Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

146. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 21, 1964.

I had a good hour-and-a-half with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr. (along with Ambassador Driss) on 19 Dec. When I commented on our plethora of problems, including our troubles in Pakistan, Bourguiba asked jocularly, “Which would you rather have—friends or allies?” (I said, “Friends”.) In brief, he made a strong pitch for aid, while I urged Tunisia to speak with an even stronger voice for moderation in Africa.

Bourguiba began jokingly by saying he thought stability was becoming a liability and perhaps he should generate a little turmoil to get Tunisia on the “emergency list.” What he really wanted was a “green light” from top US echelons to treat the successful building of the “Tunisian showcase” as an urgent matter. He cited the recent 3-day bridge-building operation by US and Tunisian military engineers as an example of how quickly things can happen when the top level gives a push. He wished the whole Tunisian aid and development program could get that kind of steam behind it.

In the discussion which followed, these specifics emerged:

1. He’d be happy to receive more US military engineers any time it would help get a job done. I pointed out the limited scope of their activities but agreed we would look into whether military engineers, either US or Tunisian, could reasonably help further with Tunisian development.

2. Bourguiba said his government is now willing to receive US experts to help plan and document projects to speed up loans. At first, GOT had wanted to do this for itself to learn how but now felt confident enough to seek help. I suggested that private firms like Checci and Nathan have been good at this elsewhere.

3. He asked whether there was any chance of our loosening up on tied US procurement. I saw little until our payments gap disappeared. He reiterated the usual arguments about US equipment often being high-priced and the difficulty of integrating it into systems standardized on European equipment.

4. He commented that oil and gas exploration in southern Tunisia had turned up hopeful signs. One Italian firm is already talking to GOT about a pipeline. The biggest boon of real discovery would be the reduction in power costs, which would release money for further development

5. When I underscored the importance of re-establishing decent economic relations with France, he animatedly described how far GOT had gone to meet French desires in every respect. But De Gaulle feels personally insulted and little can be done until the air clears. After a point, “Tunisia is too weak to bend,” he said. He made clear he’d welcome help, but I pointed out that our currency is none too good in Paris these days either.

6. Taking up my comparison of Tunisian project preparation with Moroccan ineptitude, Bourguiba outlined his impressions of the Moroccan situation. He said (interestingly, since I’d pressed the idea with Amb. Bengelloun in October) that King Hassan during his recent visit to Tunis had pressed his ministers to learn all they could about Tunisian development techniques and even left several of them behind to continue their study. He also invited Tunisian specialists to Morocco to study Moroccan problems, and to bring back to Tunisia selected Moroccans for further training. From a private visit to Morocco last summer, he deduced that the big Moroccan political problem is the court coterie which isolates Hassan as a sort of cult of adulation; men like Oufkir poison the King’s views. He also said Hassan “is a man 35 with the body of a man 50” and has serious stomach trouble.

When Bourguiba asked what I wanted to say to him, I hit two points:

1. More and more, US policy is turning on the Congo, and—for better or worse—causing the USG to re-examine our relations with African radicals like Nasser and Ben Bella. (He smiled, and I acknowledged he’d been warning us for years about Nasser.) I said we really couldn’t think too harshly of the new East African governments because they are so inexperienced, but Nasser and the old-timers know better. We also are coming around to feel that we’re entitled to more backing from our friends; we want the moderate Africans to stand up and be counted.

2. We hope for Tunisian moderation on the Israeli question, which I felt could heat up over the next 3–4 years. We couldn’t expect GOT to change its position—we understand its views. But we have been encouraged by the willingness of the Lebanese, for instance, in keeping UAC forces out of its territory. All we ask is for reasonable Arabs to realize everyone will get hurt if there’s a showdown. It used to be that the Western Arabs ignored Palestine, but Ben Bella has now attracted to them the wrath of anti-Arab lobbies and other critics in the US—all of which makes it increasingly difficult for us to carry on a reasonable Maghreb policy.

Responding to my first point, he described at length his efforts the day before in New York and his disgust that most of the OAU foreign ministers won’t stand up for what is obviously right, even in their own longer term interests. Nigeria was the only other member not ready to follow the crowd. Bourguiba claimed credit for stiffening the spines of the Moroccans and Malagasy. He pointed out the delicacy of the Tunisians’ effort as white Africans to stay moderate without discrediting themselves. He said he had argued at some length with one Sudanese delegate at least to admit facts (e.g. radical arms shipments through Khartoum), but he threw up his hands at trying to force reason on Maghoub.

A discussion of Ben Bella developed out of my comments on BB’s role in getting the Western Arabs into the Israeli issue. He felt that BB is not the most radical Algerian; BB has trouble with extremists in his own government, notably Bouteflika and Boumedienne. He cited specifically how Bouteflika had tried to undermine a Bourguiba, Sr.-BB agreement in Cairo to solemnize an Algerian-Tunisian border settlement (milestone 233) during Bourguiba’s visit to Algiers in May. He also commented on BB’s penchant—like Sukarno’s—for “externalizing his problems.” I said BB is fooling around in the Congo because he’s revolutionary at heart. All he knows is how to promote revolutions.

Before leaving, Bourguiba stressed another major fear: What will happen to Tunisia if Libya collapses? He said—as I mentioned one possible Libyan leader after another—that there’s no one in Libya after the King dies whom we can deal with. He even said the Tunisians had to consider moving into Libya when the King dies to pre-empt Nasser (though I suspect this comment was more to dramatize his point than a serious thought). I told him we’re very much concerned—he quipped, “You’re concerned; we’re scared”—and said we’d continue to think hard about staving off the problem of a Nasser push into a Libyan vacuum.

RWK

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscelleanous, 12/63–9/68. Secret. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Williams, and Newsom.