138. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Morocco, the Middle East Situation and Security Concerns
PARTICIPANTS
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Morocco:
- Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Foreign Minister
- Ahmed Osman, Ambassador to the United States
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United States:
- Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary
- Peter Spicer, Country Officer for Morocco
- Alec Toumayan, Language Services
After exchanging greetings with Mr. Palmer, Foreign Minister Laraki remarked that he had been distressed at the divergence between our appraisal of the ME situation and his own. He repeated that, as he had told the President yesterday,2 Morocco feels that an unconditional withdrawal is the indispensable preliminary step that can then be followed by other steps. He saw a dangerous parallel between the recent Israeli-Arab conflict whereby Israeli attitudes seem to imply that Israel can hold on to its conquests, that “might makes right”, and the situation between Morocco and Algeria. Algeria would need only to attack Morocco, occupy one-third of Morocco’s national territory, as far as the natural obstacles, and then negotiate from a position of strength. Morocco found itself therefore forced to revise its policies and to formulate a new appraisal regarding its security. Morocco was aware that the struggle was on two levels, the struggle between the Arabs and Israel which had been lost and the internal struggle between the so-called “progressive states” and the so-called “reactionaries”. One already hears that the Arab lack of victory is due to the fact that the moderates failed the cause. This new appeal for what Morocco needs for its security leads to an appeal for U.S. aid, which the Minister called “completely inadequate”. If Morocco translates $14 million into F–5 aircraft for example, Morocco has one squadron. In a time of lightning air strikes and essential air cover this is totally inadequate. The Minister stated that Morocco had applied to the Czechs for T–54 tanks and the Italians for G-91 jet aircraft for which NATO concurrence is required. Laraki had asked Ambassador Tasca to act on their behalf to obtain that concurrence.
In short, and speaking with great frankness as he had done in the past, the Minister said, everything centered on whether or not Morocco could count on our aid.
Mr. Palmer remarked that perhaps it would not serve any useful purpose to go over the points which had been discussed yesterday; in particular our divergence on the prior and unconditional withdrawal. The President and Mr. Rostow both had stressed that, whatever our wishes are, in effect we have very little influence to exert on Israel. The problem is that Israel has been living for 20 years with a situation in which belligerence is exerted against it, its security is comprised and its existence is not recognized. Mr. Rostow said yesterday that the Israelis would insist on having prior assurances and prior arrangements regarding security and the exercise of the right of free international navigation before they would agree to any withdrawal.
Mr. Palmer stated that he did not agree with the parallel the Minister had drawn between the present Middle East situation and the situation [Page 208] existing between Morocco and Algeria. Mr. Palmer said he did not deny the dangers of the situation confronting Morocco, for he was fully aware of the situation. There were differences in the two situations, however, in that Algeria recognized Morocco and Algeria had no territorial claims against Morocco, at least not officially. Mr. Palmer said that there was a split within the Arab world which was providing a false issue to the so-called “progressive” states in their efforts to undermine the activity of the moderate states; which he liked to call the “constructive” states. He was not, therefore, minimizing the problem. We have great concern for the security and independence of Morocco. The USG wanted Morocco, Tunisia, Libya to be able to maintain their political independence and their security. It was in this framework that we had agreed to the Moroccan request for $14 million worth of arms. As the President had said yesterday, we are going ahead with this and we are ready to implement this agreement. We had, however, not heard finally from Morocco about the types of equipment Morocco wished to procure. As to any additional procurement arrangements they wished to enter into, the GOM could be assured that we would give them our most earnest consideration, but Mr. Palmer said he, of course, could not prejudge the decision.
Mr. Palmer reiterated, citing the President’s statement of the day before, the sincerity of our commitment to the political independence of Morocco and our continuing concern for it.
Mr. Palmer then said that it would be helpful for us to have some clarification as to the exact nature of the threat that Morocco feels to be directed against it by Algeria. Yesterday, he said, the Minister had outlined the “three-point strategy” of Nasser. Did the Minister still feel that an immediate threat exists, with a planned attack by Algeria in July, or has that been amended?
In replying to Mr. Palmer’s statement that Algeria has no claims against Morocco, Laraki pointed out that Algeria has no border with Israel. Algeria has absolutely no need for the intensive program of armament now being conducted there. This can be directed against no one but Morocco. Before the crisis the ratio of forces was 10–1 in favor of Algeria. Algeria has continued to import military equipment. True, although part of it goes to the UAR, this equipment is not intended for use against Israel, but for use against Morocco. Another sign is that 14 airports have been built in Algeria along the Moroccan border.
The Minister said that long “lead-times” cause great problems for Morocco. He cited a delay of two years for communications equipment. Morocco is concerned about what could happen in those years. The F–5 program has also been going ahead so slowly. It was started under Ambassador Benjelloun and should have been completed by the end of 1966. In mid-1967 only four had been delivered and without ordnance. Morocco could not defend itself with that, and Morocco knew that the [Page 209] U.S. would not act directly in Morocco’s behalf because that act might bring in the Soviet Union on the other side. It was not a question of Morocco exerting pressure on us or trying to blackmail us. Morocco’s choice and attitude were well known.
Mr. Palmer said that we had absolutely no doubt as to Morocco’s stand. We wanted to assure the Minister in the strongest terms possible of the importance we attach to the independence and security of Morocco. The Minister was aware of our difficulties. We are faced with demands on our resources which cause us many problems. We will have further talks with DOD in order to determine what needs to be done to speed up deliveries, and we shall also review the availabilities of equipment. We will give this matter the highest priority and we will report to the Minister as soon as possible.
Within the framework of our general cooperation, Mr. Palmer said, a review was in order to determine what could be done to restore peace and stability to that region. We appreciated the efforts made by His Majesty to secure an agreement on the reduction of armaments in the Maghreb. Nothing had come of it, for reasons which were well known. We hoped that it would be possible, within the framework of the Middle East situation, to exert influence to stop the escalation. Mr. Palmer cautioned the Minister not to believe that the USG lacked realism or that we advised disarmament in circumstances of remote possibilities. However, one should not lose sight of the opportunities that are available in the world in which we live.
The Minister replied that His Majesty intended to make a new approach to U Thant on disarmament. Once again, it was not expected that Algeria would even acknowledge the proposal. Morocco deplored the fact that it had to arm itself at the expense of economic development. What good was it to expend $60 million for the Lower Moulouya Dam and to develop 100 million hectares at a cost of $10–15 million if these works are on the border of Algeria?
Mr. Palmer asked the Minister if the recent events in the Middle East had caused France to review some of its attitudes toward the Maghreb. It should be a cause for concern for France to see Soviet penetration into Algeria.
The Minister said that he wished this were true. France’s attention has been drawn to that situation. Unfortunately, De Gaulle’s attitude was very clearly to oppose anything that Washington did. De Gaulle’s attitude here is to attempt to “pull chestnuts out of the fire”. De Gaulle had gone even beyond his Foreign Minister’s speech at the UN.
Mr. Palmer said that, in view of France’s interest and concern in the Maghreb, and even more in view of the historic relations that France has had with the Maghreb, Soviet influence must be an object of French preoccupation. [Page 210] Should Algeria attack Morocco, this would surely place France in an impossible situation.
The Minister said that, in his view, France would sacrifice its interests in Morocco. Morocco, on its side, had done everything to forestall a deterioration of relations. Witness, he said, Morocco’s satisfaction at the outcome of the Ben Barka trial.
Mr. Palmer said that if Algeria attacked Morocco, and occupied one-third of its territory, it would be very difficult for the French. World opinion would be against Algeria, and French support of Algeria would place France in an untenable position. The Minister replied that recent events had shown the ineffectiveness of world public opinion and its lack of importance.
Mr. Palmer then asked the Minister if the information Morocco had on Algerian intentions was of a nature to be made public. The Minister replied publicity was unnecessary since every intelligence service in the world knew that an attack was planned.
Mr. Palmer concluded by reiterating that we would give high priority to consideration of the Moroccan arms request. We would immediately look into what needed to be done to speed up deliveries and look into the availabilities. On future requests he could not now be more specific than he had been. He hoped the Minister would reassure His Majesty of our continued concern for the independence and political security of his country, as the President had stated the day before. Mr. Palmer informed the Minister of the resumption of economic aid programs to Morocco, saying that these programs had been affected by the general suspension at the outbreak of the crisis. He cited the recent signing of a loan agreement on Nouasseur. These acts, he said, were evidence of our continued desire to help.
The Minister, referring to economic assistance, indicated that Morocco would suffer a shortfall of 800,000 tons of wheat. He hoped that our contribution would be at least equal to what it had been the year before. Mr. Palmer stated that we would do our best. He mentioned, in this connection, the continued difficulties, that Morocco’s trade with Cuba would pose for us. The Minister stated that Morocco had already curtailed its sugar purchases at some cost. Morocco had purchased 160,000 tons of sugar from an American supplier at a higher price. His Majesty had pointed out that such a curtailment of activities could only be done in stages. It was in this constructive spirit that Morocco was acting.