Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, January 23, 1967, 4:22 p.m.

123472. State/Defense message. Subject: Tunisian MAP. Ref: Tunis 2653 NOTAL.² Tunis 2728 NOTAL.³

1. Conversation with Ladgham reported reftel reveals wide difference between GOT and ourselves in interpretations of President Bourguiba’s past allusions to a security guarantee. We had believed that Bourguiba viewed such a guarantee as a desirable long-term objective, but would look upon a joint US-Tunisian cooperative endeavor to modernize and strengthen Tunisian armed forces as a manifestation of our interest. It would now appear that Bourguiba regards security guarantee as a prerequisite, or at minimum as an integral part, of US agreement to help improve Tunisia’s defense posture. In this respect it is important to point out that our support of Tunisia prior to and since independence (i.e. our willingness to provide carefully designed, well-balanced, economically feasible military assistance program, and preferential economic treatment accorded Tunisia) is clear and convincing evidence of US interest in and support of Tunisia. However, we are prepared to continue full and frank discussion of all aspects of Tunisian security problem during coming months prior to Bourguiba’s Washington visit in June, but we must discourage repeat discourage any thought that we are prepared to provide a security guarantee.

2. We recognize language of proposed notes transmitted in State 110563 and 112264⁴ is restrictive and formalistic. This is necessitated by narrow and specific purpose of notes, which intended to constitute military assistance agreement only, and designed to meet certain statutory requirements of US law. Language can be toned down to give better visibility impression. It never intended, however, that these Notes assume character of a security treaty, alliance or guarantee.

3. The proposed FY 1967 Military Assistance Program constitutes significant US assistance towards modernizing Tunisian armed forces. Furthermore it emphasizes the need for greatly increased training of military in order to permit efficient and effective absorption of proposed equipment, as prerequisite to deliver. FYI. FY 1967 funds must be committed prior to end of the FY or be lost. Therefore, the current USCINC–EUR “abbreviated plan” for Tunisia will have to be definitized as completely as possible to enable implementation. Balance of funds will be preserved as an “abbreviated plan” on MAP orders. Equipment availability will pose even greater difficulties in the future if identification of items is delayed. For these reasons we believe it is in Tunisian Government’s interest to consider proceeding with proposed MAP. End FYI.

4. We are prepared to implement the FY 1967 Tunisia MAP on basis of assurances in 1957 confidential agreement as suggested by Ladgham and Bourguiba, Jr. Would appreciate, however, your specific comments immediately to clarify following;

• —Is Tunisian concern primarily receiving an assurance from the US and less interest in actual military assistance?
• —What is the extent of the dissatisfaction with the size and content of the program?
• —Reasons for one-year limitation clearly stated to GOT. Was limitation a serious factor in Tunisian reaction and would it have been overcome by a multi-year commitment?
• —Is their principal concern that of being faced with hard decisions on whether to follow through on developing a professional military force and accepting the new position of the military?

5. Review of memcons and Tunis 2653 indicates Tunisians may be under impression that complete fulfillment of all survey team findings necessary adjunct to our providing military assistance. If this true, suggest you reiterate purpose of team report to provide Tunisians balanced evaluation of security situation and requirements for improving military forces and not as a precondition to provision of MAP.

6. Assuming Tunisians desire go-ahead, following conditions would apply:

(A) Begin programming training and defense articles for Tunisia against FY 1967 funds on basis of the assurances given by the GOT in the 1957 confidential agreement (FYI and in accordance with the terms of Presidential Determination of 16 December 1966 End FYI). Consideration will be given to capability to absorb equipment effectively prior to delivery.

(B) Implement our plan to send a USAF team to Tunisia in February in order to study the Tunisian Air Force’s immediate requirements to enable it to utilize jet fighter aircraft. Require immediate response to preclude cancelling plans for assembling USAF team.

(C) Select and assign initially to the Amembassy Tunis, Office of the Defense Attache, personnel that will form nucleus of US military training mission.

(D) Acceptance by the GOT of above-mentioned proposals shall be evidenced by letter of agreement from the GOT stipulating that GOT reiterates the assurances it gave the US Government in the 1957 confidential agreement, and that it will receive a military training mission to be assigned to the Amembassy Tunis. The US Defense Attache may continue initially to assume responsibility for Military Assistance Program. The Chief of the military training mission shall be accredited to the Secretary of State for National Defense, and he and members of his staff shall be authorized direct access to the component units of the Tunisian defense establishment as may be required for the proper fulfillment of their mission. FYI. Embassy should note that “token payment” provisions of 1957 agreement are not applicable to delivery of grant aid funded from FY 1967 funds. End FYI.

(E) Acceptance by the GOT of training and defense articles under the assurances given by the GOT of the 1957 confidential agreement shall not be considered by the US as a commitment to accept the terms and conditions of the military assistance agreement proposed in State 110563 and 112264.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–TUN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sacksteder in AFN and Colonel Kissinger in OSD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J–5, Commander Peters in JCS/SAMAA, Litmans in DOD/GC, Dunlap in DOD/ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Post in AFN, Colonel Megna in AFI, and Meinecke in AID/AFR/NA; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Paris, Rabat for Root and Lang, and USCINCEUR for ECMAP–IA.
2. In telegram 2653 from Tunis, January 12, Russell reported a conversation with Bahi Ladgham, Minister for the Presidency, who had stated that Tunisia would like to have the same kind of relationship with and type of assistance from the United States that Turkey did, and the kind of “assurance guarantee” from the United States that it would have if it were a member of NATO. (Ibid.)
3. Dated January 18. (Ibid.)
4. Neither found.
5. On February 9, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow told Driss that although the United States had mutual security commitments with a number of countries, such as those in NATO, U.S. public opinion was hostile to other such commitments. Driss said that President Bourguiba thought it necessary for Tunisia’s security that some form of alliance with the United States be arrived at, and Rostow said that the U.S. Government was willing to study this. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–TUN)