington, February 23, 1967, 4:56 p.m.

142433. Ref: Lagos 6071.² For Ambassador from Palmer.

1. As requested reftel, IRG on Feb 21 carefully considered FMG’s request to purchase 106 mm ammunition with full appreciation and discussion your position this subject.

2. In light dangers of present Nigerian situation, with positions of both FMG and GOEN hardening and possibility of attempted solutions by force of looming in background, we have reluctantly and unanimously concluded the approval of sale under present circumstances not possible. This is based in part on your penetrating 6143 which gave major characteristics and your assessment of current crisis. We agree that next several weeks may be critical period and believe our approval of ammunition sale at this time could have unfortunate consequences not only in Nigeria but in our Congressional relations.

3. In light our large AID, Peace Corps and other programs in Nigeria, we believe it unfair and unrealistic for FMG military officers or other officials to attempt make our affirmative action on ammunition request test of good faith. Our support of FMG has been clearly demonstrated and unwavering, but we believe our supplying ammunition during present period of high tensions goes beyond bounds of such support.

4. We are deeply concerned at present rumors of resort to force by either side. Such a course would be disastrous, and we unwilling to be placed in position in which we appear to be contributing to preparations for such action. Also believe that even with spaced shipments, informing FMG now of basic decision to provide ammo could be misunderstood and contribute to rise in level of tension. Such action would also complicate pending critical AID hearings and cause serious domestic criticism.

5. Our fervent hope is that Nigerian situation may soon improve to point where such requests might be approved. Unfortunately, our own analysis of evidence available at present indicates situation deteriorating rather than improving.

6. In lieu of informing FMG of this decision, you may wish consider conveying discreetly to appropriate FMG officials our hope that FMG would refrain from pressing us on this request. To do so could, as indicated above, lead to turn-down and embarrassment of both USG and FMG. We recognize military officers may not be able to grasp our domestic problems, but civilian officials should be able to do so. Would appreciate your recommendations on above, recognizing you may also prefer simply to defer any response to FMG request.

7. I fully appreciate difficulties this decision may cause you but am confident you will understand reasons.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 NIGERIA. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Smith, cleared by Melbourne and Trimble, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Telegram 6071 from Lagos, February 11, urged reconsideration of the “long-standing” Nigerian request for ammunition, and noted that Ojukwu’s claim that the Aburi decisions included agreement not to import arms and ammunition was denied by other SMC participants, and that the British policy was to be as responsive as possible to FMG arms requests. (Ibid.)