461. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- The Situation in Yemen
Just a background word about Yemen since it provides a measure of Nasser’s and Faisal’s relative fortunes and of prospects for future Arab-Arab cohesiveness. Very simply, Nasser continues his pull-out, and the Yemeni Republican coup improved chances of an internal political settlement.
It’s still too early to tell whether the Yemenis are gong to be able to work out their problems and whether the Saudis and Egyptians will buy their solution, but prospects have improved.
The coup was led by moderates, some of whom were under house arrest in Cairo until recently. The coup leaders have so far succeeded in keeping the Republicans united, and opposition to the coup has been weak.
Because the new government isn’t pro-Nasser, it will deal more easily with those anti-Republican tribes which have been motivated primarily by anti-Egyptian rather than pro-Royalist sentiments. The coup leaders are already claiming some success in winning over these people, who contribute significantly to Royalist strength. One factor which could limit Republican ability to make progress with lukewarm [Page 852] Royalists, however, is the natural reluctance of the coup leaders to share their power with their potential allies.
The hard-line Royalists, as far as we can tell, still think they can win the civil war and haven’t yet shown any interest in negotiating. The cease-fire reported in the press this morning was a local deal around Sanaa, not a general arrangement involving all Royalists.
Both Egyptians and the Saudis are becoming less involved. Nasser is acting as if he has given up on controlling Yemen, although he clearly expects to have close relations. Over half the Egyptian troops have already been withdrawn, and plans still call for the remainder to leave by the end of the year. There’s some chance that the Saudis—who never liked the Yemeni Royal family—might decide that they can live with the Republican moderates. We have one report that Faisal has already suspended his financial support of the Royalists, but the Saudis are keeping their own counsel for the moment. Faisal would face a tough decision in cutting off those who have carried on the fight these five long years.
The coup may have been a temporary setback for the USSR since the coup leaders are basically “conservative” Republicans. However, the new crew, while somewhat more moderate, is not so much so as not to turn for help wherever it can be found. There will be a vacuum to exploit, and I see no signs of anyone else hurrying to fill it.
We aren’t rushing to pat the new fellows on the back. This time, we want to hold our blessings until we’re sure how completely the government represents all Yemen and how acceptable it is to the Saudis and Iranians. We also want to avoid a situation where the Yemenis ask us to pick up the bill the UAR may no longer pay. With relations suspended and us still smarting from ill-treatment even before the war, we are generally inclined to sit back. This makes the Communist-watchers jittery, but given our aid resources I can’t see our rushing in even if we thought it was wise before we are a lot surer of Saudi support for the new regime.
- Hal
- JWF
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Yemen, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Top Secret.↩