81. Record of Meeting1
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Record of IRG/NEA Meeting—November 2, 1966
In continuing its consideration of the Communist presence in the Near East, the Group reviewed the situation in those parts of the Arabian Peninsula not previously covered, the Persian Gulf, and Jordan. In doing so, the Group took note of the assessments of Communist activity provided by our field posts (circulated with IRG/NEA 66-36).2
Arabian Peninsula (except Yemen and South Arabia) and Persian Gulf
The Group: Noted evidence of the beginning of a pattern of subversive pressure applied from sources principally in the UAR against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and principally from sources in Iraq against the Shaikhdoms. The sources of pressure emanate from a mixture of both Arab nationalism and pro-Soviet Communism. The Communists find [Page 186] it expedient to identify themselves with, and attempt to infiltrate and control, various nationalist elements seeking radical change.
Noted that there is no overt indigenous Communist Party activity in the area; and that the only official Communist outposts in the area are the Soviet and Czech and Polish embassies in Kuwait.
Noting the increasing strategic importance of Near Eastern oil for Western Europe, agreed that CIA should prepare a comprehensive study on the current and prospective availability of oil in the area. The study should serve to identify likely future points of subversive pressure.
On Saudi Arabia, agreed that despite certain signs of potential trouble, particularly among the labor force in the ARAMCO oil-producing area, the present nature and magnitude of subversive activity do not provide cause for serious concern. The Saudi Government is determined to avoid the establishment of any Communist presence. Nevertheless, the situation bears watching because oil-rich Saudi Arabia is a natural target for subversion.
On Muscat and Oman, noted the propaganda support given from abroad by the Soviets and Chinese Communists to local revolutionary movements.
Agreed that we should keep under consideration the desirability of opening a Foreign Service post at Muscat in the next few years.
Noted that there is virtually no known direct Communist penetration of the Trucial Shaikhdoms.
Noted that Bahrain is the major center of organized subversive activity in the Persian Gulf—a fact related to the relatively high levels of education and the inadequacy of job opportunities.
Noted the evidence of some direct Communist inspiration and infiltration of the active and well organized Bahrain National Liberation Front.
Agreed that the situation in Bahrain should be kept under close review. [1 line of source text not declassified] In addition, our own civil (Consulate General, Dhahran) and military (Commander, Mid-East Force) representatives in the area should be alerted to the continuing need for pertinent information.
Agreed on the central importance of the British military establishment in Bahrain and British security commitments for the protection of vital British and other Western interests in the Persian Gulf area; but recognized that the continuance of a strong British presence will hinge on the fiscal health as well as the political determination of the United Kingdom Government.
On Kuwait, noted the fair, but limited, degree of success in establishing a legitimate presence, achieved by overt Communist diplomatic, commercial and cultural activities.
[Page 187][1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
[Here follows discussion of Jordan.]
MEMBERS PRESENT
Executive Chairman—Ambassador Hare
AID—Mr. Macomber
CIA—Mr. Critchfield
DOD—Col. Jordan
JCS—Brig. Gen. Sibley
NSC—Mr. Wriggins
USIA—Mr. Carter
State (NEA)—Mr. Davies, Mr. Moore, Mr. Atherton
NSC—Mr. Saunders
Staff Director—Mr. Sober