Office of the Historian

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Yemen1

Washington, March 9, 1967, 4:27 p.m.

151922. Taiz 1231.2 Appreciate info reftel and approve your attempt establish personal acquaintance al-Asnag. Should meeting occur, you should stress you are commenting on personal basis but may make following points: (a) with crucial phase South Arabia nation-building now taking place, those with most influence will be ones working inside rather than those who choose to opt out; (b) FLOSY’s decision boycott UN Special Mission will deny it constructive role in establishing stable South Arabian state and at same time run counter UN Resolution establishing UN Mission for which almost entire UN membership, including UAR, voted; (c) terror will solve no problems in South Arabia but merely create new ones; and (d) since British definitely and finally are leaving, shrewder course for all Arab patriots would be cooperate with UN Mission and their fellow citizens in effort establish an orderly independent administration in which all Arabs could take pride. You might also discreetly suggest to al-Asnag that UAR aims and South Arabian nationalist aims may now increasingly diverge.3

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Brewer and cleared by Bergus. Repeated to Sanaa, London, Cairo, Jidda, and Aden.↩
  2. In telegram 1231 from Taiz, March 9, Charge d’Affaires Dinsmore reported that during a discussion of South Arabian problems with UAR Consul al-Masri, the latter insisted that FLOSY was the sole representative of the people of South Arabia, to which Dinsmore responded with skepticism based on his own recent observations of conflict in Aden among FLOSY, NLF, SAL, and other organizations. Dinsmore emphasized U.S. Government interest in the peaceful settlement of differences among nationalist groups, which is why it fully supported the UN Special Mission. Al-Masri encouraged Dinsmore to establish a personal acquaintance with FLOSY representative al-Asnag, who was in Taiz—an effort which Dinsmore said he had initiated. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 1236 from Taiz, March 11, Dinsmore reported that he met with al-Asnag, who expressed FLOSY’s hopes for direct discussions with the U.K. Government. Dinsmore pointed out that FLOSY threats to the UN Mission were not reassuring, to which al-Asnag responded that its policy toward the UN Mission visit was one of “non-cooperation” rather than open hostility. (Ibid.)↩