Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, December 20, 1967, 2301Z.

87479. Dhahran 419.²

1. Dept continuing watch Yemen situation closely, particularly evolution Soviet airlift of military assistance and any further indications combat involvement Soviet pilots. For present we planning restrict public comment to minimum level that may be required by new developments and resultant press interest here. Meanwhile, we will continue (without illusions) to give appropriate encouragement to efforts find political solution, including possible new activity by Arab Tripartite Committee.

2. As indicated State 84871,³ we have already flagged our interest in problem to Soviets. To provide additional signal to them of area concern, we are inclined believe might be desirable for Saudis discuss problem frankly with Egyptians. Accordingly, unless you perceive objection, you should approach senior SAG officials along following line.

3. While tactics obviously for SAG decide, it has occurred to us might be useful if Saudis were to make known to Egyptians their concern over recent indications increasing Soviet involvement in Yemen. We would think Saudis could well point out that UAR/SAG Khartoum agreement implemented in good faith by both parties but neither presumably desired simply replacement past arrangements with weak Sanaa regime dependent on Soviets for support. Egyptians and Saudis are prepared let difficult Yemen problem seek its own level, provided there no interference from outside, and Saudis remain prepared accept any regime worked out among Yemenis themselves. However, Saudis would hope UAR would agree that establishment firm non-Arab position in strategic Yemen region hardly bodes well for future of independent Arab states themselves. Saudis might conclude by raising with Egyptians possibility that latter might use their influence with Soviets to exercise moderation in involving selves further in Yemeni inter-tribal morass. (FYI. We aware UAR influence on USSR likely be small. However, our thought is UAR might get point that future SAG financial help could not be counted upon if spirit Khartoum understanding violated by Egypt’s Russian friends. Even if possible approach to Soviets not specifically raised, UAR still no doubt sufficiently aware implications Saudi concern that Egyptians might well be motivated to do what they could with Soviets in direction greater caution. End FYI.)⁴

4. For Tehran: We had hoped Iranians might be prevailed upon also flag their concern over Yemen developments to USSR. However, in light FonMin’s negative attitude on this point (para six Tehran’s 2552),⁵ we leave to your discretion whether specific approach now warranted.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on December 19; cleared by Battle, Country Director for Iran Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs Richard B. Parker, and MacCracken; and approved by Under Secretary Rostow. Repeated to Moscow, Tehran, London, and Cairo.
2. See footnote 2, Document 465.
3. Document 468.
4. In telegram 2190 from Jidda, December 23, the Ambassador reported that he presented the Department’s suggestion to Mas’ud that day, stressing that the U.S. Government was not suspending its efforts with the Soviets. Speaking personally, Mas’ud expressed his doubts about the U.S. proposal. He believed that recent Soviet activities in Yemen had been going on with UAR knowledge and approval, and doubted that Faisal would want to approach the UAR on this matter. Nevertheless, he undertook to convey the U.S. suggestion to the King immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
5. Dated December 16. (Ibid.)