Office of the Historian

457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1

Washington, August 19, 1967, 1808Z.

24047. Ref: Jidda 631.2

1.
Department understands Saudi hesitancy regarding initiatives on Yemen which it fears may merely be clever UAR attempt gain respectability by submission proposal which not only sterile but also cloaks Egyptian intention to maintain its course toward objective of subservient Yemen. Department finds this interpretation plausible but does not necessarily share it.
2.
Saudi problem is complicated by encouragement from other Arab states. UAR proposals may appear to latter be sincere UAR offer to settle reasonably.
3.
If you should find opportunity, believe expression following observations may be useful reminder at this point:
(a)
Since other Arabs showing interest in expressing themselves on this Arab problem Saudis may find it useful to consider ways and means to invite other Arabs join in search for solution.
(b)
In any event, we presume Saudis sense they must take reasonably positive stance in response UAR gesture lest they find themselves unfavorably isolated on problem in which they vitally concerned.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by H. Eugene Bovis (NEA/UAR), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Dhahran, and USUN.↩
  2. In telegram 631 from Jidda, August 17, Eilts reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf had informed him that Saudi Arabia was under considerable Arab pressure to accept a UAR offer to revert to the Jidda Agreement. Saqqaf stated he had continued to make clear that the Jidda Agreement, which the United Arab Republic had scuttled, was no longer a valid basis for settlement of the Yemen problem. He said that his government was also unwilling to agree to establishment of a proposed three-man committee on the grounds that this would simply result in renewed Arab mediation and buy the United Arab Republic more time. (Ibid.)↩