478. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1

4831. 1. I paid call on King Faisal today to pay respects before departing on home leave. Told him while I knew his current view on Arab-Israel problem as he had outlined it during Ball-Sisco visit, I wondered if he might bring me up to date on his thinking on Yemen problem and his evaluation current Iraqi problem.

2. Yemen

Faisal recalled we had in past frequently discussed Yemen question. He expressed his regret that there has been no real change. He said in somewhat general terms that Yemeni republicans have sought to contact SAG to suggest Saudi “mediation” with Yemen royalists. He had sent reply that SAG is not a party to Yemen dispute and that republicans should work out solution directly with royalists. He dismissed [Page 878] what he called republican idea of accepting a few royalists in cabinet as insufficient. What is needed is a new conference between republicans and royalists to agree on principles of a settlement. In this context, while SAG has no desire impose Hamid ad-Dins on Yemenis, Hamid ad-Dins are Yemenis and should have same right to determine future of Yemen as do others.

3. I asked if he sensed any sign of movement between republicans and royalists to compose their differences. He said he did not. Republicans are divided between leftists and Amri-Iryani elements, which he called more moderate. Royalists also divided, but he contended their fissures not so severe. He did not know whether Tripartite Committee still extant. It has never been formally disbanded, yet seems quite moribund. Yemeni republicans are receiving considerable aid from Soviets, Chinese, UAR and Syrians. When I asked about alleged UAR aid to Yemen, he insisted UAR is still giving active help to republicans. Hence, Saudis are continuing to give royalists some aid. They are not giving as much as royalists would like, but it is keeping royalists going.

4. I indicated responses USG has been giving to occasional republican overtures to resume diplomatic relations. He said he thought this was wise and expressed hope that USG will use any such approaches to urge republicans work for national reconciliation conference. I said we had already spoken along these lines to republicans. He also thought US should give tangible support to royalists. I told him this was not in the cards, and that I doubted any US aid would be available even for a united Yemen.

[Here follows discussion of Iraq.]

Eilts
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD. Confidential; Limdis.