Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

362. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes)¹

Washington, January 18, 1966.

SUBJECT

• AF Meeting with CIA Representatives January 18, 1966

PARTICIPANTS

• AF—Mr. Fredericks and Ambassador Trimble; AFW—Mr. Clark; AFC—Mr. Brown; CIA—[names not declassified]; INR/DDC—Ambassador Koren and Mr. Ekern

1. Nigerian Coup

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agreed with Mr. Fredericks that the chief problem at the moment was the absence of adequate information on what was happening in Nigeria, the identities behind the coup,² and what the significance was. Current reporting was reviewed as well as the problems associated with evacuation of Americans should this become necessary.

Mr. Fredericks reported on his discussions with the Nigerian Ambassador whom he described as being a “shattered man.” On his way out the Ambassador made the remark that “he was no longer authorized to ask for US intervention,” but Mr. Fredericks was not sure what the Ambassador was trying to tell him. The Ambassador was very much in the dark as to happenings in Nigeria and asked for information we might have on the names of people involved in the coup.

Mr. Clark reviewed the E and E plan, and the status of preparations.

Mr. Fredericks was concerned over the role Ghana might have played, or its intentions towards the coup. He felt that Nkrumah would attempt to fish in troubled waters, and in particular try to capture Nigerian foreign policy. Should Nigeria go over to the radical coup the loss to the US would be most serious. He discoursed upon the stake the US had in Nigeria, the biggest in Africa. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] recalled that during the recent Commonwealth conference a Communist journalist had been passing out funds in Lagos.

Mr. Fredericks phrased the prime questions that had priority for intelligence acquisition purposes:

a. Who are the personalities behind the coup and what is their coloration and motivation?

b. Can the Army run the government?

c. Can the Army hold together?

d. What would happen if Ironsi was assassinated?

Mr. Fredericks also thought it important that we determine what we should say to other African leaders, if anything. If Nigeria could fall victim to military takeover, then it could happen anywhere in Africa. The stage was set. What sort of advice could we give the remaining civilian regimes? Ambassador Koren suggested that INR and possibly CIA together prepare an agreed assessment of the situation for information of our Embassies, including whatever advice for other heads of government seemed appropriate. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] gave him a preliminary Agency report on this question of shock waves from Nigeria (see attached Tab A).³

[2 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

The meeting then turned to a wide-ranging discussion of the consequences of a really chaotic situation in Nigeria, and the effect on the rest of Africa.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Nigeria. Secret. Prepared on January 21. The memorandum was also sent to the Deputy Director of INR George C. Denney, Jr., and to Deputy Director for Research Allan Evans.
2. See Document 361.
3. Not printed.