Office of the Historian

96. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, May 23, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • NSC Discussion—South Arabia

The main issue in the Middle East today is whether Nasser, the radical states and their Soviet backers are going to dominate the area. A related issue is whether the US is going to stand up for its friends, the moderates, or back down as a major power in the Near East.

Two weeks ago, we expected South Arabia to provide the test. The gulf between moderates and radicals has been getting wider for over a year. But with the British pulling out of South Arabia next January, Faisal, Hussein, Haile Selassie, the Shah and Eshkol were watching closely to see whether we and the British would stand for a Nasser takeover there. The current Arab-Israeli crisis has brought the test sooner than we expected, but the South Arabian problem will still provide the follow-up to the current showdown.

The policy question in South Arabia as on Israel’s borders is how far we can and should commit ourselves to block Nasser and his Soviet supporters. Our dilemma is that we have no stake in South Arabia itself—no immediate reason for involving ourselves in the uncertain political process there. However, the effect of the outcome on the broader confrontation makes it impossible to ignore what happens.

An active attempt to stave off a Nasser takeover would amount to a sharp shift in our Middle East policy. Since 1961, we have tried to avoid splitting the area into two camps. Given all of our conflicting interests, it has seemed wiser to build a good working relationship in all capitals. Now Nasser has all but forced us to choose sides. As your message to him2 said, we don’t want to give up entirely our effort to build some kind of relationship with him. But the time may already have come when we must make him respect us first.

I believe our first step must be to keep the British on the ground. They’re intimately involved in working out a political solution, and [Page 211] we can’t afford to see them walk out in despair. I originally scheduled this discussion (a) to give you a sense of the problem before you see PM Wilson and the Shah and (b) to give our planners a sense of your desires.

The underlined portions of the attached State paper,3 detail the problem.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting, May 24, 1967. Secret. Attached to a May 23, 7 p.m., memorandum from Rostow to the President noting that although the regular May 24 NSC meeting was scheduled to discuss problems the United States faced in South Arabia, Rostow recommended that following Nasser’s move against Israel the President use the NSC meeting to discuss the Middle East crisis instead. A record of the May 24 NSC meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX.↩
  2. President Johnson’s May 22 message to Nasser is scheduled for publication ibid.↩
  3. Document 97.↩