Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

310. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)¹

Washington, February 11, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Ethiopian Situation

Thank you for your memorandum of February 9.²

I share your concern and appreciate your offer to be of assistance. There are certainly reasons enough to worry about coup possibilities, although it is interesting that Ed Korry now thinks that on balance a coup is not imminent (Addis Ababa’s A–478, February 2).³

Ed, on his own initiative, had a long private talk with the Emperor on February 3. You have probably seen his report on it (A–499, February 5).⁴ The conversation merits close study, for Ed made most of the essential observations and the Emperor in reply ran true to form. It is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that anything or anyone can persuade the Emperor at this late stage of his career to do anything against his “better” judgment.

In responding to Ed, the Emperor said he had “heard all these criticisms,” that “time and experience were essentials to all sure progress,” and that he would “soon take steps to arrange matters.” Ed’s comment to us is that he has heard this song before but that his net impression was clearly of a man who after almost 50 years in power was confident he knew how to deal with the present crisis.

You may recall that after the 1960 abortive coup we had hopes that the Emperor would see the necessity of instituting reforms. To add to the pressures from his own top advisers (including General Abye Abebe, son-in-law and one of the heroes of the coup days, who fell out of grace as a result), a high ranking British diplomat and long time friend and confidant of the Emperor visited Addis and had a series of private talks with HIM urging reforms. All to no avail.

There are similarities with the Shah and King Hassan, but there are also important differences, not the least of which is that the Emperor belongs to a much older generation and has the underlying feel that domestic reforms, instead of strengthening his own position, would strike at the heart of his personal power, as indeed they probably would. Finally, it is of interest that Ed has come to the conclusion that irrespective of all of the obvious dangers, the Emperor will probably stay on top.

Obviously we are continuing to watch the situation closely and are looking for opportunities, but I frankly hesitate to use the trump of a Presidential message at this juncture, particularly in light of the latest audience. I suggest we at least wait for a while to see if anything results from the Emperor’s statement about “taking steps soon to arrange matters.”

I certainly remain open to persuasion on making use of White House interests and perhaps meanwhile we might examine with Ed means of enlisting the President’s help to best advantage.⁵

GMW

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Secret.
2. Document 309. Williams presumably received Komer’s memorandum on February 9.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. A covering memorandum from Haynes to Komer argues against this “short-sighted approach” and notes that the question is not “whether” there will be an explosion in Ethiopia, but “when.” Therefore, an immediate effort to convince the Emperor to make necessary reforms had to be made, no matter how slim the chances.