Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

168. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 14, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Presidential Determination—Military Aid for Tunisia

After discussing this with you at lunch on 4 October, Secretary Rusk told Bourguiba, Jr. we’d go ahead with a grant program but couldn’t commit ourselves beyond FY 1967. However, since this is the first time you’ve seen a formal recommendation, I want to give you the background.

Bourguiba has long wanted a closer relationship with us to offset the Soviet-backed arms buildup in Algeria and his deteriorating relations with DeGaulle and Nasser. Last fall, he asked us for $100 million in military equipment. To bring him back to reason, we sent a survey team. It recommended a $25 million program over five years to develop a Tunisian force that could hold off the Algerians just long enough for outside help to arrive.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara vetoed a five-year commitment. In the attached,² they recommend a one-year $5.2 million program because they don’t think the Congress will stand for any new long-term commitment right now. But they recognize that going ahead is in effect starting a five-year program since it is the only militarily sensible approach. Cutting off the program a year from now would probably be harder than not starting at all. Secretary Rusk explained to Bourguiba, Jr. our problems with long-term commitments and suggested we get started this year and deal with the future as it comes.

They feel there are strong reasons for helping Tunisia:

• —The USSR has shipped large amounts of Soviet equipment to Algeria, and Tunisia justifiably feels defenseless. Both the Moroccans and Tunisians have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Moscow to lay off.
• —Bourguiba has been remarkably good on Vietnam, and we can’t expect our friends to stick up for us if we don’t take their legitimate defense concerns seriously.
• —He has isolated himself in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser, and he is a moderate voice on Israel and African issues.
• —It doesn’t make sense to force Bourguiba to buy arms in the open market while we’re helping with his successful development program. He has nowhere else to turn.
• —Dave Bell strongly opposed this program. He argued that:
• —Tunisia’s natural relationship lies with Europe. Moving into a long-term program now would reverse our policy of gradually disengaging and nudging Tunisia toward its natural partners.
• —We might appear to be fueling a Tunisian-Algerian arms race. The examples of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Jordan-Israel teach that we should be drawing back from this kind of program wherever possible.
• —Your African program tries to build on natural sub-regional groupings like Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia. With both neighbors suspicious of Algeria, economic cooperation may be a pipe dream. Nevertheless, we ought to be urging cooperation—maybe even arms limitation—not undermining it by helping widen the Tunisian-Algerian gap.
• —Tunisia needs to concentrate every last ounce of talent and money on economic development.

We have all been uncomfortable about this program for the reasons Dave Bell cited (especially if there’s any thought of stopping after one year). At best, it’s a 60–40 decision. However, I’ve explored all the alternatives and on balance think we ought to go ahead. If we had something promising to offer Bourguiba in the way of arms limitation, I’d give that a try, but neither the Moroccans nor the Tunisians feel they can do that kind of business with either Algeria or Moscow. In the final analysis, it’s tough to tell a friend like Bourguiba that we won’t help him defend himself when he has so willingly backed our cause in Vietnam. He told Ambassador Harriman last week that he urgently needs an answer.

Therefore, since you have already given Secretary Rusk verbal approval, I recommend you sign the attached determination.³ Charlie Schultze’s memo (attached)⁴ explains the legalities. For signature if you approve.⁵

W. W. Rostow ⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Secretary Rusk’s memorandum to President Johnson, December 1, recommending that the President sign the determination authorizing a 1-year $5.2 million military assistance program is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Telegram 106134 to Tunis, December 21, informed the Embassy that the President had signed the MAP Determination, and that the Ambassador could notify the Foreign Minister of the U.S. decision to extend military assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–TUN)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.