Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

98. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach¹

Washington, June 19, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Independence Arrangements for South Arabia

1. Foreign Secretary Brown announced the following British decisions for South Arabia in the House of Commons on June 19:

• —Independence for “all South Arabia” early in January 1968.
• —Early application to Aden of an independence-type constitution which would replace the current Federal constitution for the whole country as soon as possible.
• —Additional British financial help to the SAFG military establishment, continuing support for the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the Eastern Protectorate for two years after independence and establishment of a British military aid mission to assist the organization and training of the SAFG forces.
• —Measures to tighten up against terrorism (e.g., suspension of trial by jury) combined with measures designed to facilitate political reconciliation (e.g., lifting the ban on the NLF). 2. The foregoing announcement confirms that HMG has decided to give full support to the SAFG as the only means at hand of assuring any kind of logical and, hopefully, orderly transfer of power. Several points in the British proposals are of interest:

  a. Constitutional: The British have decided to adopt the constitutional proposals contained in the Hone-Bell report of February 1966. Various changes are designed to bring the draft nearer the desiderata of the UN resolutions. The constitution is to provide for country-wide elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, which in turn will be based on liberal nationality legislation giving the vote to genuine “belongers” of various races. This provision would appear not to cover the very substantial population in Aden of Yemeni origin and, accordingly, will not be acceptable to FLOSY and other opposition groups.

  b. Aden: A “capital territory” is being established which will include Aden and its environs, including the present Federal capital. It is indicated that this arrangement will be made prior to independence. It might thus be possible to deal with the vexing issue of giving the SAFG some responsibility for security before 1968. However, the UK plans to take care of the constitutional problem (Aden will remain a Colony until independence) by “reservations” with respect to certain fields of continuing responsibility. One of these may well prove to be security.

  c. Defense: The UK will reportedly increase by ten million sterling the amount previously committed to the SAFG military for the first three years of independence. The funds will be devoted to additional arms and equipment for the Federal Army, as well as the establishment of a British military aid mission to help organize and train the Federal forces and to supply key personnel for those forces’ base and medical service. No line officers are apparently to be seconded. A number of Hunter aircraft will be supplied to give the SAFG a small operational air force. An additional squadron of eight armored cars will also be provided, as well as eight additional 25-pounders. These will be in addition to the off-shore British naval force which will be in the area for six months after independence. To this force, a unit of V bombers has been added which will be stationed at Masirah Island for at least six months and longer if the UK so decides. These forces are to deter and, if necessary, repel external military aggression.

  d. Hadhramaut: The British proposals seem to accept that this area will not join the SAFG prior to independence. To assist in maintaining stability, the UK has now decided to finance the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion until 1970. The hope is that this will provide sufficient calm for the SAFG to work out terms for the Hadhramaut’s eventual accession to the new Republic of South Arabia.

3. These unilateral British proposals are likely to be seized upon by the moribund UN Special Mission for South Arabia as the excuse to terminate its activities. While it is true that the British proposals pre-empt the constitutional processes envisaged by the UN Resolutions, the Special Mission’s inability to obtain the cooperation of all South Arabian groups has made it difficult for London to envisage any other course. The British hope to meet the expected criticism from South Arabian radicals on this point by including in the new constitution a special provision calling for the formation of a “central caretaker government” if and when this becomes possible. This is unlikely to mollify the radicals who will contend that they are not in a position to join a regime whose constitution they had no hand in forming.

4. The outlook is thus for continued polarization in South Arabia, with the British giving greater military and political support to the conservatives. They clearly hope that, by so doing, the terrorist threat from elements in Yemen can be contained until the new government finds its feet. They recognize, however, that this is a gamble, and it seems virtually certain that the political scene in South Arabia will become even more tense as these arrangements are now put in train on the ground.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer. A copy was sent to Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin.