147. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud)1
My initial concern over how we handle our next aid round with the Tunisians (my London 4561)2 was to avoid slapping Bourguiba just after he’s stuck to a responsible line on Palestine.3 However, entirely apart from this we face the problem of how to capitalize on gains from past aid as we begin talking about their next plan.
There’s a special obligation to use tact because we made such a big thing of our multi-year commitment three years ago. I realize multi-year deals aren’t as appealing to us as they were in 1961–62. But if we’re going to shift back to annual programming, it would be inexcusable not to do it gently. After all, we’re the ones who sold the Tunisians on long-term aid planning and multi-year commitments.
I’m not judging the merits of a multi-year pledge. What I’m worried about is how to present whatever decision we make to the Tunisians without jeopardizing the confidence we’ve built there.
So I think we ought to be looking for a formula for telling the Tunisians how far we’ll go in supporting their next plan. Just to get us started, what about saying something like this to Bourguiba and Ben Salah: [Page 224]
“We’ll continue aiding Tunisian development at substantial levels. Our interest is as great as ever. To improve the effectiveness of our aid, we would like to suggest some new techniques developed from our experience since 1961. For instance, one device we think offers promise is the annual development budget, which provides the most accurate guide to amounts and types of aid required. So we’d like to begin working with Ben Salah on such a budget and will gear our aid to that as soon as precise needs become clear.” This is much better than telling them right off we’re not going to make a quantitative commitment to the new plan.
The point is that this is both a political and an aid problem and we need a formula that serves both needs. Above all, we can’t afford another fiasco like the Title I blowup in December, especially on something as important as this.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963–March 1966. Secret. Also sent to Hutchinson and Williams.↩
- In telegram 4561 from London, March 22, Komer warned that AID’s plan to advise Tunisia that the U.S. Government was not prepared to make a quantitative commitment to a new Tunisian long-term plan would be “political folly” at a time when the United States wanted all the moderate Arab support it could get. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 524 from Amman, March 9, reported that President Bourguiba, who was on a visit to Jordan, had declared at a March 6 press conference in Jerusalem that Arabs could cooperate with Jews. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩